1,131 research outputs found
Orchestrating corporate social responsibility in the multinational enterprise
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) invest significant resources in corporate social responsibility (CSR), but their attempts to build a global âsocial brandâ may clash with the execution of operational strategies at a subsidiary level. Using a game-theoretic model, this research addresses the complex interplay of different contingencies that shape the coordination and control challenges facing MNEs when they implement global CSR strategies, including brand spillovers, the risk of public scandals caused by irresponsible behavior, the size of the MNE network, as well as the roles played by non-governmental organizations and altruistic managers. Challenging the view of CSR as insurance against lapses of responsible conduct, our model shows that investment in social brands helps avoid irresponsible practices across the MNE network, thereby inducing subsidiaries to âwalk the talkâ
The Ultimate Solution to the Quantum Battle of the Sexes game
We present the unique solution to the Quantum Battle of the Sexes game. We
show the best result which can be reached when the game is played according to
Marinatto and Weber's scheme. The result which we put forward does not
surrender the criticism of previous works on the same topic.Comment: 8 page
Bayesian Nash Equilibria and Bell Inequalities
Games with incomplete information are formulated in a multi-sector
probability matrix formalism that can cope with quantum as well as classical
strategies. An analysis of classical and quantum strategy in a multi-sector
extension of the game of Battle of Sexes clarifies the two distinct roles of
nonlocal strategies, and establish the direct link between the true quantum
gain of game's payoff and the breaking of Bell inequalities.Comment: 6 pages, LaTeX JPSJ 2 column format, changes in sections 1, 3 and 4,
added reference
Sustainable synthesis of enantiopure fluorolactam derivatives by a selective direct fluorination â amidase strategy
Pharmaceutically important chiral fluorolactam derivatives bearing a fluorine atom at a stereogenic centre were synthesized by a route involving copper catalyzed selective direct fluorination using fluorine gas for the construction of the key CâF bond and a biochemical amidase process for the crucial asymmetric cyclisation stage. A comparison of process green metrics with reported palladium catalyzed enantioselective fluorination methodology shows the fluorination-amidase route to be very efficient and more suitable for scale-up
Strategy abundance in 2x2 games for arbitrary mutation rates
We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed populations of finite
size, N. A well-mixed population means that any two individuals are equally
likely to interact. In particular we consider the average abundances of two
strategies, A and B, under mutation and selection. The game dynamical
interaction between the two strategies is given by the 2x2 payoff matrix
[(a,b), (c,d)]. It has previously been shown that A is more abundant than B, if
(N-2)a+Nb>Nc+(N-2)d. This result has been derived for particular stochastic
processes that operate either in the limit of asymptotically small mutation
rates or in the limit of weak selection. Here we show that this result holds in
fact for a wide class of stochastic birth-death processes for arbitrary
mutation rate and for any intensity of selection.Comment: version 2 is the final published version that contains minor changes
in response to referee comment
Sequential Deliberation for Social Choice
In large scale collective decision making, social choice is a normative study
of how one ought to design a protocol for reaching consensus. However, in
instances where the underlying decision space is too large or complex for
ordinal voting, standard voting methods of social choice may be impractical.
How then can we design a mechanism - preferably decentralized, simple,
scalable, and not requiring any special knowledge of the decision space - to
reach consensus? We propose sequential deliberation as a natural solution to
this problem. In this iterative method, successive pairs of agents bargain over
the decision space using the previous decision as a disagreement alternative.
We describe the general method and analyze the quality of its outcome when the
space of preferences define a median graph. We show that sequential
deliberation finds a 1.208- approximation to the optimal social cost on such
graphs, coming very close to this value with only a small constant number of
agents sampled from the population. We also show lower bounds on simpler
classes of mechanisms to justify our design choices. We further show that
sequential deliberation is ex-post Pareto efficient and has truthful reporting
as an equilibrium of the induced extensive form game. We finally show that for
general metric spaces, the second moment of of the distribution of social cost
of the outcomes produced by sequential deliberation is also bounded
The promotion of local wellbeing: A primer for policymakers
There is growing interest among policymakers in the promotion of wellbeing as an
objective of public policy. In particular, local authorities have been given powers to
undertake action to promote wellbeing in their area. Recent advances in the academic
literature on wellbeing are giving rise to an increasingly detailed picture of the factors
that determine peopleâs subjective wellbeing (how they think and feel about their lives).
However, the concept of subjective wellbeing is poorly understood within local
government and much of the evidence base is extremely recent. I therefore review the
literature on the definition, measurement, and determinants of wellbeing, and discuss
some of its implications for local public policy
Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
Lecture on the first SFB/TR 15 meeting, Gummersbach, July, 18 - 20, 2004This paper explores predictability of behavior in coordination games with multiple equilibria. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Attitudes towards strategic uncertainty in coordination games are related to risk aversion, experience seeking, gender and age. From the distribution of certainty equivalents among participating students we estimate probabilities for successful coordination in a wide range of coordination games. For many games success of coordination is predictable with a reasonable error rate. The best response of a risk neutral player is close to the global-game solution. Comparing choices in coordination games with revealed risk aversion, we estimate subjective probabilities for successful coordination. In games with a low coordination requirement, most subjects underestimate the probability of success. In games with a high coordination requirement, most subjects overestimate this probability. Data indicate that subjects have probabilistic beliefs about success or failure of coordination rather than beliefs about individual behavior of other players
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