A deep active inference model of the rubber-hand illusion

Understanding how perception and action deal with sensorimotor conflicts, such as the rubber-hand illusion (RHI), is essential to understand how the body adapts to uncertain situations. Recent results in humans have shown that the RHI not only produces a change in the perceived arm location, but also causes involuntary forces. Here, we describe a deep active inference agent in a virtual environment, which we subjected to the RHI, that is able to account for these results. We show that our model, which deals with visual high-dimensional inputs, produces similar perceptual and force patterns to those found in humans.Comment: 8 pages, 3 figures, Accepted in 1st International Workshop on Active Inference, in Conjunction with European Conference of Machine Learning 2020. The final authenticated publication is available online at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64919-7_1

When passive feels active - delusion-proneness alters self-recognition in the moving rubber hand illusion

Psychotic patients have problems with bodily self-recognition such as the experience of self-produced actions (sense of agency) and the perception of the body as their own (sense of ownership). While it has been shown that such impairments in psychotic patients can be explained by hypersalient processing of external sensory input it has also been suggested that they lack normal efference copy in voluntary action. However, it is not known how problems with motor predictions like efference copy contribute to impaired sense of agency and ownership in psychosis or psychosis-related states. We used a rubber hand illusion based on finger movements and measured sense of agency and ownership to compute a bodily self-recognition score in delusion-proneness (indexed by Peters’ Delusion Inventory - PDI). A group of healthy subjects (n=71) experienced active movements (involving motor predictions) or passive movements (lacking motor predictions). We observed a highly significant correlation between delusion-proneness and self-recognition in the passive conditions, while no such effect was observed in the active conditions. This was seen for both ownership and agency scores. The result suggests that delusion-proneness is associated with hypersalient external input in passive conditions, resulting in an abnormal experience of the illusion. We hypothesize that this effect is not present in the active condition because deficient motor predictions counteract hypersalience in psychosis proneness

Owning an overweight or underweight body: distinguishing the physical, experienced and virtual body

Our bodies are the most intimately familiar objects we encounter in our perceptual environment. Virtual reality provides a unique method to allow us to experience having a very different body from our own, thereby providing a valuable method to explore the plasticity of body representation. In this paper, we show that women can experience ownership over a whole virtual body that is considerably smaller or larger than their physical body. In order to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying body ownership, we use an embodiment questionnaire, and introduce two new behavioral response measures: an affordance estimation task (indirect measure of body size) and a body size estimation task (direct measure of body size). Interestingly, after viewing the virtual body from first person perspective, both the affordance and the body size estimation tasks indicate a change in the perception of the size of the participant’s experienced body. The change is biased by the size of the virtual body (overweight or underweight). Another novel aspect of our study is that we distinguish between the physical, experienced and virtual bodies, by asking participants to provide affordance and body size estimations for each of the three bodies separately. This methodological point is important for virtual reality experiments investigating body ownership of a virtual body, because it offers a better understanding of which cues (e.g. visual, proprioceptive, memory, or a combination thereof) influence body perception, and whether the impact of these cues can vary between different setups

Embodiment and body awareness in meditators

[EN] Mindfulness practice consists of focusing attention in an intentional way on the experience of the present moment, including bodily sensations, thoughts or feelings, and the environment, with an attitude of acceptance and without judging. The body and, especially, body awareness are key elements in mindfulness. Embodiment or the feeling of being located within one's physical body is a related concept, and it is composed of the sense of ownership, location, and agency of the body. The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is an experimental paradigm that has been used to understand the mechanisms of embodiment, and evidence shows that body awareness modulates this illusion. To our knowledge, no studies have analyzed embodiment processes in meditators. The aim of this study is to use the RHI to analyze the mechanisms of embodiment and its relationship with body awareness and mindfulness in meditators and non-meditators. The sample was composed of long-term meditators (n = 15) and non-meditators (n = 15). Objective and self-report measures for embodiment with the RHI and self-report questionnaires of body awareness and mindfulness were administered. One-way ANOVA revealed significant differences between groups in sense of agency in the rubber hand. Meditators experienced less sense of agency in the rubber hand than non-meditators. Pearson's correlations showed that this lower sense of agency in the rubber hand was associated with higher body awareness and mindfulness. Results highlight the role of body awareness and mindfulness in embodiment mechanisms. This study has clinical implications, especially in psychopathological disorders that can be influenced by disturbances in these processes.The authors would like to acknowledge the "BODYTA" project (Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, PSI2014-51928-R), "PROMOSAM" (Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, PSI2014-56303-REDT), and "Excellence Research Program PROMETEO II" (Generalitat Valenciana, Conselleria de Educacion, Cultura y Deporte, PROMETEOII/2013/003). CIBERobn is an initiate of the ISCIII. PROMOSAM Excellence in Research Program (PSI2014-56303-REDT), MINECO, Spain.Cebolla, A.; Miragall, M.; Palomo, P.; Llorens Rodríguez, R.; Soler, J.; Demarzo, M.; García Campayo, J.... (2016). Embodiment and body awareness in meditators. Mindfulness. 7(6):1297-1305. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12671-016-0569-xS1297130576Aguado, J., Luciano, J. V., Cebolla, A., Serrano-Blanco, A., Soler, J., & García-Campayo, J. (2015). 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Characterizing first and third person viewpoints and their alternation for embodied interaction in virtual reality

Empirical research on the bodily self has shown that the body representation is malleable, and prone to manipulation when conflicting sensory stimuli are presented. Using Virtual Reality (VR) we assessed the effects of manipulating multisensory feedback (full body control and visuo-tactile congruence) and visual perspective (first and third person perspective) on the sense of embodying a virtual body that was exposed to a virtual threat. We also investigated how subjects behave when the possibility of alternating between first and third person perspective at will was presented. Our results support that illusory ownership of a virtual body can be achieved in both first and third person perspectives under congruent visuo-motor-tactile condition. However, subjective body ownership and reaction to threat were generally stronger for first person perspective and alternating condition than for third person perspective. This suggests that the possibility of alternating perspective is compatible with a strong sense of embodiment, which is meaningful for the design of new embodied VR experiences

Rubber hands in space: the role of distance and relative position in the rubber hand illusion

The rubber hand illusion (RHI) is a perceptual phenomenon in which participants experience ownership over a fake model hand through synchronous visuotactile stimulation. Several studies have shown that the illusion occurs only when both hands are in close proximity to each other. In the present study, we systematically examined the role of relative position (lateral, distal) and distance (13-75 cm) of the model hand (with respect to participants' real hand) on illusion experience across both lateral and distal positions. Furthermore, we also compared different facets of the subjective illusion experience; the experience of the model hand being part of one's body (i.e., ownership) and the perceptual fusion of vision and touch (i.e., referral of touch). In two experiments we observed indications for a stronger illusion experiences in distal compared to lateral positions of identical distances, indicating that the illusory effects may vary as a function of the relative position of the hand. Our results also showed that manipulations of distance differently modulated both facets of the illusion. While ownership was restricted to near distances, referral of touch sensations remained stable at farther distances. These results are interpreted in relation to variations in sensory weighting across different planes