Justification by an infinity of conditional probabilities

Today it is generally assumed that epistemic justification comes in degrees. The consequences, however, have not been adequately appreciated. In this paper we show that the assumption invalidates some venerable attacks on infinitism: once we accept that epistemic justification is gradual, an infinitist stance makes perfect sense. It is only without the assumption that infinitism runs into difficulties

The Implementation, Interpretation, and Justification of Likelihoods in Cosmology

I discuss the formal implementation, interpretation, and justification of likelihood attributions in cosmology. I show that likelihood arguments in cosmology suffer from significant conceptual and formal problems that undermine their applicability in this context

The Problem of Confirmation in the Everett Interpretation

I argue that the Oxford school Everett interpretation is internally incoherent, because we cannot claim that in an Everettian universe the kinds of reasoning we have used to arrive at our beliefs about quantum mechanics would lead us to form true beliefs. I show that in an Everettian context, the experimental evidence that we have available could not provide empirical confirmation for quantum mechanics, and moreover that we would not even be able to establish reference to the theoretical entities of quantum mechanics. I then consider a range of existing Everettian approaches to the probability problem and show that they do not succeed in overcoming this incoherence

An information theory for preferences

Recent literature in the last Maximum Entropy workshop introduced an analogy between cumulative probability distributions and normalized utility functions. Based on this analogy, a utility density function can de defined as the derivative of a normalized utility function. A utility density function is non-negative and integrates to unity. These two properties form the basis of a correspondence between utility and probability. A natural application of this analogy is a maximum entropy principle to assign maximum entropy utility values. Maximum entropy utility interprets many of the common utility functions based on the preference information needed for their assignment, and helps assign utility values based on partial preference information. This paper reviews maximum entropy utility and introduces further results that stem from the duality between probability and utility

Gibbs conditioning extended, Boltzmann conditioning introduced

Conditional Equi-concentration of Types on I-projections (ICET) and Extended Gibbs Conditioning Principle (EGCP) provide an extension of Conditioned Weak Law of Large Numbers and of Gibbs Conditioning Principle to the case of non-unique Relative Entropy Maximizing (REM) distribution (aka I-projection). ICET and EGCP give a probabilistic justification to REM under rather general conditions. mu-projection variants of the results are introduced. They provide a probabilistic justification to Maximum Probability (MaxProb) method. 'REM/MaxEnt or MaxProb?' question is discussed, briefly. Jeffreys Conditioning Principle is mentioned.Comment: Three major changes: 1) Definition of proper I-projection has been changed. 2) An argument preceding Eq. (7) at the proof of ICET is now correctly stated. 3) Abstract was rewritten. To appear at Proceedings of MaxEnt 2004 worksho

Justification by Infinite Loops

In an earlier paper we have shown that a proposition can have a well-defined probability value, even if its justification consists of an infinite linear chain. In the present paper we demonstrate that the same holds if the justification takes the form of a closed loop. Moreover, in the limit that the size of the loop tends to infinity, the probability value of the justified proposition is always well-defined, whereas this is not always so for the infinite linear chain. This suggests that infinitism sits more comfortably with a coherentist view of justification than with an approach in which justification is portrayed as a linear process

Epistemic Akrasia and Epistemic Reasons

It seems that epistemically rational agents should avoid incoherent combinations of beliefs and should respond correctly to their epistemic reasons. However, some situations seem to indicate that such requirements cannot be simultaneously satisfied. In such contexts, assuming that there is no unsolvable dilemma of epistemic rationality, either (i) it could be rational that one’s higher-order attitudes do not align with one’s first-order attitudes or (ii) requirements such as responding correctly to epistemic reasons that agents have are not genuine rationality requirements. This result doesn’t square well with plausible theoretical assumptions concerning epistemic rationality. So, how do we solve this puzzle? In this paper, I will suggest that an agent can always reason from infallible higher-order reasons. This provides a partial solution to the above puzzle

There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning

The justificatory force of empirical reasoning always depends upon the existence of some synthetic, a priori justification. The reasoner must begin with justified, substantive constraints on both the prior probability of the conclusion and certain conditional probabilities; otherwise, all possible degrees of belief in the conclusion are left open given the premises. Such constraints cannot in general be empirically justified, on pain of infinite regress. Nor does subjective Bayesianism offer a way out for the empiricist. Despite often-cited convergence theorems, subjective Bayesians cannot hold that any empirical hypothesis is ever objectively justified in the relevant sense. Rationalism is thus the only alternative to an implausible skepticism