La Teorí­a de Juegos en la Administración Estratégica Empresarial

Este artí­culo proporciona una revisión de literatura de la historia de la teorí­a de juegos y sus pronósticos, así­ como también modelos mentales y emociones estratégicas aplicadas en las instituciones económicas y la sociedad en general. El hilo común en este trabajo es referirse a las teorí­as en la administración estratégica empresarial basada en la teorí­a de juegos para de esta manera tener una comprensión profunda de la aplicabilidad de estas teorí­as en los mercados competitivos

Pandemic Emotions: The Good, The Bad, and The Unconscious —Implications for Public Health, Financial Economics, Law, and Leadership

Pandemics lead to emotions that can be good, bad, and unconscious. This Article offers an interdisciplinary analysis of how emotions during pandemics affect people’s responses to pandemics, public health, financial economics, law, and leadership. Pandemics are heart-breaking health crises. Crises produce emotions that impact decision-making. This Article analyzes how fear and anger over COVID-19 fueled anti-Asian and anti-Asian American hatred and racism. COVID-19 caused massive tragic economic, emotional, mental, physical, and psychological suffering. These difficulties are interconnected and lead to vicious cycles. Fear distorts people’s decision readiness, deliberation, information acquisition, risk perception, and thinking. Distortions affect people’s financial, health, and political decisions, causing additional fears. Emotions have direct health impacts and indirect behavioral impacts, which in turn have their own health impacts. People differ vastly in whether, how much, and when they experience anxiety, complacency, and panic during pandemics. A common path is to feel some anxiety initially, then panic, and finally become complacent. This Article advocates these responses to pandemics: (1) paying people directly monthly pandemic financial assistance, (2) encouraging people to practice mindfulness, (3) gently enforcing Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions, (4) fostering accurate information acquisition about pandemics, and (5) applying psychological game theory to better understand emotions that depend on beliefs about leadership

Bargaining over strategies of non-cooperative games

We propose a bargaining process supergame over the strategies to play in a non-cooperative game. The agreement reached by players at the end of the bargaining process is the strategy profile that they will play in the original non-cooperative game. We analyze the subgame perfect equilibria of this supergame, and its implications on the original game. We discuss existence, uniqueness, and efficiency of the agreement reachable through this bargaining process. We illustrate the consequences of applying such a process to several common two-player non-cooperative games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the Hawk-Dove Game, the Trust Game, and the Ultimatum Game. In each of them, the proposed bargaining process gives rise to Pareto-efficient agreements that are typically different from the Nash equilibrium of the original games

Performance of Trust-Based Governance

Trust is crucial for the success of interorganizational relationships, yet we lack a clear understanding of when trust-based governance is likely to succeed or fail. This paper explores that topic via a closed-form and a computational analysis of a formal model based on the well-known trust game. We say that trust-based governance performs better in situations where it results in a willingness to be vulnerable with trustworthy others and an unwillingness to be vulnerable with untrustworthy others. We find that trust-based governance performs better in situations in which (a) trustworthy and untrustworthy partners exhibit markedly different behavior (high behavioral risk) or (b) the organization is willing to be vulnerable despite doubts concerning the partner’s trustworthiness (low trust threshold)

Sharing Guilt: How Better Access to Information May Backfire

We study strategic communication between a customer and an advisor who is privately informed about the most suitable choice for the customer but whose preferences are misaligned with the customer’s preferences. The advisor sends a message to the customer who, in turn, can secure herself from bad advice by acquiring costly information on her own. In our experiments, we find that making the customer’s information acquisition less costly leads to less prosocial behavior of the advisor. This can be explained by a model of shared guilt, which predicts a shift in causal attribution of guilt from the advisor to the customer if the latter could have avoided her ex post disappointment. We conclude that providing better access to information through, for example, consumer protection regulation or digital information aggregation and dissemination, may have unintended negative consequences on peoples’ willingness to take responsibility for each other

IMPACTO DO RECORDKEEPING NA CONFIANÇA E RECIPROCIDADE EM UMA CULTURA INDIVIDUALISTA VERSUS COLETIVISTA: UMA ANÁLISE EXPERIMENTAL

A presente pesquisa buscou verificar a influência do recordkeeping sobre a confiança e reciprocidade, analisando o efeito moderador da cultura individualista versus coletivista de estudantes de graduação de ciências contábeis. Utilizou-se o questionário “Values Survey Module 1994”, desenvolvido por Hofstede (1990) para captar a dimensão cultural individualista versus coletivista. Para avaliar a confiança e a reciprocidade foi utilizado o modelo experimental de Basu et al. (2009), através da aplicação do trust game. No desenho do jogo existiam participantes ocupando o papel de investidor e participantes ocupando o papel de administrador como ilustração de uma transação entre agentes estranhos. O grupo de tratamento foi aquele cujo cenário compreendia um ambiente econômico onde os jogadores tinham a opção de manter registros (recordkeeping) e, como grupo de controle, o cenário em que os participantes não tiveram acesso ao recordkeeping. Para testar as hipóteses comportamentais foram aplicadas regressões com dados em painel de efeito aleatórios estimado pelos mínimos quadrados generalizados (GLS). Os resultados indicaram que os investidores mais individualistas/menos coletivistas aumentaram o nível de confiança, enquanto não foi possível identificar a influência da contabilidade no nível de reciprocidade dos agentes. Notou-se também que o aumento da confiança e reciprocidade está relacionado com sujeitos com idade menor. Entre as limitações da pesquisa é possível citar que os achados não podem ser generalizados para o conjunto da população e que, embora haja uma simulação envolvendo vários períodos, não há um acompanhamento longitudinal dos indivíduos

Incomplete-Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game

International audienc

Incomplete-information models of guilt aversion in the trust game

In the theory of psychological games it is assumed that players’ preferences on material consequences depend on endogenous beliefs. Most of the applications of this theoretical framework assume that the psychological utility functions representing such preferences are common knowledge. However, this is often unrealistic. In particular, it cannot be true in experimental games where players are subjects drawn at random from a population. Therefore, an incomplete-information methodology is needed. We take a first step in this direction, focusing on guilt aversion in the Trust Game. In our models, agents have heterogeneous belief hierarchies. We characterize equilibria where trust occurs with positive probability. Our analysis illustrates the incomplete-information approach to psychological games and can help to organize experimental results in the Trust Game