Aristotle on the Essence of Human Thought

This book is concerned with Aristotle’s definition of the human capacity for rational thinking (nous) offered in De anima. For Aristotle, nous is the principle, and ultimate explanans, of all the phenomena of human thinking. The book presents an in-depth interpretation of De anima III 4–8 as a single and coherent philosophical argument. More specifically, the book argues for the following views: (i) Rationalism. Humans come to know the world via two fundamentally different cognitive powers: nous and perception. They are fundamentally different cognitive powers because the nature of their corresponding object is fundamentally different; (ii) Essentialism. The human power for thinking is defined as a capacity for directly grasping the essences of everything there is, including itself. It is this very capacity that Aristotle shows to be the principle of all other kinds of human thinking. (iii) Separatism. Human nous is unmixed with the body, has no dedicated bodily organ, and is separable from the body. As a result, it cannot be assimilated to any of the other parts of the soul. While nous belongs to our essence as human beings, it is not part of the natural world; (iv) Embeddedness in the cognitive soul. Human nous is embedded in a cognitive soul. Among other things, this means that the distinctive activity of human nous—thinking—can only take place in the context of a larger set of activities which are common to the body and the soul

Soul's Tools

This paper explores the various ways Aristotle refers to and employs “heat and cold” in his embryology. In my view, scholars are too quick to assume that references to heat and cold are references to matter or an animal’s material nature. More commonly, I argue, Aristotle refers to heat and cold as the “tools” of soul. As I understand it, Aristotle is thinking of heat and cold in many contexts as auxiliary causes by which soul activities (primarily “concoction”) are carried out. This, as I argue, is what it means to call them “tools” of soul. An upshot of this investigation is the fuller picture of Aristotle’s conception of efficient causation it provides in general, and the better understanding of the efficient causal operation of an organism’s nature or soul it provides in particular

THEMISTIUS AGAINST PORPHYRY (?) ON ‘WHY WE DO NOT REMEMBER’

AbstractThis article sheds new light on Themistius’ argument in what is philosophically the most original (and historically the most influential) section of his extant work, namely On Aristotle's On the Soul 100.16–109.3: here, Themistius offers a systematic interpretation of Aristotle's ‘agent’ intellect and its ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ counterparts. A solution to two textual difficulties at 101.36–102.2 is proposed, supported by the Arabic translation. This allows us to see that Themistius engages at length with a Platonizing reading of the enigmatic final lines of De anima III.5, where Aristotle explains ‘why we do not remember’ (without specifying when and what). This Platonizing reading (probably inspired by Aristotle's early dialogue Eudemus) can be safely identified with the one developed in a fragmentary text extant only in Arabic under the title Porphyry's treatise On the soul. While Themistius rejects this reading, he turns out to be heavily influenced by the author's interpretation of the ‘agent’, ‘potential’ and ‘passive’ intellect. These findings offer us a new glimpse into Themistius’ philosophical programme: he is searching for an alternative to both the austere (and, by Themistius’ lights, distorted) Aristotelianism of Alexander of Aphrodisias and the all too Platonizing reading of Aristotle adopted by thinkers such as Porphyry.</jats:p

Two perspectives of language in Nietzsche's early thinking

This article presents the early Nietzsche's work from 1856-73, which is placed here into context of its plentiful reception in the eighties and nineties and from which it offers czech translations of some important texts. The first chapter shows how in the connection with autobiographical notes from 1856-65 the theme of language enters into Nietzsche's thinking, namely as a milieu able to let some moments of past endure. In the second chapter it is in particular in confrontation with Schopenhauer, but also on the background of Langes and Hartmanns works, demonstrated how the concept of music articulates itself in Nietzsche's notes from 1869-71. It becomes clear that Nietzsche's music, which unhides the process of becoming, the mode of succession (Aufeinander), through which everything passes without regard on its quality and which is specified in oposition to language displaying everything in the mode of coexistence (Nebeneinander), thus as ideas, representations, symbols, that this music represents together with its counterpart in language a pair of concepts much more general than are the usual concepts of language and music. Language and music are two respects of symbolic system, into which we have always already entered. In the third chapter breakdown of Nietzsche's conception of culture is firstly..

Unqualified Change in Aristotle's Natural Philosophy

We start with the question, whether and in how far the distinction between "unqualified" and "qualified" predication of change (i.e. predication of "coming to be" and of "becoming") provides a sound clue for understanding of reality. Firstly, we focus on methodological assumptions of Aristotle's natural philosophy and science, namely on their relation to everyday language. In the next step we ask, whether and how the general conclusions about the character of any change made in Physics are valid also for any change (i.e. for "qualified" and "unqualified" change) separately. Last two chapters, then, are concerned with some consequences of Aristotle's endeavor to make justice to everyday distinction of "unqualified" and "qualified" changes for his conception of nature, namely with the character of matter and the circularity of change

Trojan Destinies (τυγχάνω and τεύχω in the oldest Greek epos)

The aim of this study is to introduce the idea of fate present in Homer's Iliad. By "idea" is meant what gives the unity to apparently incoherent views (1) of fate as death and life's content; (2) of fate as a given lot and a power; (3) of fate as what is shaped by men, and what meets them. This triple polarity of meaning is explored on two levels: (a) the level of construction of the epic (how the fates are represented in the poem) and (b) the level of the Homeric expressions for fate (how the characters and the narrator talk about it). Both subjects have been treated many times and from various perspectives in the existing secondary literature. That's why this study does in neither case aim at an exhausting analysis. As for the construction of the epic, it focuses on the role played in its structure by decision, and especially on how the various decisions of different characters are integrated into the unity of narration. Among the expressions that are standardly envisaged it treats in some detail only the two most important, i.e. μοῖρα and αἶσα, although at the same time it considers also two verbs, τεύχω and τυγχάνω , to which the due attention has not yet been paid. Exploiting the results of formal-literary studies of the last decades this study returns back to a question formulated in the..

Trojan Destinies (τυγχάνω and τεύχω in the oldest Greek epos)

The aim of this study is to introduce the idea of fate present in Homer's Iliad. By "idea" is meant what gives the unity to apparently incoherent views (1) of fate as death and life's content; (2) of fate as a given lot and a power; (3) of fate as what is shaped by men, and what meets them. This triple polarity of meaning is explored on two levels: (a) the level of construction of the epic (how the fates are represented in the poem) and (b) the level of the Homeric expressions for fate (how the characters and the narrator talk about it). Both subjects have been treated many times and from various perspectives in the existing secondary literature. That's why this study does in neither case aim at an exhausting analysis. As for the construction of the epic, it focuses on the role played in its structure by decision, and especially on how the various decisions of different characters are integrated into the unity of narration. Among the expressions that are standardly envisaged it treats in some detail only the two most important, i.e. μοῖρα and αἶσα, although at the same time it considers also two verbs, τεύχω and τυγχάνω , to which the due attention has not yet been paid. Exploiting the results of formal-literary studies of the last decades this study returns back to a question formulated in the..