Achievements, value, and God: an essay on the cognitive success of religious knowledge

Recent literature in religious epistemology has overlooked a significant debate in mainstream epistemology. In short, theories in religious epistemology have failed to consider the value problem. This essay, then, hopes to rectify this omission by arguing that one of the most influential accounts of religious epistemology - reformed epistemology - fails to adequately account for the value of knowledge. I argue, however, that a reasonable way out for the reformed epistemologist comes by way of endorsing the achievement thesis. The achievement thesis, put simply, states that knowledge is valuable because it is a cognitive achievement - unlike, for example, mere true belief. The central question of this essay, then, is this: Is Knowledge of God a Cognitive Achievement? In order to better answer this question I highlight two different ways in which one can understand the nature of cognitive achievements. First, a cognitive achievement can be understood as success from ability that is always primarily creditable to the agent. Or, second, a cognitive achievement can be understood as success from ability that is jointly creditable to the agent. Both, I argue, are compatible with knowledge and the achievement thesis. Whether knowledge of God is primarily or jointly creditable, however, will depend on the way in which one understands the role the agent plays in the belief forming process. Given the nature of reformed epistemology, I argue that knowledge of God is the kind of achievement that is jointly creditable. Further, and central to the argument, I argue that the reformed epistemologist is in a good position to meet the requirements for the strong achievement thesis. The strong achievement thesis argues that an achievement should be understood in terms of overcoming some obstacle whereby the agent's belief is the result of some ability that can be credited to the agent. The account I propose not only meets the requirements of the strong achievement thesis, but also retains a distinctive feature of reformed epistemology - namely, that the belief in God can be said to overcome the obstacle of cognitive malfunction that, as the reformed epistemologist argues, is brought about by sin. It's an achievement becasue it overcomes an excessively hostile environment (what I call the maxi-environment) that is not conducive to belief in God given the cognitive consequence of sin. In the end, it is possible to provide an account of reformed epistemology where the value of knowledge (over and above mere true belief) is adequately demonstrated

Reformed Epistemology and the Epistemic Status of Religious Belief

I discuss the reformed epistemologist and his claim that one is within one’s epistemic rights in believing in God without any evidence or argument. The basis for this claim hinges on a parity argument that compares one’s perceptual experiences with religious experiences. It is argued by the reformed epistemologist that in the same way that perceptual experience is justified without evidence, so too are religious experiences. If the parity argument is successful, then belief in God can be seen as properly basic. It is this controversial claim, then, that will be the focus of my study. My research will begin with an overview of key ideas within reformed epistemology followed by a three major objections. Of the three objections presented, I will be primarily concerned with the last objection which deals with defeaters of religious belief. I will look at whether a belief retains its basicality once a defeater-defeater is presented. I will suggest that this objection must be defeated in order for reformed epistemology to be of any consequence