The Costs of Domestic Political Unrest

Does domestic political unrest deter foreign direct investment (FDI)? And what are the longer term impacts of unrest upon the market? Most theories suggest that investors are deterred by unrest. However, empirical research returns only marginal support. We argue that these mixed results stem from the conflation of the distinct tactics and outcomes of political unrest. Violent forms of unrest increase uncertainty and risk. By comparison, nonviolent forms of unrest are shown to more frequently achieve their goals and increase the prospects for democratic change and market stability. In addition, investors avoid markets where campaigns have ended in failure, defined as the campaign not achieving their stated political aims. Failed campaigns often precipitate a cycle of unrest that create greater uncertainty over the long-term stability of a state. We find strong evidence in favor of our propositions, even after taking political motivation and non-random selection into account. © 2013 International Studies Association

L-selectin mediated leukocyte tethering in shear flow is controlled by multiple contacts and cytoskeletal anchorage facilitating fast rebinding events

L-selectin mediated tethers result in leukocyte rolling only above a threshold in shear. Here we present biophysical modeling based on recently published data from flow chamber experiments (Dwir et al., J. Cell Biol. 163: 649-659, 2003) which supports the interpretation that L-selectin mediated tethers below the shear threshold correspond to single L-selectin carbohydrate bonds dissociating on the time scale of milliseconds, whereas L-selectin mediated tethers above the shear threshold are stabilized by multiple bonds and fast rebinding of broken bonds, resulting in tether lifetimes on the timescale of $10^{-1}$ seconds. Our calculations for cluster dissociation suggest that the single molecule rebinding rate is of the order of $10^4$ Hz. A similar estimate results if increased tether dissociation for tail-truncated L-selectin mutants above the shear threshold is modeled as diffusive escape of single receptors from the rebinding region due to increased mobility. Using computer simulations, we show that our model yields first order dissociation kinetics and exponential dependence of tether dissociation rates on shear stress. Our results suggest that multiple contacts, cytoskeletal anchorage of L-selectin and local rebinding of ligand play important roles in L-selectin tether stabilization and progression of tethers into persistent rolling on endothelial surfaces.Comment: 9 pages, Revtex, 4 Postscript figures include

Carleson measures for Hilbert spaces of analytic functions on the complex half-plane

The notion of a Carleson measure was introduced by Lennart Carleson in his proof of the Corona Theorem for H∞(D). In this paper we will define it for certain type of reproducing kernel Hilbert spaces of analytic functions of the complex half-plane, C+, which will include Hardy, Bergman and Dirichlet spaces. We will obtain several necessary or sufficient conditions for a positive Borel measure to be Carleson by preforming tests on reproducing kernels, weighted Bergman kernels, and studying the tree model obtained from a decomposition of the complex half-plane. The Dirichlet space will be investigated in detail as a special case. Finally, we will present a control theory application of Carleson measures in determining admissibility of controls in well-posed linear evolution equations

Post-literate Poetics : [recenzja]

http://fp.amu.edu.pl/post-literate-poetics/In his latest collection of essays Po piśmie [After writing], Jacek Dukaj conceives of human history as an evolution of forms in which man manifests experiences; its final stage is the direct transfer of experiences. The second most important question is the subjectification of the tool. I review earlier realizations of this concept in Dukaj’s writings and compare his observations with other contemporary narratives which address the history and future of homo sapiens (mainly by Yuval Noah Harari)

Extending Trade Law Precedent

Precedent is celebrated as a fundamental feature of dense legal systems as it creates predictability, builds coherence, and enhances the authority of courts and tribunals. But, in international adjudication, precedent can also affect interstate cooperation and ultimately the legitimacy of international organizations. Wary of clashing with state interests, most international dispute settlement systems are designed so that rulings do not set obligatory precedent. This Article describes the role of precedent in the Appellate Body (AB) of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to explain how precedent can affect compliance with the decisions of international courts and tribunals (ICs). This Article makes two main contributions. First, it shows that there can be precedent without a formal stare decisis rule. In theory the AB has a rule against binding precedent. Based on empirical evidence, however, this Article shows that the AB has in fact a strong norm of relying on prior decisions. Second, it shows that over time, the widening of legal commitments can result from extending precedent to new situations and this has an impact on the ability or willingness of states to comply. These findings have implications for the WTO and beyond. For the WTO, efforts to better define the value of precedent are unlikely to resolve the general mistrust of the AB and, therefore, this Article proposes other solutions to control the drift resulting from precedent. Beyond the WTO, international scholars should account for the intertemporal dimension of legal commitments in analyzing and explaining compliance with international law

The International and Domestic Determinants of Insider Trading Laws

Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/147054/1/j.1468-2478.2010.00604.x.pd