The Misuse and Failure of the Evolutionary Argument

The evolutionary argument is an argument against epiphenomenalism, designed to show that some mind-body theory that allows for the efficacy of qualia is true. First developed by Herbert Spencer and William James, the argument has gone through numerous incarnations and it has been criticized in a number of different ways. Yet many have found the criticisms of the argument in the literature unconvincing. Bearing this in mind, I examine two primary issues: first, whether the alleged insights employed in traditional versions of the argument have been correctly and consistently applied, and second, whether the alleged insights can withstand critical scrutiny. With respect to the first issue, I conclude that the proponents of the argument have tended to grossly oversimplify the considerations involved, incorrectly supposing that the evolutionary argument is properly conceived as a non-specific argument for the disjunction of physicalism and interactionist dualism and against epiphenomenalism. With respect to the second issue, I offer a new criticism that decisively refutes all arguments along the lines of the one I present. Finally, I draw positive lessons about the use of empirical considerations in debates over the mind-body problem

Mary's Powers of Imagination

One common response to the knowledge argument is the ability hypothesis. Proponents of the ability hypothesis accept that Mary learns what seeing red is like when she exits her black-and-white room, but they deny that the kind of knowledge she gains is propositional in nature. Rather, she acquires a cluster of abilities that she previously lacked, in particular, the abilities to recognize, remember, and imagine the color red. For proponents of the ability hypothesis, knowing what an experience is like simply consists in the possession of these abilities. Criticisms of the ability hypothesis tend to focus on this last claim. Such critics tend to accept that Mary gains these abilities when she leaves the room, but they deny that such abilities constitute knowledge of what an experience is like. To my mind, however, this critical strategy grants too much. Focusing specifically on imaginative ability, I argue that Mary does not gain this ability when she leaves the room for she already had the ability to imagine red while she was inside it. Moreover, despite what some have thought, the ability hypothesis cannot be easily rescued by recasting it in terms of a more restrictive imaginative ability. My purpose here is not to take sides in the debate about physicalism, i.e., my criticism of the ability hypothesis is not offered in an attempt to defend the anti-physicalist conclusion of the knowledge argument. Rather, my purpose is to redeem the imagination from the misleading picture of it that discussion of the knowledge argument has fostered

Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism

Few these days dispute that the knowledge argument demonstrates an epistemic gap between the physical facts and the facts about experience. It is much more contentious whether that epistemic gap can be used to demonstrate a metaphysical gap of a kind that is inconsistent with physicalism. In this paper I will explore two attempts to block the inference from an epistemic gap to a metaphysical gap – the first from the phenomenal concept strategy, the second from Russellian monism – and suggest how the proponent of the knowledge argument might respond to each of these challenges. In doing so, I will draw on recent discussions of grounding and essence in the metaphysics literature

Consecuencias tributarias del comercio electrónico

Resumen: “Se mueven los bienes. Se mueven las personas. Se mueven las ideas. Y las culturas cambian”. (National Geographic , agosto 1999). Resumir de manera exhaustiva las implicaciones tributarias de la difusión del comercio electrónico significa desatender las características de un fenómeno en constante evolución y devenir. Por lo tanto, nos limitaremos a ofrecer una descripción y evaluación sólo parciales para la OCDE y los Estados Unidos. El término “comercio” deriva del latín c o m m e r c i u m, compuesto por c u my m e r x - m e r c i s , o sea mercancías. Originariamente los dos términos eran usados junto al verbo f a c e r e, en su acepción de actividad humana dirigida a la manipulación de la realidad. Facere cum mercei n d icaba la actividad humana que contribuía al cambio de las situaciones reales a través del uso de mercancías. Es importante notar que originariamente el intercambio de mercancías se efectuaba atribuyendo a éstas un valor de uso, sin que el intercambio generase una plusvalía real a beneficio del vendedor. La manipulación de la realidad se efectuaba por consiguiente a través del intercambio equitativo de mercancías, que cambiaba la situación momentánea de los sujetos interesados. Con el pasaje a una economía basada en la atribución de un valor de intercambio a las mercancías, se ha evidenciado la cuota de plusvalía de las mismas. La manipulación de la realidad ha empezado a adquirir las características de una actividad empresarial autónoma. El término comercio, desde la forma originaria de predicado, se ha convertido en un sustantivo que indica una clase específica de empresa económica. Si al término comercio añadimos el adjetivo electrónico, se evidencia una contradicción. Sería más correcto hablar de una actividad comercial efectuada electrónicamente: al usar el adverbio en lugar del adjetivo se subraya únicamente la manera en que se efectúa el comercio y no se cambian las características propias del término. En resumen, el significado originario del predicado f a c e r eh a cambiado su modalidad y contexto

L'analisi della dual income taxation e della tassazione dei redditi di capitale in rapporto alla progressivita' IRPEF nel sistema tributario italiano: la Dual Income Tax tra modello puro e atipicità applicative nell'Ordinamento italiano

Aborda a dupla tributação de rendimentos no Sistema Fiscal italiano. Analisa o modelo puro de tributação dupla de renda e sua aplicação atípica na Itália

Evolutionary arguments and the mind-body problem

Imagine slicing your hand with a steak knife. Inevitably, this leads to a characteristic unpleasant sensation, and just as reliably, to a withdrawal of the wounded limb. But can this rather mundane fact--and other similar facts--shed any light on the mind-body problem or the issue of the role of experience in causing behavior? In my dissertation, I explore this issue head on, and in the process clarify and criticize the arguments of philosophers who have given an affirmative answer to this question--philosophers such as William James and Herbert Spencer. These arguments have coupled evidence like the above with the fact that human beings have evolved, in order to make the case that epiphenomenalism with respect to qualia is false. My first task will be to formulate a rigorous version of a James-Spencer style argument, which will occupy us in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 is dedicated to answering a number of objections to the argument, in an effort to show that if there is a problem with it, this problem lies elsewhere. Chapter 3 explores alternative arguments in the spirit of the original one formulated in Chapter 1, and discusses any resulting effects on the plausibility of the conclusion. Chapter 4 is the capstone chapter of the dissertation. In it, I discuss a crucial objection to all arguments in the spirit of that given in the first chapter--namely, that physicalism has analogous flaws to epiphenomenalism where accommodating the relevant evidence is concerned. My conclusions in this final chapter are twofold. First, that even if there is no fatal flaw in the general strategy the evolutionary argument employs, it works against all forms of dualism, not just epiphenomenalism. And second, the accusations made in the objection are correct; physicalism suffers from problems analogous to those faced by epiphenomenalism (and, indeed, interactionism as well). Although the primary findings of the dissertation are negative, there are many lessons we can take from them along the way. Most prominent among them is an improved perspective on the appropriate roles of empirical findings and armchair philosophical theorizing in debate over the mind-body problem.Ph.D.Includes bibliographical references (p. 235-239)