Philosophy and science in Berkeley’s de motu

My main Intention in writing this thesis is to give a greater insight into Berkeley's philosophical concerns with eighteenth century science as expressed in de Motu. I have written this thesis in four parts, covering the scientific background, the philosohical background, an exposition of de Motu itself, and a more modern treatment of de Motu.In the scientific background I cover such topics as the relation between Descartes and Newton, Newton’s achievement, Newton's position regarding such matters as the status of gravity and motion. In the philosophical background I discuss such matters as Berkeley's sources, the nature of Occasionalism, Occasionalism's alternative to realism, and Berkeley's divergence from Malebranche. In the third section I deal with Berkeley's anti-realist construal of scientific language, his treatment of absolute space, his attack on Descartes causal paradigm, the meaning of scientific terms, the connection between explanation and realism (if any), and between cause and explanation. In the fourth section I compare and contrast Berkeley and Popper, discuss instrumentalism and its relation to explanation. Popper's muddled beliefs about Berkeley’s philosophy of language and its implications for Berkeley’s philosophy of science. I also discuss such topics as Berkeley's conception of explanation, the difference between Berkeley's and Popper's realism; and the the role of the scientific test. I will also defend instrumentalists and Berkeley from the charge that their view of scientific theories reduces them to mere computation rules

Using neural networks in software repositories

The first topic is an exploration of the use of neural network techniques to improve the effectiveness of retrieval in software repositories. The second topic relates to a series of experiments conducted to evaluate the feasibility of using adaptive neural networks as a means of deriving (or more specifically, learning) measures on software. Taken together, these two efforts illuminate a very promising mechanism supporting software infrastructures - one based upon a flexible and responsive technology

Pierre Duhem’s philosophy and history of science

LEITE (Fábio Rodrigo) – STOFFEL (Jean-François), Introduction (pp. 3-6). BARRA (Eduardo Salles de O.) – SANTOS (Ricardo Batista dos), Duhem’s analysis of Newtonian method and the logical priority of physics over metaphysics (pp. 7-19). BORDONI (Stefano), The French roots of Duhem’s early historiography and epistemology (pp. 20-35). CHIAPPIN (José R. N.) – LARANJEIRAS (Cássio Costa), Duhem’s critical analysis of mecha­ni­cism and his defense of a formal conception of theoretical phy­sics (pp. 36-53). GUEGUEN (Marie) – PSILLOS (Stathis), Anti-­scepticism and epistemic humility in Pierre Duhem’s philosophy of science (pp. 54-72). LISTON (Michael), Duhem : images of science, historical continuity, and the first crisis in physics (pp. 73-84). MAIOCCHI (Roberto), Duhem in pre-war Italian philos­ophy : the reasons of an absence (pp. 85-92). HERNÁNDEZ MÁRQUEZ (Víctor Manuel), Was Pierre Duhem an «esprit de finesse» ? (pp. 93-107). NEEDHAM (Paul), Was Duhem justified in not distinguishing between physical and chemical atomism ? (pp. 108-111). OLGUIN (Roberto Estrada), «Bon sens» and «noûs» (pp. 112-126). OLIVEIRA (Amelia J.), Duhem’s legacy for the change in the historiography of science : An analysis based on Kuhn’s writings (pp. 127-139). PRÍNCIPE (João), Poincaré and Duhem : Resonances in their first epistemological reflec­tions (pp. 140-156). MONDRAGON (Damián Islas), Book review of «Pierre Duhem : entre física y metafísica» (pp. 157-159). STOFFEL (Jean-François), Book review of P. Duhem : «La théorie physique : son objet, sa structure» / edit. by S. Roux (pp. 160-162). STOFFEL (Jean-François), Book review of St. Bordoni : «When historiography met epistemology» (pp. 163-165)

CONTEMPORARY COSMOLOGY AS A CASE STUDY IN SCIENTIFIC METHODOLOGY

This thesis examines two recent research projects in cosmology with the aim of presenting them as a case study of the use of evidence in science. Descriptions of scientific reasoning commonly use language reminiscent of simple hypothetico-deductive methodology. However, a number of philosophers of science have argued that this model of scientific reasoning is inadequate. In particular, recent work has looked to the methodology of Isaac Newton for an addition to the standard hypothetico-deductive account. This methodology seeks to deliver a richer notion of empirical success through providing warrant for scientific claims on the basis of the ability of a theory to deliver agreeing measurements of its theoretical parameters from diverse and independent sources. One aspect of recent work in cosmology is the introduction of specific measurements of a positive value of the cosmological constant, A, a theoretical parameter that, prior to recent results, most cosmologists either ignored or assumed to be set at zero. This thesis claims that, in accordance with Newton\u27s methodology, it is through the use of this richer notion of empirical success that the current research provides empirical support for the inclusion of the parameter and for the standard cosmological model in general. The thesis examines the core of the course of cosmological reasoning regarding the relationship between observation and the mass-energy density parameters of the universe. Following an introductory chapter, Chapter Two reviews the standard cosmological model prior to the recent work on A, with a focus on the use of agreeing measurements in this research. Chapter Three reviews recent cosmological research on type la supemovae and the use of these events to produce measurements of cosmological iii produce measurements of cosmological parameters. Chapter Five reviews the use of the agreement in the measurements produced by these theories and the nature of the empirical support that this agreement delivers to the standard cosmological model against systematic error and against alternative theories that may be potential rivals of the standard cosmological model

Scientific Progress on the Semantic View : An Account of Scientific Progress as Objective Logical and Empirical Strength Increments

The aim of this master thesis is to make a convincing argument that scientific progress can be spoken of in objective terms. In order to make this argument I will propose a philosophical theory of scientific progress. Two concepts will be constructed with this aim in mind, both which are types of strength measures on scientific theories. The first concept, that of logical strength, pertains to the way a theory may exclude, or permit less, model classes compared to another theory. The second concept, that of empirical strength, pertains to an objective measure of the informational content of data models, defined in terms of Kolmogorov complexity. This latter idea stems from communication and computational theory. Scientific progress is then defined as the interaction, or the stepwise increases, of these two strength measures. Central for the conception of a scientific theory is the philosophical framework known as The Semantic View of Scientific Theories. This view can briefly be characterized as an empirical extension of Tarskian model-theory. Another central notion for this theory of scientific progress is the philosophical or metaphysical thesis called structural realism. Both will accordingly be explained and argued for. Finally, as a test on this proposed theory of scientific progress, it will be applied to two examples of theory transition from the history of physical theory. I conclude that the proposed theory handles these two cases well

Simulation and modeling of magnetically-assisted impaction coating (MAIC) process for dry particle coating

The objective of proposed research is to model, and understand the processes happening at multiple length and time scales in magnetically assisted impaction coating process. The smallest length scale is of the order of the molecular size and is important because during collisions the molecules rearrange themselves to form a semi-permanent bond between the core and secondary particles, which is studied by using the results of direct numerical integration of the governing Newton\u27s equations. The effect of parameters such as size, orientation and relative velocity of particles on the collision mechanics is quantified. The largest length scale which is the device scale determines the magnetic field strength that is needed to fluidize the mixture. The intermediate length scale is of the order of particle size. The frequency of collision among the fluidized particles at this length scale determines the residence time required to coat the particles. The velocities and the normal force attained by the non-magnetic particles are estimated and compared with the same necessary for coating process. The deformation of the virtual guest particles are estimated from the normal force of collision of host particles and the van der Waal force of attraction is calculated. The attraction force is found to be more than the separation force of guest from the host, which is favorable for the coating process

Hierarchical simulations of hybrid polymer-solid materials

Complex polymer-solid materials have gained a lot of attention during the last 2-3 decades due to the fundamental physical problems and the broad spectrum of technological applications in which they are involved. Therefore, significant progress concerning the simulations of such hybrid soft-hard nanostructured systems has been made in the last few years. Simulation techniques vary from quantum to microscopic (atomistic) up to mesoscopic (coarse-grained) level. Here we give a short overview of simulation approaches on model polymer-solid interfacial systems for all different levels of description. In addition, we also present a brief outlook concerning the open questions in this field, from the point of view of both physical problems and computational methodologies

Philosophy, Science, and Sense Perception

Originally published in 1964. In four essays, Professor Mandelbaum challenges some of the most common assumptions of contemporary epistemology. Through historical analyses and critical argument, he attempts to show that one cannot successfully sever the connections between philosophic and scientific accounts of sense perception. While each essay is independent of the others, and the argument of each must therefore be judged on its own merits, one theme is common to all: that critical realism, as Mandelbaum calls it, is a viable epistemological position, even though some schools of thought hold it in low esteem