Chapter 9 When Inner Speech Misleads

This chapter examines whether and when the experience of inner speech can be inaccurate and thereby mislead the subject. It presents a view about the representational content of speech experience generally and then applies it to inner speech in particular. On such a view, speech experience typically presents us with far more than simply the low-level acoustic properties of speech: it conveys the relevant mental states of the (actual or hypothetical) speaker. Similarly, inner speech presents inner speakers with their own mental states. In light of this, inner speech can mislead either by presenting the subject with mental states they do not in fact have, or by presenting these mental states as belonging to another agent. The chapter reflects on the sorts of contexts in which either of these could occur

Reading Margery Kempe’s inner voices

This article draws on research from the major collaborative research project Hearing the Voice, based at Durham University, to reconsider and foreground Margery Kempe’s inner voices, and hence, to return to an emphasis on inner, spiritual experience as shaping her Book. The richness of Margery’s multi-sensory experience, and the care with which it is depicted, is illuminated by and illuminates the experience of contemporary voice-hearers, offering a powerful alternative perspective to often reductive bio-medical understandings. Contemporary cognitive frameworks, particularly scientific accounts of inner speech, are in turn employed to open out Margery’s inner voices and to offer insights into the psychology of spiritual meditation

Chapter Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Inner Speech

Inner speech is a pervasive feature of our conscious lives.1 But what is inner speech, and what happens in unconscious processing that makes it the conscious experience that it is? A clue to answering this can be found in cases where the mechanisms that produce inner speaking behave unusually. In this paper, we suggest an account of a specific instance of this, namely, a particular subtype of auditory verbal hallucination (AVH), and draw some lessons about the processes that underlie normal inner speech

Concepts, abstractness and inner speech

We explore the role of inner speech (covert self-directed talk) during the acquisition and use of concepts differing in abstractness. Following Vygotsky, inner speech results from the internalization of linguistically mediated interactions that regulate cognition and behaviour. When we acquire and process abstract concepts, uncertainties about word meaning might lead us to search actively for their meaning. Inner speech might play a role in this searching process and be differentially involved in concept learning compared with use of known concepts. Importantly, inner speech comes in different varieties—e.g. it can be expanded or condensed (with the latter involving syntactic and semantic forms of abbreviation). Do we use inner speech differently with concepts varying in abstractness? Which kinds of inner speech do we preferentially use with different kinds of abstract concepts (e.g. emotions versus numbers)? What other features of inner speech, such as dialogicality, might facilitate our use of concepts varying in abstractness (by allowing us to monitor the limits of our knowledge in simulated social exchanges, through a process we term inner social metacognition)? In tackling these questions, we address the possibility that different varieties of inner speech are flexibly used during the acquisition of concepts and their everyday use

Inner speech as language process and cognitive tool.

Many people report a form of internal language known as inner speech (IS). This review examines recent growth of research interest in the phenomenon, which has broadly supported a theoretical model in which IS is a functional language process that can confer benefits for cognition in a range of domains. A key insight to have emerged in recent years is that IS is an embodied experience characterized by varied subjective qualities, which can be usefully modeled in artificial systems and whose neural signals have the potential to be decoded through advancing brain-computer interface technologies. Challenges for future research include understanding individual differences in IS and mapping form to function across IS subtypes

‘When my mummy and daddy aren't looking at me when I do my maths she helps me’; Children can be taught to create imaginary companions: An exploratory study

Spontaneous imaginary companion (SIC) creation in childhood is a typical imaginative play behaviour associated with advanced sociocognitive skills; however, the direction of causality has not been established. To investigate this experimentally, researchers must determine whether children can create, on request, qualitatively equivalent imaginary companions (ICs) to those created spontaneously. We examined whether children could create ICs, and how these compared to SICs. Nine elementary school children were encouraged to create ICs in a 3-month intervention. Accounts of elicited ICs were compared with an age-matched sample of interviewees with SICs. Seven children maintained ICs for 6 months post intervention. Template analysis of IC interviews found four themes: Realistic Play, Multifaceted IC Mind, Utility of the IC, and Elicited IC Across Time. Analysis suggests elicited and SICs were similar in nature and utility, although intervention ICs tended to have animal rather than human appearances. Findings support the argument that children can be encouraged to create ICs similar to SICs

Exploring the Ecological Validity of Thinking on Demand: Neural Correlates of Elicited vs. Spontaneously Occurring Inner Speech

Psychology and cognitive neuroscience often use standardized tasks to elicit particular experiences. We explore whether elicited experiences are similar to spontaneous experiences. In an MRI scanner, five participants performed tasks designed to elicit inner speech (covertly repeating experimenter-supplied words), inner seeing, inner hearing, feeling, and sensing. Then, in their natural environments, participants were trained in four days of random-beep-triggered Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES). They subsequently returned to the scanner for nine 25-min resting-state sessions; during each they received four DES beeps and described those moments (9 × 4 = 36 moments per participant) of spontaneously occurring experience. Enough of those moments included spontaneous inner speech to allow us to compare brain activation during spontaneous inner speech with what we had found in task-elicited inner speech. ROI analysis was used to compare activation in two relevant areas (Heschl’s gyrus and left inferior frontal gyrus). Task-elicited inner speech was associated with decreased activation in Heschl’s gyrus and increased activation in left inferior frontal gyrus. However, spontaneous inner speech had the opposite effect in Heschl’s gyrus and no significant effect in left inferior frontal gyrus. This study demonstrates how spontaneous phenomena can be investigated in MRI and calls into question the assumption that task-created phenomena are often neurophysiologically and psychologically similar to spontaneously occurring phenomena

The Ice in Voices:Understanding negative content in auditory-verbal hallucinations

Negative voice-content is the best sole predictor of whether the hearer of an auditory-verbal hallucination will experience distress/impairment necessitating contact with mental health services. Yet, what causes negative voice-content and how interventions may reduce it remains poorly understood. This paper offers definitions of negative voice content and considers what may cause negative voice-content. We propose a framework in which adverse life-events may underpin much negative voice-content, a relation which may be mediated by me- chanisms including hypervigilance, reduced social rank, shame and self-blame, dissociation, and altered emo- tional processing. At a neurological level, we note how the involvement of the amygdala and right Broca's area could drive negative voice-content. We observe that negative interactions between hearers and their voices may further drive negative voice-content. Finally, we consider the role of culture in shaping negative voice-content. This framework is intended to deepen and extend cognitive models of voice-hearing and spur further devel- opment of psychological interventions for those distressed by such voices. We note that much of the relevant research in this area remains to be performed or replicated. We conclude that more attention needs to be paid to methods for reducing negative voice-content, and urge further research in this important area