Reexamining the role of intent in moral judgements of purity violations

Perceived intent is a pivotal factor in moral judgement: intentional moral violations are considered more morally wrong than accidental ones. However, a body of recent research argues that intent is less important for moral judgements of impure acts-that it, those acts that are condemned because they elicit disgust. But the literature supporting this claim is limited in multiple ways. We conducted a new test of the hypothesis that condemnation of purity violations operates independently from intent. In Study 1, participants judged the wrongness of moral violations that were either intentional or unintentional and were either harmful (e.g., stealing) or impure (e.g., public defecation). Results revealed a large effect of intent on moral wrongness ratings that did not vary across harmful and disgusting scenarios. In Study 2, a registered report, participants judged the wrongness of disgust-eliciting moral violations that were either mundane and dyadic (e.g., serving contaminated food) or abnormal and self-directed (e.g., consuming urine). Results revealed a large effect of intent on moral wrongness judgements that did not vary across mundane and abnormal scenarios. Findings challenge the claim that moral judgements about purity violations rely upon unique psychological mechanisms that are insensitive to information about the wrongdoer's mental state

Pareto-Improving Water Management over Space and Time: The Honolulu Case

We model welfare gains from efficient allocation of groundwater over space and time relative to the status quo policy of financial cost recovery. In order to promote political feasibility, an intertemporal compensation plan is devised that renders the reform Pareto-improving. Gainers from the reform finance the compensation in proportion to their benefits through a block-pricing scheme. For the Honolulu case, only 7% of the $441 million in gains to winners is needed to compensate losers from the reform. Future winners from the reform also repay the deficit created by the compensation package, much as state and local governments finance capital improvements. Copyright 2009, Oxford University Press.