On staying grounded and avoiding Quixotic dead ends

The 15 articles in this special issue on The Representation of Concepts illustrate the rich variety of theoretical positions and supporting research that characterize the area. Although much agreement exists among contributors, much disagreement exists as well, especially about the roles of grounding and abstraction in conceptual processing. I first review theoretical approaches raised in these articles that I believe are Quixotic dead ends, namely, approaches that are principled and inspired but likely to fail. In the process, I review various theories of amodal symbols, their distortions of grounded theories, and fallacies in the evidence used to support them. Incorporating further contributions across articles, I then sketch a theoretical approach that I believe is likely to be successful, which includes grounding, abstraction, flexibility, explaining classic conceptual phenomena, and making contact with real-world situations. This account further proposes that (1) a key element of grounding is neural reuse, (2) abstraction takes the forms of multimodal compression, distilled abstraction, and distributed linguistic representation (but not amodal symbols), and (3) flexible context-dependent representations are a hallmark of conceptual processing

Consciosusness in Cognitive Architectures. A Principled Analysis of RCS, Soar and ACT-R

This report analyses the aplicability of the principles of consciousness developed in the ASys project to three of the most relevant cognitive architectures. This is done in relation to their aplicability to build integrated control systems and studying their support for general mechanisms of real-time consciousness.\ud To analyse these architectures the ASys Framework is employed. This is a conceptual framework based on an extension for cognitive autonomous systems of the General Systems Theory (GST).\ud A general qualitative evaluation criteria for cognitive architectures is established based upon: a) requirements for a cognitive architecture, b) the theoretical framework based on the GST and c) core design principles for integrated cognitive conscious control systems

Artificial Cognition for Social Human-Robot Interaction: An Implementation

© 2017 The Authors Human–Robot Interaction challenges Artificial Intelligence in many regards: dynamic, partially unknown environments that were not originally designed for robots; a broad variety of situations with rich semantics to understand and interpret; physical interactions with humans that requires fine, low-latency yet socially acceptable control strategies; natural and multi-modal communication which mandates common-sense knowledge and the representation of possibly divergent mental models. This article is an attempt to characterise these challenges and to exhibit a set of key decisional issues that need to be addressed for a cognitive robot to successfully share space and tasks with a human. We identify first the needed individual and collaborative cognitive skills: geometric reasoning and situation assessment based on perspective-taking and affordance analysis; acquisition and representation of knowledge models for multiple agents (humans and robots, with their specificities); situated, natural and multi-modal dialogue; human-aware task planning; human–robot joint task achievement. The article discusses each of these abilities, presents working implementations, and shows how they combine in a coherent and original deliberative architecture for human–robot interaction. Supported by experimental results, we eventually show how explicit knowledge management, both symbolic and geometric, proves to be instrumental to richer and more natural human–robot interactions by pushing for pervasive, human-level semantics within the robot's deliberative system

Undefining Man: A Case for Symbolic Animal Communication via Refutation of Kenneth Burke\u27s Definition of Man

There have been tendencies in various fields to use communication as a way of differentiating humans and other species. Even when individuals are confronted with empirical evidence to the contrary, many still hold onto the notion that humans are in a communicative position clearly divergent in all ways from animals. This thesis will utilize Kenneth Burke\u27s Definition of Man as a launching point to support a claim that animals utilize their conscious cognitive abilities to communicate symbolically