Negation in context

The present essay includes six thematically connected papers on negation in the areas of the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic and metaphysics. Each of the chapters besides the first, which puts each the chapters to follow into context, highlights a central problem negation poses to a certain area of philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses the problem of logical revisionism and whether there is any room for genuine disagreement, and hence shared meaning, between the classicist and deviant's respective uses of 'not'. If there is not, revision is impossible. I argue that revision is indeed possible and provide an account of negation as contradictoriness according to which a number of alleged negations are declared genuine. Among them are the negations of FDE (First-Degree Entailment) and a wide family of other relevant logics, LP (Priest's dialetheic "Logic of Paradox"), Kleene weak and strong 3-valued logics with either "exclusion" or "choice" negation, and intuitionistic logic. Chapter 3 discusses the problem of furnishing intuitionistic logic with an empirical negation for adequately expressing claims of the form 'A is undecided at present' or 'A may never be decided' the latter of which has been argued to be intuitionistically inconsistent. Chapter 4 highlights the importance of various notions of consequence-as-s-preservation where s may be falsity (versus untruth), indeterminacy or some other semantic (or "algebraic") value, in formulating rationality constraints on speech acts and propositional attitudes such as rejection, denial and dubitability. Chapter 5 provides an account of the nature of truth values regarded as objects. It is argued that only truth exists as the maximal truthmaker. The consequences this has for semantics representationally construed are considered and it is argued that every logic, from classical to non-classical, is gappy. Moreover, a truthmaker theory is developed whereby only positive truths, an account of which is also developed therein, have truthmakers. Chapter 6 investigates the definability of negation as "absolute" impossibility, i.e. where the notion of necessity or possibility in question corresponds to the global modality. The modality is not readily definable in the usual Kripkean languages and so neither is impossibility taken in the broadest sense. The languages considered here include one with counterfactual operators and propositional quantification and another bimodal language with a modality and its complementary. Among the definability results we give some preservation and translation results as well

Through and beyond classicality: analyticity, embeddings, infinity

Structural proof theory deals with formal representation of proofs and with the investigation of their properties. This thesis provides an analysis of various non-classical logical systems using proof-theoretic methods. The approach consists in the formulation of analytic calculi for these logics which are then used in order to study their metalogical properties. A specific attention is devoted to studying the connections between classical and non-classical reasoning. In particular, the use of analytic sequent calculi allows one to regain desirable structural properties which are lost in non-classical contexts. In this sense, proof-theoretic versions of embeddings between non-classical logics - both finitary and infinitary - prove to be a useful tool insofar as they build a bridge between different logical regions

Strategic logics : complexity, completeness and expressivity

by transferring normative attributes from an agent to another. Such interactions are called delegation. Formal models of delegation and control were studied in, e.g., [189, 149, 191]. In this work, we consider the scenario where agents delegate control over propositions to other agents. The distinction between controllable and uncontrollable propositions stems from areas like discrete event systems and control theory, where, e.g., Boutilier [39] studied control in the context of deontic logic. Control and controllable propositions were also studied in [52, 66, 249, 248]. We now give an overview of the thesis. The main purpose of Chapter 2 is to introduce basic concepts and notation and to review relevant literature. The first section presents a brief survey on modal logic. Then, in sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4, we introduce epistemic, temporal and strategic modal logics and state known results that characterise their expressivity and computational complexity. In particular, we consider variants of ATL as extensions of branching-time logics. With such ATL-like logics we can describe dynamic multi-agent interactions. In Section 2.5, we discuss extensions of ATL with epistemic notions. Additionally, we suggest a framework for memory-bounded strategic reasoning. In particular, we introduce an epistemic variant of ATL that accounts for agents with limited memory resources as this case was neglected in the literature to date. In Chapter 3, we investigate the computational complexity of ATL and its epistemic extension ATEL. We show in detail how 'the complexity of the satisfiability problem for both logics can be settled at ExpTIME-complete. The part of the chapter about ATL is based on the paper 'ATL Satisfiability is Indeed ExpTIME-COmplete' by Walther, Lutz, Wolter and Wooldridge in the Journal of Logic and Computation, 2006 (265)' and the part about ATEL is based on the paper 'ATEL with Common and Distributed Knowledge is ExpTime-Complete' by Walther which was presented at the 4th Workshop on Methods for Modalities, Humbolt University, Berlin, December 1-2, 2005 [264]. In Chapter 4, we aim to extend the expressiveness of ATL without increasing its computational complexity. We introduce explicit names for strategies in the object language and extend modal operators with the possibility to bind agents to strategy names. In this way, we can fix the decisions of agents that possibly belong to several coalitions. By identifying the behaviqur of agents, we can reason about the effects of agents changing coalitions. Dynamic coalitions provide more flexibility to adapt abilities to a changing environment. We investigate the expressivity of the resulting logic ATLES and compare it to ATL and ATL*. Moreover, we formulate two model checking problems for ATLES and investigate their complexity as well as the complexity of the satisfiability problem for ATLES. Additionally, we present a complete axiomatisation. This chapter is based on the paper 'Alternating-time Temporal Logic with Explicit Strategies' by Walther, van der Hoek and Wooldridge which is going to presented at the 11th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge (TARK), Brussels, Belgium, June 25-27, 2007 [266]

Epistemic Modality, Mind, and Mathematics

This book concerns the foundations of epistemic modality. I examine the nature of epistemic modality, when the modal operator is interpreted as concerning both apriority and conceivability, as well as states of knowledge and belief. The book demonstrates how epistemic modality relates to the computational theory of mind; metaphysical modality; the types of mathematical modality; to the epistemic status of large cardinal axioms, undecidable propositions, and abstraction principles in the philosophy of mathematics; to the modal profile of rational intuition; and to the types of intention, when the latter is interpreted as a modal mental state. Chapter \textbf{2} argues for a novel type of expressivism based on the duality between the categories of coalgebras and algebras, and argues that the duality permits of the reconciliation between modal cognitivism and modal expressivism. Chapter \textbf{3} provides an abstraction principle for epistemic intensions. Chapter \textbf{4} advances a topic-sensitive two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, and provides three novel interpretations of the framework along with the epistemic and metasemantic. Chapter \textbf{5} applies the fixed points of the modal $\mu$-calculus in order to account for the iteration of epistemic states, by contrast to availing of modal axiom 4 (i.e. the KK principle). Chapter \textbf{6} advances a solution to the Julius Caesar problem based on Fine's "criterial" identity conditions which incorporate conditions on essentiality and grounding. Chapter \textbf{7} provides a ground-theoretic regimentation of the proposals in the metaphysics of consciousness and examines its bearing on the two-dimensional conceivability argument against physicalism. The topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{4} is availed of in order for epistemic states to be a guide to metaphysical states in the hyperintensional setting. Chapter \textbf{8} examines the modal commitments of abstractionism, in particular necessitism, and epistemic modality and the epistemology of abstraction. Chapter \textbf{9} examines the modal profile of $\Omega$-logic in set theory. Chapter \textbf{10} examines the interaction between epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics, epistemic set theory, and absolute decidability. Chapter \textbf{11} avails of modal coalgebraic automata to interpret the defining properties of indefinite extensibility, and avails of epistemic two-dimensional semantics in order to account for the interaction of the interpretational and objective modalities thereof. The hyperintensional, topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics developed in chapter \textbf{2} is applied in chapters \textbf{7}, \textbf{8}, \textbf{10}, and \textbf{11}. Chapter \textbf{12} provides a modal logic for rational intuition and provides four models of hyperintensional semantics. Chapter \textbf{13} examines modal responses to the alethic paradoxes. Chapter \textbf{14} examines, finally, the modal semantics for the different types of intention and the relation of the latter to evidential decision theory

Automated Deduction – CADE 28

This open access book constitutes the proceeding of the 28th International Conference on Automated Deduction, CADE 28, held virtually in July 2021. The 29 full papers and 7 system descriptions presented together with 2 invited papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 76 submissions. CADE is the major forum for the presentation of research in all aspects of automated deduction, including foundations, applications, implementations, and practical experience. The papers are organized in the following topics: Logical foundations; theory and principles; implementation and application; ATP and AI; and system descriptions

Higher-Order Logical Pluralism as Metaphysics

Higher-order metaphysics is in full swing. One of its principle aims is to show that higher-order logic can be our foundational metaphysical theory. A foundational metaphysical theory would be a simple, powerful, systematic theory which would ground all of our metaphysical theories from modality, to grounding, to essence, and so on. A satisfactory account of its epistemology would in turn yield a satisfactory epistemology of these theories. And it would function as the final court of appeals for metaphysical questions. It would play the role for our metaphysical community that ZFC plays for the mathematical community. I think there is much promise in this project. There is clear value in having a shared foundational theory to which metaphysicians can appeal. And there is reason to think that higher-order logic can play this role. After all, it has long been known that one can do math in higher-order logic. And there is growing reason to think that one can do metaphysics in higher-order logic in much the same way. However, most of the research approaches higher-order logic from a monist perspective, according to which there is 'one true' higher-order logic. And in the midst of the enthusiasm, metaphysicians seem to have overlooked that this approach leaves the program susceptible to epistemological problems that plague monism about other areas, like set theory. The most significant of these is the Benacerraf Problem. This is the problem of explaining the reliability of our higher-order-logical beliefs. The problem is sufficiently serious that, in the set-theoretic case, it has led to a reconception of the foundations of mathematics, known as pluralism. In this dissertation I investigate a pluralist approach to higher-order metaphysics. The basic idea is that any higher-order logic which can play the role of our foundational metaphysical theory correctly describes the metaphysical structure of the world, in much the way that the set-theoretic pluralist maintains that any set theory which can play the role of our foundational mathematical theory is true of a mind-independent platonic universe of sets. I outline my view about what it takes for a higher-order logic to play this role, what it means for such a logic to correctly describe the metaphysical structure of the world, and how it is that different higher-order logics which seem to disagree with each other can meet both of these conditions. I conclude that higher-order logical pluralism is the most tenable version of the higher-order logic as metaphysics program. Higher-order logical pluralism constitutes a radical departure from conventional wisdom, requiring a significant reconception of the nature of validity, modality, and metaphysics in general. It renders moot some of the most central questions in these domains, such as: Is the law of excluded middle valid? Is it the case that necessarily everything is necessarily something? Is the grounding relation transitive? On this picture, these questions no longer have objective answers. They become like the question of whether the Continuum Hypothesis is true, according to the set-theoretic pluralist. The only significant question in the neighborhood of the aforementioned questions is: which metaphysical principles are best suited to the task at hand