¿Una creencia verdadera justificada es conocimiento? [Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?]

[ES] En este breve trabajo, se presenta una edición bilingüe de Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, de Edmund L. Gettier, donde se presentan contraejemplos a la definición de «conocimiento» como «creencia verdadera justificada». [ES] In this brief text, a bilingual edition of Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, by Edmund L. Gettier, some counterexamples are presented to the definition of «knowledge» as «justified true belief»

Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?

[ES] En este breve trabajo, se presenta una edición bilingüe de Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963), de Edmund L. Gettier, donde se presentan contraejemplos a la definición de «conocimiento» como «creencia verdadera justificada». [ES] In this brief text, a bilingual edition of Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, (1963) by Edmund L. Gettier, some counterexamples are presented to the definition of «knowledge» as «justified true belief»

Why Knowledge Matters

An explanation is given of why it is in the nature of inquiry into whether or not p that its aim is fully achieved only if one comes to know that p or to know that not-p and, further, comes to know how one knows, either way. In the absence of the latter one is in no position to take the inquiry to be successfully completed or to vouch for the truth of the matter in hand. An upshot is that although knowledge matters because truth matters this should not be understood to mean that knowledge matters because true belief matters

Expecting moral philosophers to be reliable

Are philosophers’ intuitions more reliable than philosophical novices’? Are we entitled to assume the superiority of philosophers’ intuitions just as we assume that experts in other domains have more reliable intuitions than novices? Ryberg raises some doubts and his arguments promise to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy once and for all. In this paper, I raise a number of objections to these arguments. I argue that philosophers receive sufficient feedback about the quality of their intuitions and that philosophers’ experience in philosophy plausibly affects their intuitions. Consequently, the type of argument Ryberg offers fails to undermine the expertise defence of intuition-use in philosophy

On the Right Path: A Modal Logic for Supervised Learning

Formal learning theory formalizes the process of inferring a general result from examples, as in the case of inferring grammars from sentences when learning a language. Although empirical evidence suggests that children can learn a language without responding to the correction of linguistic mistakes, the importance of Teacher in many other paradigms is significant. Instead of focusing only on learner(s), this work develops a general framework---the supervised learning game (SLG)---to investigate the interaction between Teacher and Learner. In particular, our proposal highlights several interesting features of the agents: on the one hand,Learner may make mistakes in the learning process, and she may also ignore the potential relation between different hypotheses; on the other hand, Teacher is able to correct Learner's mistakes, eliminate potential mistakes and point out the facts ignored by Learner. To reason about strategies in this game, we develop a modal logic of supervised learning (SLL). Broadly, this work takes a small step towards studying the interaction between graph games, logics and formal learning theory.Comment: The paper was accepted by LORI 2019. But due to the page-limit constraints, that Proceedings version does not include any proofs. In this version, we show the proofs for the result

Epistemic/non-epistemic dependence

If someone knows something then there is something in virtue of which she knows it; and if someone justifiably believes something then there is something in virtue of which she is justified in believing it. That much is relatively uncontroversial. Only slightly more controversial is the claim that our having an epistemic achievement, such as knowing something or being justified in believing something, depends on how we are in non-epistemic respects. That is, our instantiating of epistemic properties depends on our instantiating non-epistemic properties. In this paper, I argue that epistemic/non-epistemic dependence should be given a central place in epistemology, and that doing so has significant consequences

On legitimacy in impact assessment: An epistemologically-based conceptualisation

Impact assessment (IA) is carried out as an ex ante process to inform decision-making. It includes requirements for engagement with stakeholders (including the public) regarding actions proposed by a proponent. A key issue with the various stakeholders involved is the perceived legitimacy of the IA, which can have implications both for the reputation of the proponent, and the likelihood of conflict over the decision. But the understanding of legitimacy in the IA literature has changed over time in line with an ontological shift from positivism (that scientifically generated information leads to better informed decisions) to the post-positivist acknowledgement of the limitations of scientific method whereby assumptions must be subject to transparency, deliberation and openness. This has led to an epistemological shift towards greater subjectivism which, we suggest, has created new opportunities (which have been realised in political decision-making) to subvert knowledge through the increased use of the Internet and social media. To address the potential for such subversion of legitimacy, we seek to conceptualise legitimacy in the IA context through framing IA around a critical realist ontology and a reliabilist virtue epistemology. This allows us to identify ‘knowledge legitimacy’ as an equally important component of IA legitimacy along with organisational legitimacy. We conceptualise knowledge legitimacy through literature review drawing on rich understandings of knowledge from IA and other fields of research in order to develop a four-dimensional typology. This includes the dimensions of: knowledge accuracy; knowledge restriction; knowledge diffusion; and knowledge spectrum. This is the first theoretically grounded attempt to understand legitimacy in IA. It is hoped that it will provoke discussion in the IA community to further advance theoretical understandings of IA and legitimacy of practice