A single-crystal source of path-polarization entangled photons at non-degenerate wavelengths

We demonstrate a bright, narrowband, compact, quasi-phase-matched single-crystal source generating path-polarization-entangled photon pairs at 810 nm and 1550 nm at a maximum rate of 3 Mcounts/(s THz mW) after coupling to single-mode fiber, and with two-photon interference visibility above 90%. While the source can already be used to implement quantum communication protocols such as quantum key distribution, this work is also instrumental for narrowband applications such as entanglement transfer from photonic to atomic qubits, or entanglement of photons from independent sources.Comment: 7 pages, 3 figures, published in Optics Express (2008

Quantum Eavesdropping without Interception: An Attack Exploiting the Dead Time of Single Photon Detectors

The security of quantum key distribution (QKD) can easily be obscured if the eavesdropper can utilize technical imperfections of the actual implementation. Here we describe and experimentally demonstrate a very simple but highly effective attack which even does not need to intercept the quantum channel at all. Only by exploiting the dead time effect of single photon detectors the eavesdropper is able to gain (asymptotically) full information about the generated keys without being detected by state-of-the-art QKD protocols. In our experiment, the eavesdropper inferred up to 98.8% of the key correctly, without increasing the bit error rate between Alice and Bob significantly. Yet, we find an evenly simple and effective countermeasure to inhibit this and similar attacks

Experimental demonstration of phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system

Unconditional security proofs of various quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols are built on idealized assumptions. One key assumption is: the sender (Alice) can prepare the required quantum states without errors. However, such an assumption may be violated in a practical QKD system. In this paper, we experimentally demonstrate a technically feasible "intercept-and-resend" attack that exploits such a security loophole in a commercial "plug & play" QKD system. The resulting quantum bit error rate is 19.7%, which is below the proven secure bound of 20.0% for the BB84 protocol. The attack we utilize is the phase-remapping attack (C.-H. F. Fung, et al., Phys. Rev. A, 75, 32314, 2007) proposed by our group.Comment: 16 pages, 6 figure

Controlling passively-quenched single photon detectors by bright light

Single photon detectors based on passively-quenched avalanche photodiodes can be temporarily blinded by relatively bright light, of intensity less than a nanowatt. I describe a bright-light regime suitable for attacking a quantum key distribution system containing such detectors. In this regime, all single photon detectors in the receiver Bob are uniformly blinded by continuous illumination coming from the eavesdropper Eve. When Eve needs a certain detector in Bob to produce a click, she modifies polarization (or other parameter used to encode quantum states) of the light she sends to Bob such that the target detector stops receiving light while the other detector(s) continue to be illuminated. The target detector regains single photon sensitivity and, when Eve modifies the polarization again, produces a single click. Thus, Eve has full control of Bob and can do a successful intercept-resend attack. To check the feasibility of the attack, 3 different models of passively-quenched detectors have been tested. In the experiment, I have simulated the intensity diagrams the detectors would receive in a real quantum key distribution system under attack. Control parameters and side effects are considered. It appears that the attack could be practically possible.Comment: Experimental results from a third detector model added. Minor corrections and edits made. 11 pages, 10 figure

Discovery of the Binary Pulsar PSR B1259-63 in Very-High-Energy Gamma Rays around Periastron with H.E.S.S

We report the discovery of very-high-energy (VHE) gamma-ray emission of the binary system PSR B1259-63/SS 2883 of a radio pulsar orbiting a massive, luminous Be star in a highly eccentric orbit. The observations around the 2004 periastron passage of the pulsar were performed with the four 13 m Cherenkov telescopes of the H.E.S.S. experiment, recently installed in Namibia and in full operation since December 2003. Between February and June 2004, a gamma-ray signal from the binary system was detected with a total significance above 13 sigma. The flux was found to vary significantly on timescales of days which makes PSR B1259-63 the first variable galactic source of VHE gamma-rays observed so far. Strong emission signals were observed in pre- and post-periastron phases with a flux minimum around periastron, followed by a gradual flux decrease in the months after. The measured time-averaged energy spectrum above a mean threshold energy of 380 GeV can be fitted by a simple power law F_0(E/1 TeV)^-Gamma with a photon index Gamma = 2.7+-0.2_stat+-0.2_sys and flux normalisation F_0 = (1.3+-0.1_stat+-0.3_sys) 10^-12 TeV^-1 cm^-2 s^-1. This detection of VHE gamma-rays provides unambiguous evidence for particle acceleration to multi-TeV energies in the binary system. In combination with coeval observations of the X-ray synchrotron emission by the RXTE and INTEGRAL instruments, and assuming the VHE gamma-ray emission to be produced by the inverse Compton mechanism, the magnetic field strength can be directly estimated to be of the order of 1 G.Comment: 10 pages, 8 figures, accepted in Astronomy and Astrophysics on 2 June 2005, replace: document unchanged, replaced author field in astro-ph entry - authors are all members of the H.E.S.S. collaboration and three additional authors (99+3, see document

Information theoretic security by the laws of classical physics

It has been shown recently that the use of two pairs of resistors with enhanced Johnson-noise and a Kirchhoff-loop-i.e., a Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) protocol-for secure key distribution leads to information theoretic security levels superior to those of a quantum key distribution, including a natural immunity against a man-in-the-middle attack. This issue is becoming particularly timely because of the recent full cracks of practical quantum communicators, as shown in numerous peer-reviewed publications. This presentation first briefly surveys the KLJN system and then discusses related, essential questions such as: what are perfect and imperfect security characteristics of key distribution, and how can these two types of securities be unconditional (or information theoretical)? Finally the presentation contains a live demonstration.Comment: Featured in MIT Technology Review http://www.technologyreview.com/view/428202/quantum-cryptography-outperformed-by-classical/ ; Plenary talk at the 5th IEEE Workshop on Soft Computing Applications, August 22-24, 2012, (SOFA 2012). Typos correcte

Heavy Metal Tolerance in Stenotrophomonas maltophilia

Stenotrophomonas maltophilia is an aerobic, non-fermentative Gram-negative bacterium widespread in the environment. S. maltophilia Sm777 exhibits innate resistance to multiple antimicrobial agents. Furthermore, this bacterium tolerates high levels (0.1 to 50 mM) of various toxic metals, such as Cd, Pb, Co, Zn, Hg, Ag, selenite, tellurite and uranyl. S. maltophilia Sm777 was able to grow in the presence of 50 mM selenite and 25 mM tellurite and to reduce them to elemental selenium (Se0) and tellurium (Te0) respectively. Transmission electron microscopy and energy dispersive X-ray analysis showed cytoplasmic nanometer-sized electron-dense Se0 granules and Te0 crystals. Moreover, this bacterium can withstand up to 2 mM CdCl2 and accumulate this metal up to 4% of its biomass. The analysis of soluble thiols in response to ten different metals showed eightfold increase of the intracellular pool of cysteine only in response to cadmium. Measurements by Cd K-edge EXAFS spectroscopy indicated the formation of Cd-S clusters in strain Sm777. Cysteine is likely to be involved in Cd tolerance and in CdS-clusters formation. Our data suggest that besides high tolerance to antibiotics by efflux mechanisms, S. maltophilia Sm777 has developed at least two different mechanisms to overcome metal toxicity, reduction of oxyanions to non-toxic elemental ions and detoxification of Cd into CdS

Critical analysis of the Bennett-Riedel attack on secure cryptographic key distributions via the Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise scheme

Recently, Bennett and Riedel (BR) (http://arxiv.org/abs/1303.7435v1) argued that thermodynamics is not essential in the Kirchhoff-law–Johnson-noise (KLJN) classical physical cryptographic exchange method in an effort to disprove the security of the KLJN scheme. They attempted to demonstrate this by introducing a dissipation-free deterministic key exchange method with two batteries and two switches. In the present paper, we first show that BR's scheme is unphysical and that some elements of its assumptions violate basic protocols of secure communication. All our analyses are based on a technically unlimited Eve with infinitely accurate and fast measurements limited only by the laws of physics and statistics. For non-ideal situations and at active (invasive) attacks, the uncertainly principle between measurement duration and statistical errors makes it impossible for Eve to extract the key regardless of the accuracy or speed of her measurements. To show that thermodynamics and noise are essential for the security, we crack the BR system with 100% success via passive attacks, in ten different ways, and demonstrate that the same cracking methods do not function for the KLJN scheme that employs Johnson noise to provide security underpinned by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. We also present a critical analysis of some other claims by BR; for example, we prove that their equations for describing zero security do not apply to the KLJN scheme. Finally we give mathematical security proofs for each BR-attack against the KLJN scheme and conclude that the information theoretic (unconditional) security of the KLJN method has not been successfully challenged.Laszlo B. Kish, Derek Abbott, Claes G. Granqvis