Regulation of Artificial Intelligence in Selected Jurisdictions

Comparative Summary This report examines the emerging regulatory and policy landscape surrounding artificial intelligence (AI) in jurisdictions around the world and in the European Union (EU). In addition, a survey of international organizations describes the approach that United Nations (UN) agencies and regional organizations have taken towards AI. As the regulation of AI is still in its infancy, guidelines, ethics codes, and actions by and statements from governments and their agencies on AI are also addressed. While the country surveys look at various legal issues, including data protection and privacy, transparency, human oversight, surveillance, public administration and services, autonomous vehicles, and lethal autonomous weapons systems, the most advanced regulations were found in the area of autonomous vehicles, in particular for the testing of such vehicles. The Oxford Dictionary defines AI as “the theory and development of computer systems able to perform tasks normally requiring human intelligence, such as visual perception, speech recognition, decision-making, and translation between languages.” The majority of surveyed jurisdictions see AI in a positive light and aspire to become leaders in the field. Many countries have therefore developed or are in the process of developing national AI or digital strategies and action plans. Canada was the first country to launch such a national AI strategy in 2017. The strategies and action plans highlight, among others things, the need to develop ethical and legal frameworks to ensure that AI is developed and applied based on the country’s values and fundamental rights. Many countries have established specific commissions to look into these issues. However, with the exception of the EU, no jurisdiction has yet published such specific ethical or legal frameworks for AI. In December 2018, an expert group of the European Commission released draft AI ethics guidelines that set out a framework for designing trustworthy AI. South Korea in 2008 enacted a general law on the “intelligent robot industry” that, among other things, authorized the government to enact and promulgate a charter on intelligent robot ethics. However, it appears that no such charter has yet been enacted. Some countries have taken the first steps to use AI in the area of justice. In Portugal, a legal assistance tool will be launched that conducts research on the requests made and learns from them. In the future, it might be used to predict the probability of success of a judicial process. Likewise, in France the Courts of Appeals of Rennes and Douai tested predictive justice software on various appeals cases in 2017. Many of the surveyed countries are contracting parties to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Traffic, an international agreement with the objective to “facilitate international road traffic and to increase road safety through the adoption of uniform traffic rules.” A 2016 amendment to the Convention on Road Traffic removed legal obstacles for the contracting parties to allow transferring driving tasks to automated technologies. Countries that have enacted regulations to allow for the testing of autonomous vehicles on public roads generally require that a human driver be present in the car who can take over the driving functions if necessary. As an exception, the Netherlands and Lithuania have passed legislation that allows the experimental use of self-driving vehicles without a human driver present in the car on public roads. Israel passed a regulation and a directive for experimentation in autonomous vehicles. Authorization to conduct experiments in autonomous vehicles requires, among others, a review by a professional committee. Spain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates authorize the testing without a human driver present on a case-by-case basis, but have not enacted specific legislation. New Zealand, unlike other countries, has no specific legal requirement for vehicles to have drivers. However, the government has not received any formal requests to test autonomous vehicles on public roads. In Singapore and the Province of Ontario, Canada, it is up to the discretion of the responsible authority to approve driverless testing. Other testing requirements for autonomous vehicles may include insurance, the transmission of certain data to the government, or accident recorders in the vehicle. Finland allows the testing of autonomous vehicles, but one political party has suggested forbidding nonautonomous vehicles as a long-term goal. With regard to lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), countries regularly meet in the Governmental Group of Experts (GGE) of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) to discuss the applicability of international humanitarian law norms to LAWS. The majority of countries agree that meaningful human control is necessary for LAWS. Countries either support the adoption of a new, legally-binding treaty to ban the use of LAWS; support the adoption of a political declaration as a middle ground to develop a shared understanding of the challenges posed by LAWS; oppose the adoption of a treaty as basic principles remain ill-defined; or think that no action is necessary at this point. The following visuals give an overview of the different positions and actions that countries have taken with regard to national AI strategies and actions plans, autonomous vehicles, and LAWS

Initiatives to Counter Fake News in Selected Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Russia, Sweden, United Kingdom

Comparative Summary by Peter Roudik, Director of Legal Research This report examines the legal approaches of fifteen countries, representing all regions of the world, to the emerging problem of manipulation with “fake news” using mass and social media, especially the impact of fake news on ongoing political processes and elections, and the legislative measures undertaken to counteract the dissemination of false information. Fake news as a phenomenon is not new and has been known since ancient times, but the present-day proliferation of digital and social media platforms, which allow for much broader distribution of information to a global audience, makes the need to counter fake news much more acute. With the exception of Japan, which appears to be the only country in this study where fake news scandals are limited to newspapers and tweeted messages that have no outside influence, a fact explained by the difficulty of the Japanese language for foreigners, the widespread distribution of false information and its impact on decision making and democratic processes is becoming a challenge worldwide. In 2017, a parliamentary committee in Egypt identified the dissemination of 53,000 false rumors over a period of two months. In Germany, 59% of survey participants stated that they had encountered fake news, and in some segments of the population this number was up to almost 80%. In Kenya, a country where 90% of the population has access to high-speed internet, 90% of surveyed users said that they received false or inaccurate information regarding the recent elections through social media. The countries included in this study are addressing the fake news problem through one or more of the following four approaches: • In the absence of legislation that expressly addresses the objectivity of news posted on social media, some of the surveyed countries apply relevant provisions of existing civil, criminal, administrative, and other laws regulating the media, elections, and anti-defamation (Canada, Japan, Nicaragua, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), even though these laws, enacted in the pre-internet era, do not always reflect current technological and telecommunications developments. • Others are choosing to enact new and more focused legislation that imposes sanctions on social media networks that spread false news, usually imposing fines and ordering the removal of information identified as false (China, Egypt, France, Germany, Israel, Malaysia, and Russia). In Malaysia and Egypt these provisions apply extraterritorially. • Another option reflected in the country surveys is to engage election authorities and digital platforms to secure a well-informed electorate, either by identifying and blocking fake news, providing fact-checking resources for the general public, or through the mass publication of “real” news during election season and beyond (Argentina, the UK, China, and Malaysia). Argentina, for example, is considering legislation that would create a Commission for the Verification of Fake News within the National Election Chamber. During national election campaigns, the Commission would recognize, label, and prevent the distribution of news considered “of doubtful credibility.” Both the UK and China have programs in place to systematically rebut fake news by publishing reliable information, while Malaysia provides a fact-checking portal. • Some of the countries are also addressing the issue in a more general way by educating citizens about the dangers of fake news (Sweden and Kenya). Sweden starts at a young age, having enlisted a famous cartoon character to teach children about the dangers of fake news through a cartoon strip that illustrates what happens to the bear’s super-strength when false rumors are circulated about him. The US Embassy in Kenya launched a media literacy campaign in 2018, initially aimed at the Kenya chapter of the Young African Leaders Initiative, with the specific goal of stopping the dissemination of fake news. Among the countries surveyed, there is no common position regarding the definition of “fake news” and its scope. The UK government attempts to avoid use of the term altogether, instead using the words “disinformation” and “misinformation.” Countries with established anti-fake news laws have more elaborate terminology. Malaysian legislation defines fake news as “any news, information, data and reports, which is or are wholly or partly false, whether in the form of features, visuals or audio recordings or in any other form capable of suggesting words or ideas.” Russia passed a law penalizing the publication of fake news in March 2019, defining the term as “socially-significant false information distributed under the guise of truthful messages if they create a threat of endangering people’s lives, health, or property; create possibilities for mass violations of public order or public security; or may hinder the work of transportation and social infrastructure, credit institutions, lines of communications, industry, and energy enterprises.” China has made it a crime to “fabricate false information on [a] dangerous situation, epidemic, disaster or alert and disseminate such information via [an] information network or any other media while clearly knowing that it is fabricated, thereby seriously disturbing public order.” Relying on the 1881 Freedom of the Press Law, France has made it illegal to “disturb public peace through the publication, dissemination, or reproduction of fake news in bad faith.” The bad-faith publication, dissemination, or reproduction of forged or altered items, or items falsely attributed to third parties, is also prohibited. Broad definitions are usually found in the laws of those countries that are rated low in indices related to freedom of speech, and such laws are often viewed by human rights organizations as government attempts to further restrict free speech and stifle opposition. The new Malaysian government tried unsuccessfully to repeal a 2018 act under which the government is required to “take measures to remove” the publication of recognized false information and imprison the publisher for up to six years. In Canada and Kenya courts have found anti-fake news provisions unconstitutional as a violation of freedom of expression and have thus suspended the implementation of such provisions. Following the events of the United States 2016 election campaign, several countries introduced legal mechanisms aimed at protecting the integrity of the democratic process, although depending on country specifics these laws apply to varied actors. In Sweden, the focus was on self-regulation by professional organizations of journalists and other media providers and strengthening ethics rules. This solution followed the European Union’s approach where an EU-wide voluntary Code of Practice on Disinformation has been introduced. However, in view of the inadequacy of voluntary measures taken by social media platforms, Germany enacted the Network Enforcement Act in 2017. While this Act does not create new obligations for social media, it The Law Library of Congress 3 Initiatives to Counter Fake News: Comparative Summary imposes heavy fines for noncompliance with existing legislation and creates rules for the investigation and removal of illegal content hosted by networks with a very large number of registered users. French law also provides for special preventive measures that need to be implemented by operators of large-scale online platforms. Russian law distinguishes between news published by online media, news aggregators, and individual social network users. There are specific rules for the removal of information and the liability of authors, publishers, and internet providers depending on the type of the online platform. Some countries are also taking steps to prevent foreign influence in their national elections. Interesting examples include an Israeli bill targeting foreign propaganda that, if passed, would allow the head of the Central Election Commission, who serves as a Supreme Court justice, to issue injunctions preventing the receipt of prohibited donations, monetary or otherwise, under current law. Under French law, a judge may order any measures necessary to stop the online dissemination of misleading information during the three months preceding an election. During the same period, foreign television broadcasts may be suspended if they deliver false information. The governments of several countries included in this report recognize that a substantive response to disinformation could be an effective way to tackle fake news. The British government’s position is that it is more important to inform citizens of the facts than to simply rebut false information. For this purpose, a Rapid Response Unit within the executive branch monitors news and engages with the public online. In China, a government online platform called “Refuting Rumors” was launched to broadcast “real” news sourced from government agencies and state-owned media. A similar web portal allowing the public to check the authenticity of news found online has been established in Malaysia. In addition, Kenya and Sweden have general education campaigns aimed at young people in place to counter the fake news trend, as noted above. The individual country surveys that follow analyze current and proposed initiatives to limit the spread of false information undertaken at the national level, each country’s challenges associated with these efforts, and efforts undertaken by national governments to secure the validity and accuracy of legal information

Toward large tubular helices based on the polymerization of tri(benzamide)s

Herein we present the synthesis and polycondensation of mono- and di-N-protected, bis-substituted tri(benzamide)s with the aim to create large, tubular helices. We synthesized 2,4-dimethoxy and 2,5-bis-TEGylated aminobenzoic acid derivatives as bent and linear monomers and introduced p-methoxybenzyl (PMB) amide protecting groups to the oligobenzamide backbone. An iterative coupling strategy allowed for sequence control, giving rise to oligomers consisting of one bent and two linear monomers. The resulting meta-para-para-linked aromatic trimers carried either one or two PMB-protecting groups. With high organosolubility and flexibility, this synthetic strategy generated suitable precursors for subsequent polycondensation reactions. After polymerization, treatment with acid triggered the cleavage of the N-protecting groups. We hypothesize that the hydrogen bonding pattern generated along the polyaramide backbone could lead to the formation of a helical polymer. A drastic change in hydrodynamic volume was observed by gel permeation chromatography and dissolution in a chiral solvent lead to the observation of a circular dichroism signal for this polymer. The results of the polycondensations of N-protected oligobenzamides are reported herein. The formation of macrocycles as well as polymers could also be observed, giving a highly interesting insight into the underlying mechanism of the polycondensation of flexible, oligobenzamide-based oligomer

Evaluation of Interferon-Gamma Release Assays in the Diagnosis of Recent Tuberculosis Infection in Health Care Workers

BACKGROUND:Health care workers (HCWs) are a group at risk of latent tuberculosis infection (LTBI). The aims of this study were to determine IFN-gamma response by QuantiFERON-TB GOLD In Tube (QFN-G-IT) and T-SPOT.TB in HCWs, comparing the results with tuberculin skin test (TST); and to analyze the capacity of IFN-gamma tests to detect recent versus remote LTBI with a prolonged stimulation test (PST). METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS:A total of 147 HCWs were enrolled; 23 of whom were BCG vaccinated. 95 HCWs (64.6%) had a previous positive TST and were not retested; and 52 HCWs had a previous negative TST or were tested for the first time. When we analysed individuals without previous positive TST, the number of positive results for T-SPOT.TB was 12/52 (23.1%); and for QFN-G-IT, 9/52 (17.3%). The global concordance (kappa) between T-SPOT.TB and QFN-G-IT with TST was 0.754 and 0.929 respectively. Of individuals with previous positive TST, T-SPOT.TB and QFN-G-IT were negative in 51.6% (49/95) and 62.1% (59/95) respectively, decreasing the concordance to 0.321 and 0.288, respectively. In non-BCG vaccinated HCWs with previous positive TST a positive IFN-gamma test was associated with degree of exposure and diameter of TST. PST was performed in 24 HCW with previous positive TST and negative IFN-gamma tests. PST was developed in 3 cell cultures stimulated with medium alone, ESAT-6 and CFP-10, respectively. In the third and sixth day of incubation period, part of the supernatants were replaced with complete medium supplemented with (rIL)-2. On day 9, ELISPOT assay was performed. In 14 samples PST was not valid due to not having enough cells. In 8 cases, the response was negative, and in 2 cases positive, suggesting that these patients were infected with Mycobacterium tuberculosis in some point in the past. CONCLUSIONS:Both IFN-gamma tests showed a similar number of positive results, and concordance between the tests was excellent. None of the tests was affected by prior BCG vaccination. IFN-gamma tests are a useful tool for detecting recent infection in HCW population

A genome scan for milk production traits in dairy goats reveals two new mutations in <i>Dgat1</i> reducing milk fat content

The quantity of milk and milk fat and proteins are particularly important traits in dairy livestock. However, little is known about the regions of the genome that influence these traits in goats. We conducted a genome wide association study in French goats and identified 109 regions associated with dairy traits. For a major region on chromosome 14 closely associated with fat content, the Diacylglycerol O-Acyltransferase 1 (DGAT1) gene turned out to be a functional and positional candidate gene. The caprine reference sequence of this gene was completed and 29 polymorphisms were found in the gene sequence, including two novel exonic mutations: R251L and R396W, leading to substitutions in the protein sequence. The R251L mutation was found in the Saanen breed at a frequency of 3.5% and the R396W mutation both in the Saanen and Alpine breeds at a frequencies of 13% and 7% respectively. The R396W mutation explained 46% of the genetic variance of the trait, and the R251L mutation 6%. Both mutations were associated with a notable decrease in milk fat content. Their causality was then demonstrated by a functional test. These results provide new knowledge on the genetic basis of milk synthesis and will help improve the management of the French dairy goat breeding program

The gut microbial metabolite formate exacerbates colorectal cancer progression

The gut microbiome is a key player in the immunomodulatory and protumorigenic microenvironment during colorectal cancer (CRC), as different gut-derived bacteria can induce tumour growth. However, the crosstalk between the gut microbiome and the host in relation to tumour cell metabolism remains largely unexplored. Here we show that formate, a metabolite produced by the CRC-associated bacterium Fusobacterium nucleatum, promotes CRC development. We describe molecular signatures linking CRC phenotypes with Fusobacterium abundance. Cocultures of F. nucleatum with patient-derived CRC cells display protumorigenic effects, along with a metabolic shift towards increased formate secretion and cancer glutamine metabolism. We further show that microbiome-derived formate drives CRC tumour invasion by triggering AhR signalling, while increasing cancer stemness. Finally, F. nucleatum or formate treatment in mice leads to increased tumour incidence or size, and Th17 cell expansion, which can favour proinflammatory profiles. Moving beyond observational studies, we identify formate as a gut-derived oncometabolite that is relevant for CRC progression

Overview of JET results for optimising ITER operation

The JET 2019–2020 scientific and technological programme exploited the results of years of concerted scientific and engineering work, including the ITER-like wall (ILW: Be wall and W divertor) installed in 2010, improved diagnostic capabilities now fully available, a major neutral beam injection upgrade providing record power in 2019–2020, and tested the technical and procedural preparation for safe operation with tritium. Research along three complementary axes yielded a wealth of new results. Firstly, the JET plasma programme delivered scenarios suitable for high fusion power and alpha particle (α) physics in the coming D–T campaign (DTE2), with record sustained neutron rates, as well as plasmas for clarifying the impact of isotope mass on plasma core, edge and plasma-wall interactions, and for ITER pre-fusion power operation. The efficacy of the newly installed shattered pellet injector for mitigating disruption forces and runaway electrons was demonstrated. Secondly, research on the consequences of long-term exposure to JET-ILW plasma was completed, with emphasis on wall damage and fuel retention, and with analyses of wall materials and dust particles that will help validate assumptions and codes for design and operation of ITER and DEMO. Thirdly, the nuclear technology programme aiming to deliver maximum technological return from operations in D, T and D–T benefited from the highest D–D neutron yield in years, securing results for validating radiation transport and activation codes, and nuclear data for ITER

Gender differences in the use of cardiovascular interventions in HIV-positive persons; the D:A:D Study

Peer reviewe

Overview of JET results for optimising ITER operation

The JET 2019–2020 scientific and technological programme exploited the results of years of concerted scientific and engineering work, including the ITER-like wall (ILW: Be wall and W divertor) installed in 2010, improved diagnostic capabilities now fully available, a major neutral beam injection upgrade providing record power in 2019–2020, and tested the technical and procedural preparation for safe operation with tritium. Research along three complementary axes yielded a wealth of new results. Firstly, the JET plasma programme delivered scenarios suitable for high fusion power and alpha particle (α) physics in the coming D–T campaign (DTE2), with record sustained neutron rates, as well as plasmas for clarifying the impact of isotope mass on plasma core, edge and plasma-wall interactions, and for ITER pre-fusion power operation. The efficacy of the newly installed shattered pellet injector for mitigating disruption forces and runaway electrons was demonstrated. Secondly, research on the consequences of long-term exposure to JET-ILW plasma was completed, with emphasis on wall damage and fuel retention, and with analyses of wall materials and dust particles that will help validate assumptions and codes for design and operation of ITER and DEMO. Thirdly, the nuclear technology programme aiming to deliver maximum technological return from operations in D, T and D–T benefited from the highest D–D neutron yield in years, securing results for validating radiation transport and activation codes, and nuclear data for ITER