95 research outputs found
Henri Temianka Correspondence; (leplin)
https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/temianka_correspondence/2312/thumbnail.jp
Enlisting Popper in the Case for Scientific Realism
Karl Popper fut un rĂ©aliste scientifique malgrĂ© lui. Au mĂ©pris de ses propres restrictions concernant les formes de raisonnement scientifique acceptables et la portĂ©e de lâĂ©vidence empirique, il insista sur une conception fortement rĂ©aliste des buts et des accomplissements de la science. Dans cet article, je construis une dĂ©fense gĂ©nĂ©rale du rĂ©alisme scientifique, mâappuyant, au il des dĂ©veloppements, sur celles des positions popperiennes qui font progresser lâargument, et critiquant celles qui lâentravent. Bien que la ligne argumentative dâensemble soit mienne, je montre, par des attributions directes, que Popper partage mes conclusions rĂ©alistes, et pourquoi il les partage.Karl Popper was a scientific realist in spite of himself. In defiance of his own restrictions on acceptable forms of scientific reasoning and the reach of empirical evidence, he insisted on a strongly realist conception of the goals and achievements of science. In this article I mount a general defense of scientific realism, taking advantage, as I proceed, of those Popperian positions that advance the argument, and criticizing those that impede it. While the overall line of argumentation is my own, I show, through direct attributions, that and why Popper shares my realist conclusions
Objectivity in Confirmation: Post Hoc Monsters and Novel Predictions
The aim of this paper is to put in place some cornerstones in the foundations for an objective theory of confirmation by considering lessons from the failures of predictivism. Discussion begins with a widely accepted challenge, to find out what is needed in addition to the right kind of inferentialâsemantical relations between hypothesis and evidence to have a complete account of confirmation, one that gives
a definitive answer to the question whether hypotheses branded as ââpost hoc monstersââ can be confirmed. The predictivist view is then presented as a way to meet this challenge. Particular attention
is paid to Worrallâs version of predictivism, as it appears to be the most sophisticated of the lot. It is argued that, despite its faults, his view turns our heads in the right direction by attempting to remove contingent considerations from confirmational matters. The demand to remove such considerations becomes the first of four cornerstones. Each cornerstone is put in place with the aim to steer clear of
the sort of failures that plague various kinds of predictivism. In the process, it becomes obvious that the original challenge is wrongheaded and in need of revision. The paper ends with just such a revision
Historical inductions, Old and New
I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudanâs âOld inductionâ and Stanfordâs New induction, and then delineate a minimal realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions
Justifying the Special Theory of Relativity with Unconceived Methods
Many realists argue that present scientific theories will not follow the fate of past scientific theories because the former are more successful than the latter. Critics object that realists need to show that present theories have reached the level of success that warrants their truth. I reply that the special theory of relativity has been repeatedly reinforced by unconceived scientific methods, so it will be reinforced by infinitely many unconceived scientific methods. This argument for the special theory of relativity overcomes the criticsâ objection, and has advantages over the no-miracle argument and the selective induction for it
Science and Its Discontents: Is There an End to Knowing?
Is there an end to our scientific quest? This question that continues to divide the scientific
community between those who believe that the progress of science is infinite and those
who think that we already understand how the universe works and no major discoveries
are to be expected in the future. This article explores the philosophical worldview of
modern science that has given rise to this question. It argues that an approach to
knowledge that focuses on the process of construction of knowledge rather than its
products offers a possibility of definitively answering this question and opening paths
for a more rational approach in advancing and managing the scientific progress
Whatâs so bad about scientism?
In their attempt to defend philosophy from accusations of uselessness made by prominent scientists, such as Stephen Hawking, some philosophers respond with the charge of âscientism.â This charge makes endorsing a scientistic stance, a mistake by definition. For this reason, it begs the question against these critics of philosophy, or anyone who is inclined to endorse a scientistic stance, and turns the scientism debate into a verbal dispute. In this paper, I propose a different definition of scientism, and thus a new way of looking at the scientism debate. Those philosophers who seek to defend philosophy against accusations of uselessness would do philosophy a much better service, I submit, if they were to engage with the definition of scientism put forth in this paper, rather than simply make it analytic that scientism is a mistake
Ad Hoc Hypotheses and the Monsters within
Science is increasingly becoming automated. Tasks yet to be fully
automated include the conjecturing, modifying, extending and testing of hypotheses. At present scientists have an array of methods to help them carry out those tasks. These range from the well-articulated, formal and unexceptional rules to the semi-articulated and variously understood rules-of-thumb and intuitive hunches. If we are to hand over at least some of the aforementioned tasks to machines, we need to
clarify, refine and make formal, not to mention computable, even the more obscure of the methods scientists successfully employ in their inquiries. The focus of this essay is one such less-than-transparent methodological rule. I am here referring to the rule that ad hoc hypotheses ought to be spurned. This essay begins with a brief examination of some notable conceptions of ad hoc-ness in the philosophical literature. It is pointed out that there is a general problem afflicting most such conceptions, namely the intuitive judgments that are supposed to motivate them are not universally shared. Instead of getting bogged down in what ad hoc-ness exactly means, I shift the focus of the analysis to one undesirable feature often present in alleged cases of ad hoc-ness. I call this feature the âmonstrousnessâ of a hypothesis. A fully articulated formal account of this feature is presented by specifying what it is about the internal constitution of a hypothesis that makes it monstrous. Using this account, a monstrousness measure is then proposed and somewhat sketchily
compared with the minimum description length approach
Mudança cientĂfica: modelos filosĂłficos e pesquisa histĂłrica
The authors call for a more thorough testing of the empirical claims of recent theories of scientific change. To facilitate this the empirical claims of Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos and Laudan are listed in nontechnical language, both by author and by topic. A bibliography of case studies is included.Os autores deste ensaio entendem que Ă© preciso testar de forma mais completa as afirmaçÔes empĂricas das recentes teorias da mudança cientĂfica. Tendo em vista facilitar tal empreendimento, apresentam-se em linguagem nĂŁo-tĂ©cnica as afirmaçÔes empĂricas de Kuhn, Feyerabend, Lakatos e Laudan, que estĂŁo organizadas por autor e por assunto. Ao final, inclui-se uma bibliografia de estudos de caso
- âŠ