Naturalistic stimuli reveal a dominant role for agentic action in visual representation

Abstract Naturalistic, dynamic movies evoke strong, consistent, and information-rich patterns of activity over a broad expanse of cortex and engage multiple perceptual and cognitive systems in parallel. The use of naturalistic stimuli enables functional brain imaging research to explore cognitive domains that are poorly sampled in highly-controlled experiments. These domains include perception and understanding of agentic action, which plays a larger role in visual representation than was appreciated from experiments using static, controlled stimuli

Neural Responses to Naturalistic Clips of Behaving Animals Under Two Different Task Contexts

The human brain rapidly deploys semantic information during perception to facilitate our interaction with the world. These semantic representations are encoded in the activity of distributed populations of neurons (Haxby et al., 2001; McClelland and Rogers, 2003; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008b) and command widespread cortical real estate (Binder et al., 2009; Huth et al., 2012). The neural representation of a stimulus can be described as a location (i.e., response vector) in a high-dimensional neural representational space (Kriegeskorte and Kievit, 2013; Haxby et al., 2014). This resonates with behavioral and theoretical work describing mental representations of objects and actions as being organized in a multidimensional psychological space (Attneave, 1950; Shepard, 1958, 1987; Edelman, 1998; Gärdenfors and Warglien, 2012). Current applications of this framework to neural representation (e.g., Kriegeskorte et al., 2008b) often implicitly assume that these neural representational spaces are relatively fixed and context-invariant. In contrast, earlier work emphasized the importance of attention and task demands in actively reshaping representational space (Shepard, 1964; Tversky, 1977; Nosofsky, 1986; Kruschke, 1992). A growing body of work in both electrophysiology (e.g., Sigala and Logothetis, 2002; Sigala, 2004; Cohen and Maunsell, 2009; Reynolds and Heeger, 2009) and human neuroimaging (e.g., Hon et al., 2009; Jehee et al., 2011; Brouwer and Heeger, 2013; Çukur et al., 2013; Sprague and Serences, 2013; Harel et al., 2014; Erez and Duncan, 2015; Nastase et al., 2017) has suggested mechanisms by which behavioral goals dynamically alter neural representation

Connectivity in the human brain dissociates entropy and complexity of auditory inputs ☆

Complex systems are described according to two central dimensions: (a) the randomness of their output, quantified via entropy; and (b) their complexity, which reflects the organization of a system's generators. Whereas some approaches hold that complexity can be reduced to uncertainty or entropy, an axiom of complexity science is that signals with very high or very low entropy are generated by relatively non-complex systems, while complex systems typically generate outputs with entropy peaking between these two extremes. In understanding their environment, individuals would benefit from coding for both input entropy and complexity; entropy indexes uncertainty and can inform probabilistic coding strategies, whereas complexity reflects a concise and abstract representation of the underlying environmental configuration, which can serve independent purposes, e.g., as a template for generalization and rapid comparisons between environments. Using functional neuroimaging, we demonstrate that, in response to passively processed auditory inputs, functional integration patterns in the human brain track both the entropy and complexity of the auditory signal. Connectivity between several brain regions scaled monotonically with input entropy, suggesting sensitivity to uncertainty, whereas connectivity between other regions tracked entropy in a convex manner consistent with sensitivity to input complexity. These findings suggest that the human brain simultaneously tracks the uncertainty of sensory data and effectively models their environmental generators. Introduction Theoretical and experimental work in the fields of psychology and complexity science has arrived at two separate approaches for describing how stimuli may be encoded and what constitutes a complex stimulus (see On the other hand, the second, more recent view (e.g., Crutchfield, 2012) holds that simplicity/complexity depends on how demanding it is to model the underlying system that generated a particular stimulus or signal via the interactions of its states. From this perspective, there is a convex, inverse U-shaped relation between disorder and complexity. This is because highly ordered and highly disordered signals are typically generated by succinct, easily describable systems, whereas more sophisticated, or complex, systems generally convey intermediate levels of entropy. 1 Note that in this latter approach, complexity does not capture how difficult it is to veridically encode or reproduce any specific stimulus or signal, but rather how computationally demanding it is to model the system or source generating that signal. As can be appreciated, the two views described above are independent, and graphs depicting 1 For instance, ABCDABCD can be thought of as generated by a system (e.g., a transition matrix) that transitions between four states deterministically (a simple explanation), while a random stimulus can be characterized by a system where all state transitions are equally likely (a similarly simple explanation). http://d

Modeling Semantic Encoding in a Common Neural Representational Space

Encoding models for mapping voxelwise semantic tuning are typically estimated separately for each individual, limiting their generalizability. In the current report, we develop a method for estimating semantic encoding models that generalize across individuals. Functional MRI was used to measure brain responses while participants freely viewed a naturalistic audiovisual movie. Word embeddings capturing agent-, action-, object-, and scene-related semantic content were assigned to each imaging volume based on an annotation of the film. We constructed both conventional within-subject semantic encoding models and between-subject models where the model was trained on a subset of participants and validated on a left-out participant. Between-subject models were trained using cortical surface-based anatomical normalization or surface-based whole-cortex hyperalignment. We used hyperalignment to project group data into an individual’s unique anatomical space via a common representational space, thus leveraging a larger volume of data for out-of-sample prediction while preserving the individual’s fine-grained functional–anatomical idiosyncrasies. Our findings demonstrate that anatomical normalization degrades the spatial specificity of between-subject encoding models relative to within-subject models. Hyperalignment, on the other hand, recovers the spatial specificity of semantic tuning lost during anatomical normalization, and yields model performance exceeding that of within-subject models

Modeling Semantic Encoding in a Common Neural Representational Space

Encoding models for mapping voxelwise semantic tuning are typically estimated separately for each individual, limiting their generalizability. In the current report, we develop a method for estimating semantic encoding models that generalize across individuals. Functional MRI was used to measure brain responses while participants freely viewed a naturalistic audiovisual movie. Word embeddings capturing agent-, action-, object-, and scene-related semantic content were assigned to each imaging volume based on an annotation of the film. We constructed both conventional within-subject semantic encoding models and between-subject models where the model was trained on a subset of participants and validated on a left-out participant. Between-subject models were trained using cortical surface-based anatomical normalization or surface-based whole-cortex hyperalignment. We used hyperalignment to project group data into an individual’s unique anatomical space via a common representational space, thus leveraging a larger volume of data for out-of-sample prediction while preserving the individual’s fine-grained functional–anatomical idiosyncrasies. Our findings demonstrate that anatomical normalization degrades the spatial specificity of between-subject encoding models relative to within-subject models. Hyperalignment, on the other hand, recovers the spatial specificity of semantic tuning lost during anatomical normalization, and yields model performance exceeding that of within-subject models

The “Narratives” fMRI dataset for evaluating models of naturalistic language comprehension

The “Narratives” collection aggregates a variety of functional MRI datasets collected while human subjects listened to naturalistic spoken stories. The current release includes 345 subjects, 891 functional scans, and 27 diverse stories of varying duration totaling ~4.6 hours of unique stimuli (~43,000 words). This data collection is well-suited for naturalistic neuroimaging analysis, and is intended to serve as a benchmark for models of language and narrative comprehension. We provide standardized MRI data accompanied by rich metadata, preprocessed versions of the data ready for immediate use, and the spoken story stimuli with time-stamped phoneme- and word-level transcripts. All code and data are publicly available with full provenance in keeping with current best practices in transparent and reproducible neuroimaging

Genome-wide association identifies nine common variants associated with fasting proinsulin levels and provides new insights into the pathophysiology of type 2 diabetes.

OBJECTIVE: Proinsulin is a precursor of mature insulin and C-peptide. Higher circulating proinsulin levels are associated with impaired β-cell function, raised glucose levels, insulin resistance, and type 2 diabetes (T2D). Studies of the insulin processing pathway could provide new insights about T2D pathophysiology. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS: We have conducted a meta-analysis of genome-wide association tests of ∼2.5 million genotyped or imputed single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) and fasting proinsulin levels in 10,701 nondiabetic adults of European ancestry, with follow-up of 23 loci in up to 16,378 individuals, using additive genetic models adjusted for age, sex, fasting insulin, and study-specific covariates. RESULTS: Nine SNPs at eight loci were associated with proinsulin levels (P < 5 × 10(-8)). Two loci (LARP6 and SGSM2) have not been previously related to metabolic traits, one (MADD) has been associated with fasting glucose, one (PCSK1) has been implicated in obesity, and four (TCF7L2, SLC30A8, VPS13C/C2CD4A/B, and ARAP1, formerly CENTD2) increase T2D risk. The proinsulin-raising allele of ARAP1 was associated with a lower fasting glucose (P = 1.7 × 10(-4)), improved β-cell function (P = 1.1 × 10(-5)), and lower risk of T2D (odds ratio 0.88; P = 7.8 × 10(-6)). Notably, PCSK1 encodes the protein prohormone convertase 1/3, the first enzyme in the insulin processing pathway. A genotype score composed of the nine proinsulin-raising alleles was not associated with coronary disease in two large case-control datasets. CONCLUSIONS: We have identified nine genetic variants associated with fasting proinsulin. Our findings illuminate the biology underlying glucose homeostasis and T2D development in humans and argue against a direct role of proinsulin in coronary artery disease pathogenesis

Keep it real: rethinking the primacy of experimental control in cognitive neuroscience

Naturalistic experimental paradigms in neuroimaging arose from a pressure to test the validity of models we derive from highly-controlled experiments in real-world contexts. In many cases, however, such efforts led to the realization that models developed under particular experimental manipulations failed to capture much variance outside the context of that manipulation. The critique of non-naturalistic experiments is not a recent development; it echoes a persistent and subversive thread in the history of modern psychology. The brain has evolved to guide behavior in a multidimensional world with many interacting variables. The assumption that artificially decoupling and manipulating these variables will lead to a satisfactory understanding of the brain may be untenable. We develop an argument for the primacy of naturalistic paradigms, and point to recent developments in machine learning as an example of the transformative power of relinquishing control. Naturalistic paradigms should not be deployed as an afterthought if we hope to build models of brain and behavior that extend beyond the laboratory into the real world