Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics

A substantial school in the philosophy of science identifies Bayesian inference with inductive inference and even rationality as such, and seems to be strengthened by the rise and practical success of Bayesian statistics. We argue that the most successful forms of Bayesian statistics do not actually support that particular philosophy but rather accord much better with sophisticated forms of hypothetico-deductivism. We examine the actual role played by prior distributions in Bayesian models, and the crucial aspects of model checking and model revision, which fall outside the scope of Bayesian confirmation theory. We draw on the literature on the consistency of Bayesian updating and also on our experience of applied work in social science. Clarity about these matters should benefit not just philosophy of science, but also statistical practice. At best, the inductivist view has encouraged researchers to fit and compare models without checking them; at worst, theorists have actively discouraged practitioners from performing model checking because it does not fit into their framework.Comment: 36 pages, 5 figures. v2: Fixed typo in caption of figure 1. v3: Further typo fixes. v4: Revised in response to referee

Literal Perceptual Inference

In this paper, I argue that theories of perception that appeal to Helmholtz’s idea of unconscious inference (“Helmholtzian” theories) should be taken literally, i.e. that the inferences appealed to in such theories are inferences in the full sense of the term, as employed elsewhere in philosophy and in ordinary discourse. In the course of the argument, I consider constraints on inference based on the idea that inference is a deliberate acton, and on the idea that inferences depend on the syntactic structure of representations. I argue that inference is a personal-level but sometimes unconscious process that cannot in general be distinguished from association on the basis of the structures of the representations over which it’s defined. I also critique arguments against representationalist interpretations of Helmholtzian theories, and argue against the view that perceptual inference is encapsulated in a module

Convergence Rates of Gaussian ODE Filters

A recently-introduced class of probabilistic (uncertainty-aware) solvers for ordinary differential equations (ODEs) applies Gaussian (Kalman) filtering to initial value problems. These methods model the true solution $x$ and its first $q$ derivatives \emph{a priori} as a Gauss--Markov process $\boldsymbol{X}$, which is then iteratively conditioned on information about $\dot{x}$. This article establishes worst-case local convergence rates of order $q+1$ for a wide range of versions of this Gaussian ODE filter, as well as global convergence rates of order $q$ in the case of $q=1$ and an integrated Brownian motion prior, and analyses how inaccurate information on $\dot{x}$ coming from approximate evaluations of $f$ affects these rates. Moreover, we show that, in the globally convergent case, the posterior credible intervals are well calibrated in the sense that they globally contract at the same rate as the truncation error. We illustrate these theoretical results by numerical experiments which might indicate their generalizability to $q \in \{2,3,\dots\}$.Comment: 26 pages, 5 figure