Revealing schemes: the politics of conspiracy in Russia and the post-Soviet region

What motivates governments and other political actors to promote conspiracy theories? And what impact do these theories have on society? Drawing on a new book covering Russia and the post-Soviet region, Scott Radnitz explores the causes, consequences, and contradictions of conspiracism in politics

It takes more than a village : mobilization, networks, and the state in Central Asia

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Political Science, February 2007.Includes bibliographical references (p. [234]-[252]).This dissertation develops and demonstrates a theory to account for the outbreak of mass mobilization in authoritarian settings. Two conditions make the expansion of protest across community boundaries more likely: (1) low levels of public goods, coupled with (2) economic opportunities that allow elites autonomous from the state to earn revenue. Under regimes where the rule of law is weak, non-state elites have an incentive to protect their assets from state predation by developing a social support base. They do this by making symbolic gestures and providing surrogate public goods to communities. If the regime threatens to harm this relationship, by restricting elites' freedoms or denying them access to resources, top-down mobilization is one of the few means available to advance or defend their position. Elites base their appeal on shared local identity and the material benefit that people derive from elite charity. The ultimate scale of mobilization is determined by the number and geographic dispersion of elites who mobilize locally and then unite their protests.(cont.) Three mechanisms may be activated to expand mobilization beyond the local level: demonstration, in which people receive information of an event through an impersonal medium and emulate other people's actions by analogy to their own situation; diffusion, or direct contact between actors connected by strong social ties; and brokerage, or mediation between groups by a small number of well-connected individuals. I argue that only if diffusion and brokerage are activated in concert can an incipient movement overcome gaps between (1) elites and masses and (2) different communities (or regions). I demonstrate my theory by comparing Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, then analyzing two cases of mass mobilization within Kyrgyzstan-one of regional scale and one national. In both cases, I illustrate the centrality of vertical networks in bringing about mobilization, and trace how both brokerage and diffusion were activated to expand mobilization from local to regional or national scale. I then test the theory on cases outside the region. The dissertation contributes to the comparative politics literature on contentious politics, the breakdown of authoritarian regimes, and the effect of Soviet legacies on state and society.by Scott Radnitz.Ph.D

Mirroring Opposition Threats

Hugo Chávez and his Bolivarian Movement came to power in 1999 promising to refound the Venezuelan state and restructure the polity in ways that would build “popular power” through the promotion of grassroots participation, organization, and mobilization. Once in office, the Bolivarian forces launched a series of initiatives to sponsor organization and mobilization among supporters, which ranged widely in their functions and strategic purpose. State-mobilized organizations can be seen as operating in three different arenas of politics: the local governance arena; the electoral arena; and the protest arena. From an ideological standpoint, the Bolivarian Movement was oriented toward sponsoring organizations that could operate in the first of these arenas, helping realize Chávez’s vision of constructing a “protagonistic democracy” by establishing vehicles for citizen participation in local governance. In the terminology of this volume, these activities are best seen as a form of “infrastructural mobilization,” working to solidify political support and achieve the government’s longer-term aims

Justice, power and informal settlements: Understanding the juridical view of property rights in Central Asia

The article examines how judges and lawyers struggle to legitimise and normalise private property rights against attempts by poor and migrant groups to politicise housing and social needs in Central Asia. It will discuss the juridical understanding of justice and equality in relation to property rights violations on the outskirts of major cities in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. It will argue that the juridical system is central in construing property rights and obligations, and in so doing social inequalities are legitimised and naturalised in a neoliberalising post-Soviet space. The article uses the concepts of 'the moral economy' and 'the juridical field' to examine how judges and lawyers justify and normalise their ways of interpreting and ordering the social world

The Origins of Social Capital Evidence From a Survey of Post-Soviet Central Asia

This article investigates the determinants of social capital by analyzing an original survey of post-Soviet Central Asia. It tests hypotheses derived from two related questions: whether networks, norms, and trust are empirically related and the extent to which four factors—culture, regime type, perceptions of government responsiveness, and development interventions—predict levels of social capital. The results show that trust and norms diverge from networking. Interaction is higher under less repressive regimes and is further increased by development interventions; trust and norms are higher under conditions of greater repression. Culture does not affect any indicators of social capital, but perceptions of responsiveness correlate with higher levels of trust. As such, disaggregating social capital is a promising new direction for research. Scholars should investigate why the components of social capital sometimes correlate but at other times diverge, and they should consider the possibility of distinct causal mechanisms in their development

Ideological and Conspiratorial Underpinnings of Russia’s War against Ukraine

This issue deals with the ideological and conspiratorial underpinnings of Russia’s war against Ukraine. Using data from the Survey of Russian Elites 1993-2020, Sharon Rivera highlights attitudinal similarities and differences between Putin and the broader elite. Julian Waller illustrates the comprehensive use of illiberal rhetoric by the Russian elite. Scott Radnitz explains the role conspiratorial propaganda has played in the war, highlighting the Kremlin’s aims of persuasion, signaling, and confusion. And Daria Khlevnyuk discusses the alignment between conspiracy theories about the dissolution of the USSR among the “old left” and Russian state propaganda.Diese Ausgabe befasst sich mit den ideologischen und verschwörungstheoretischen Strömungen, die Russlands Krieg gegen die Ukraine flankieren. Anhand von Daten aus dem Survey of Russian Elites 1993-2020 zeigt Sharon Rivera Ähnlichkeiten und Unterschiede in den Einstellungen von Putin und der breiteren Elite auf. Julian Waller veranschaulicht die umfassende Verwendung illiberaler Rhetorik durch die russische Elite. Scott Radnitz erläutert die Rolle, die verschwörungstheoretische Propaganda im Krieg gespielt hat, und hebt die Ziele des Kremls hervor, nämlich Überredung, Signalwirkung und Verwirrung. Daria Khlevnyuk erörtert die Übereinstimmung zwischen Verschwörungstheorien über die Auflösung der UdSSR in der "alten Linken" und der russischen Staatspropaganda.ISSN:1863-042