Theories of International Regimes

Over the last decade, international regimes have become a major focus of empirical research and theoretical debate within international relations. This article provides a critical review of this literature. We survey contending definitions of regimes and suggest dimensions along which regimes vary over time or across cases; these dimensions might be used to operationalize “regime change.” We then examine four approaches to regime analysis: structural, game-theoretic, functional, and cognitive. We conclude that the major shortcoming of the regimes literature is its failure to incorporate domestic politics adequately. We suggest a research program that begins with the central insights of the interdependence literature which have been ignored in the effort to construct “systemic” theory.Governmen

Political boundary spanning:politicians at the interface between collaborative governance and representative democracy

Research finds that productive interfaces between collaborative and bureaucratic forms of governance hinges on the extent t

Interactive political leadership in theory and practice:How elected politicians may benefit from co-creating public value outcomes

This paper argues that elected politicians may strengthen their political leadership role by initiating, orchestrating and engaging in the co-creation of public value outcomes. The collaborative turn in public value theory shows how public managers may mobilize the knowledge, ideas and resources of users, citizens and organized stakeholders, but it has so far neglected the role of elected politicians who tend to be reduced to a legitimizing sounding board for public managers aiming to advance public value creation in collaboration with a plethora of public and private actors. This paper seeks to compensate this benign neglect by advancing a new notion of ‘interactive political leadership’. This new construct aims to conceptualize the way that elected politicians may develop new and better policy solutions through a problem-focused interaction with relevant and affected actors from the economy and civil society, including users, volunteers, citizens and other lay actors. The theoretical argument about the development of interactive political leadership, which takes us beyond the traditional forms of sovereign political leadership that perceives politicians as ‘elected kings’, is illustrated by empirical examples drawn from local, national and supranation levels of governmen

China\u27s hegemonic intentions and trajectory: Will it opt for benevolent, coercive, or Dutch‐style hegemony?

China\u27s unprecedented economic growth led some scholars to conclude that it will replace the United States as the future global hegemon. However, China\u27s intentions in exercising future global leadership are yet unknown and difficult to extrapolate from its often contradictory behaviour. A preliminary overview of China\u27s island building in the South China Sea reveals its potentially coercive intentions. This inference is consistent with the analysis of those who prognosticate China\u27s violent rise. Conversely and simultaneously, China\u27s participation in peacekeeping operations and its global investments evince its benevolent hegemonic intentions, which are congruent with the argument of those who predict China\u27s peaceful hegemonic ascent. Confronted with these divergent tendencies in China\u27s recent international relations, and assuming its continued rise, it is, thus, essential to examine China\u27s strategic intentions and how these may ultimately project its violent or peaceful hegemonic rise. This article argues that the “Third Way” or “Dutch‐style” hegemony is highly instructive in this context and, thus, should be examined and added to the existing debate on China\u27s rise as either a benevolent or coercive hegemon. We argue that Dutch‐style hegemony may be the most viable way for China to proceed in its global hegemonic ascendancy

Civil society participation in global governance: Insights from climate politics

A rather unique feature of global climate negotiations is that most governments allow representatives of civil society organisations to be part of their national delegation. It remains unclear, however, why states grant such access in the first place. While there are likely to be benefits from formally including civil society, there are also substantial costs stemming from constraints on sovereignty. In light of this tradeoff, this article argues for a ‘contagion’ effect that explains this phenomenon besides domestic determinants. In particular, states, which are more central to the broader network of global governance, are more likely to be informed of and influenced by other states' actions and policies toward civil society. In turn, more central governments are likely to include civil society actors if other governments do so as well. This argument is tested with data on the participation of civil society organisations in national delegations to global climate negotiations between 1995 and 2005. To further uncover the underlying mechanisms, the article also provides an analysis of survey data collected at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations in Durban in 2011