Issues and challenges in the application of Husserlian phenomenology to the Lived Experience of Hate Crime and Its Legal Aftermath

The field of hate crime research addresses the presence, sources and impact of particular types of expressions of prejudice, often perceived as particularly damaging and hurtful forms of interpersonal abuse and violence. Little, if any, credible academic research seeks to vindicate the specific racist, gendered and other vicious prejudices articulated by many perpetrators of hate crime. In turn, this raises the reflexive question of the possibilities of researchers themselves ever being able to adopt a truly "unprejudiced" approach to the presence of such damaging prejudices. Can this goal be realised without a researcher necessarily losing an experientially-grounded understanding of what these meanings, values and purposes have come to mean, and how they are themselves interpretatively re-constituted anew, including within the lived experience of victims, witnesses, police, prosecutors, judges and victim support workers? A possible philosophically-informed approach to the dilemmas posed by this topic is offered by Husserl's phenomenology. Husserl's perpetually unfinished philosophical methodology strives, with concerted if sometimes tragic reflective rigor, to "suspend," "bracket out" and "neutralise" those core presuppositions constitutive of the research field that typically pre-judge precisely whatever demands to be questioned and explored in a radically non-prejudicial manner. This study critically explores the possibilities, reflective stages and theoretical limitations of a sympathetically reconstructed Husserlian approach to hate crime, itself understood as a would-be qualitative "science of consciousness." It argues that despite its manifest tensions, gaps, ambiguities and internal contradictions, aspects of the Husserlian philosophical approach directed towards the different levels of experienced hate crime still retain the potential to both challenge and advance our understanding of this topic. It is the "instructive" part of "instructive failure" that this article highlights

Overcoming Psychologism. Twardowski on Actions and Products

This paper is about the topic of psychologism in the work of Kazimierz Twardowski and my aim is to revisit this important issue in light of recent publications from, and on Twardowski’s works. I will first examine the genesis of psychologism in the young Twardowski’s work; secondly, I will examine Twardowski’s picture theory of meaning and Husserl’s criticism in Logical Investigations; the third part is about Twardowski’s recognition and criticism of his psychologism in his lectures on the psychology of thinking; the fourth and fifth parts provide an overview of Twardowski’s paper “Actions and Products” while the sixth part addresses the psychologism issue in the last part of this paper through the delineation of psychology and the humanities. I shall conclude this study with a brief assessment of Twardowski’s solution to psychologism

How to return to subjectivity? Natorp, Husserl, and Lacan on the limits of reflection

This article discusses the recent call within contemporary phenomenology to return to subjectivity in response to certain limitations of naturalistic explanations of the mind. The meaning and feasibility of this call is elaborated by connecting it to a classical issue within the phenomenological tradition concerning the possibility of investigating the first-person perspective through reflection. We will discuss how this methodological question is respectively treated and reconfigured in the works of Natorp, Husserl, and Lacan. Finally, we will lay out some possible consequences of such a cross-reading for the conception of subjectivity and the concomitant effort to account for this dimension of first-person experience in response and in addition to its omission within the standard third-person perspective of psychological research

Doing it differently: Engaging interview participants with imaginative variation

Imaginative variation was identified by Husserl (1936/1970) as a phenomenological technique for the purpose of elucidating the manner in which phenomena appear to consciousness. Briefly, by engaging in the phenomenological reduction and using imaginative variation, phenomenologists are able to describe the experience of consciousness, having stepped outside of the natural attitude through the epochē. Imaginative variation is a stage aimed at explicating the structures of experience, and is best described as a mental experiment. Features of the experience are imaginatively altered in order to view the phenomenon under investigation from varying perspectives. Husserl argued that this process will reveal the essences of an experience, as only those aspects that are invariant to the experience of the phenomenon will not be able to change through the variation. Often in qualitative research interviews, participants struggle to articulate or verbalise their experiences. The purpose of this article is to detail a radical and novel way of using imaginative variation with interview participants, by asking the participants to engage with imaginative variation, in order to produce a rich and insightful experiential account of a phenomenon. We will discuss how the first author successfully used imaginative variation in this way in her study of the erotic experience of bondage, discipline, dominance & submission, and sadism & masochism (BDSM), before considering the usefulness of this technique when applied to areas of study beyond sexuality

Hearing the silences: adult Nigerian women’s accounts of ‘early marriages’

‘Early marriage’ is a relatively common, but under-researched global phenomenon, associated with poor health, mental health, educational and occupational outcomes, particularly for young girls. In this article, we draw on qualitative interviews with 6 Nigerian women from Sokoto State, who were married between the ages of 8 and 15. The interviews explored young women’s experiences of the transition to marriage, being married, pregnancy and their understanding of the marital and parental role. Using Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis, we explore women’s constrained articulations of their experiences of early marriage, as they are constituted within a social context where the identity of ‘woman’ is bound up in values and practices around marriage and motherhood. We explore the complexity of ‘hearing’ women’s experiences when their identities are bound up in culturally overdetermined ideas of femininity that function explicitly to silence and constrain the spaces in which women can speak

Phenomenological psychology & descriptive experience sampling: a new approach to exploring music festival experience

This paper provides in-depth discussion of a methodological approach to researching music festival experience. Grounded in existential phenomenology (Heidegger, 1927/1962. Being and time (J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell) it argues for the adoption of an interpretative phenomenological perspective (Merleau–Ponty, 1945/1962. Phenomenology of perception (C. Smith, Trans.). New York, NY: Humanities Press) to more fully understand the live music festival experience. Phenomenological psychology (Smith, Harre and Van angenhove, 1995. Ideography and the case–study. In J. A. Smith, R. Harre, & L.Van Langenhove (Eds.), Rethinking psychology (pp. 59–69). London: SAGE Publications) contextualises the music festival experience within the attendee’s Lifeworld. Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) (Smith, 2015. Qualitative psychology: A practical guide to research methods (3rd ed.). Los Angeles, CA: Sage Publications Ltd) provides a robust process for analysing the music festival experience ideographically. Participants used Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES)(Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001. Telling what we know: Describing inner experience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5(9), 400–403) to record their Green Man music festival experiences, this data was then explored during phenomenological interviews. DES and IPA provide a contrasting conceptualisation of experience, with findings that contribute to Ashworth’s (2003b. The phenomenology of the lifeworld and social psychology. Social Psychology Review, 5(1), 18–34) theories of Lifeworld and Krueger’s (2014b. Varieties of extended emotions. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 13(4), 533–555) Hypothesis of Individual Extended Emotions and his Hypothesis of Collective Extended Emotions. Lastly, building upon the application and adaptability to the music festival context allows a consideration of future studies

Embedded Agency in Institutional Theory: Problem or Paradox

In “Beyond Constraining and Enabling: Toward New Microfoundations in Institutional Theory” Professor Cardinale (2018) seeks to expose and correct “shortcomings” (p.133) in institutional theory’s conceptualization of structure, agency and their relationship. To this end, he theorizes the “different mechanism[s] through which actors are embedded in structure” (p.134). We agree that institutional theory’s microfoundations merit theoretical attention and development. However, we question the premise that the issue of agency in institutional theory is adequately, or even plausibly, formulated as one of “embeddedness”. We also challenge the relevance of Professor Cardinale’s engagement of Husserl to help solve what we argue to be a phantom problem central to his theory

What ‘children’ experience and ‘adults’ may overlook: phenomenological approaches to media practice, education and research

This paper argues that each utterance of media should be seen as in dialogue with each other utterance, and that children, being the phenomenological hub to their lived media experience, should be recognised as engaging with media holistically. Argument draws upon two recent qualitative studies with children between six and eleven years of age. These studies, although separate, shared certain phenomenology orientated conceptual underpinnings and arrived at relatable findings. Notably that participating children tended to address media in a platform agnostic manner and offered little sense that they saw the media platform itself as being of overriding significance to their holistic media engagement. Ultimately, if children’s lived media engagement is dialogic and holistic, then focusing on only one discreet media utterance (like television for example) can be said to become deeply problematic to those within children’s media practice, education and research

The whole and its parts : why and how to disentangle plant communities and synusiae in vegetation classification

Most plant communities consist of different structural and ecological subsets, ranging from cryptogams to different tree layers. The completeness and approach with which these subsets are sampled have implications for vegetation classification. Non‐vascular plants are often omitted or sometimes treated separately, referring to their assemblages as “synusiae” (e.g. epiphytes on bark, saxicolous species on rocks). The distinction of complete plant communities (phytocoenoses or holocoenoses) from their parts (synusiae or merocoenoses) is crucial to avoid logical problems and inconsistencies of the resulting classification systems. We here describe theoretical differences between the phytocoenosis as a whole and its parts, and outline consequences of this distinction for practise and terminology in vegetation classification. To implement a clearer separation, we call for modifications of the International Code of Phytosociological Nomenclature and the EuroVegChecklist. We believe that these steps will make vegetation classification systems better applicable and raise the recognition of the importance of non‐vascular plants in the vegetation as well as their interplay with vascular plants