Cracking down on bribery

Do crackdowns on bribery impact corrupt behavior in the long run? In this paper we observe the long-run impact of a short-term punishment institution (i.e., a crackdown) on bribery behavior in a lab setting. We conduct lab experiments in two countries with cultures that differ in corruption norms, and which experience very different levels of bribery: the US and Pakistan. Bribery is implemented in the laboratory as a repeated three-player sequential game, consisting of a firm, a government official and a citizen. The design contains three phases: pre-crackdown, crackdown, and post-crackdown. Results show that post-crackdown behavior is not significantly different from pre-crackdown behavior in either country. We conclude that short-term crackdowns may impact behavior in the short run, depending on the strength of the existing corruption norms in the country. More importantly, in our setting crackdowns are completely ineffective in the long run, as corrupt behavior rebounds to pre-crackdown levels

The Influence of Corruption on the Developing World: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, International Commerce and Africa

The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) demonstrates the United States’ commitment to fight against bribery and corruption and the FCPA has had a substantial impact on commerce between organizations in the United States and the developing word

Corruption in experimental economics. Contributions and strategies in the prevention and fight against corruption

[eng] This work is addressed to give a general overview of the main contributions in the field of corruption from an experimental economics perspective. In the first section we introduce the topic of corruption and we briefly explain some rules regarding the experimental economics methodology. In the second section we review the main works that give an understanding of the determinants of behavior when people face a bribery environment. In third section we explain the anticorruption policies that has been studied in the lab. Fourth section concludes.[spa] Este trabajo está dirigido a dar una visión general de las principales contribuciones en el campo de la corrupción desde una perspectiva económica experimental. En la primera sección presentamos el tema de la corrupción y explicamos brevemente algunas reglas sobre la metodología de la economía experimental. En la segunda sección se revisan los principales trabajos que permiten comprender los determinantes del comportamiento cuando las personas se enfrentan a un entorno de soborno. En la tercera sección se explican las políticas anticorrupción que se han estudiado en el laboratorio. La cuarta sección concluye.[cat] Aquest treball està dirigit a donar una visió general de les principals contribucions en el camp de la corrupció des d'una perspectiva econòmica experimental. En la primera secció presentem el tema de la corrupció i expliquem breument algunes regles sobre la metodologia de l'economia experimental. En la segona secció es revisen els principals treballs que permeten comprendre els determinants del comportament quan les persones s'enfronten a un entorn de suborn. En la tercera secció s'expliquen les polítiques anticorrupció que s'han estudiat en el laboratori. La quarta secció conclou

Norms, law and social change: Nigeria’s anti-corruptionstruggle, 1999–2017

Corruption is notoriously persistent in Nigeria notwithstanding the panoply of laws deployed over the years against it. This article argues that the factors constraining the effectiveness of laws in the fight against corruption are to be found not in the laws, but in the larger societal matrix of resilient social norms and institutions, which constitute the environment of corruption in the country. The environment thus constituted is either conducive to, or largely tolerant of, corruption. The article then suggests that the anti-corruption effort, to be successful, must engage broadly with the environment by instigating social change

Strategies of Combating Corruption in Nigeria: The Islamic Perspective

Corruption has become a pandemic and a moral burden that bedeviled the world. Corruption is a practice that permeates all societal segments, sectors, activities and it takes various shapes, forms, dimensions, classifications and manifestations. Nearly all countries of the world are affected by the endemic of corruption albeit, in different magnitude with some having lower incidence while others a high rate of occurrence. Corruption has constituted itself as a political and socioeconomic problem worldwide because it leads to misgovernance, deprivation, inequality and squander of scarce public resources which have the concomitant repercussions of poverty, insecurity, joblessness, hunger and malnutrition, poor healthcare services delivery and low quality education. The problem of corruption took a new dimension when it continuously defies various strategies and alternatives proffered by nation-states, international organisations and agencies. One of the outstanding measures that permanently proves workable is the Islamic model which forbids the practice of corruption and ties it with moral burden and spiritual integrity. Hence, this study presented an alternative model with reference to Nigeria as the area of study. The study utilised a conceptual descriptive approach where documented sources were consulted and analysed. The study discovered that despite the existence of various anti-graft agencies, corruption continues in Nigeria unabated which portrays the need for adopting a different approach and that has been provided as the Islamic perspective. The study recommends among several others that the Islamic ethics and morals of detesting corrupt practices and the accompanied sanctions should be integrated in the crusade against corruption

The Tragedy of Corruption Corruption as a social dilemma

We investigate corruption as a social dilemma by means of a bribery game in which a risk of collective failure is introduced when the number of public officials accepting a bribe from firms reaches a certain threshold. We show that, despite the social risk, the pursuit of individual interest prevails and leads to the elimination of honest officials over time. Reducing the size of the groups while increasing the probability of collective failure diminishes the public officials' corruptibility but is not sufficient to eliminate the tragedy of corruption altogether

Can transparency of information reduce embezzlement? Experimental Evidence from Tanzania

Embezzlement is a major concern. By means of a sequential dictator game, we investigate theoretically and experimentally whether making information more transparent and reducing the number of intermediaries in transfer chains can reduce embezzlement. Consistent with reference-dependent preferences in terms of moral ideal, we show that the impact of transparency is conditional on the length of the transfer chain and on the position of the intermediary in the chain. Its direct effect on image encourages honesty. Its indirect effect via expectations plays in the opposite direction, motivating intermediaries to embezzle more when expecting that the following intermediary will embezzle less

Identity and political corruption: a laboratory experiment

This paper explores the role of identity in voters’ decision to retain corrupt politicians. We build up a model of electoral accountability with pure moral hazard and bring it to the lab. Politicians must decide whether to invest in a public project with uncertain returns or to keep the funds for themselves. Voters observe the outcome of the project but not the action of the politician; if the project is unsuccessful, they do not know whether it was because of bad luck or because the politician embezzled the funds. We run two treatments; a control and a treatment where subjects are assigned an identity using the minimal group paradigm. Our main result is that, upon observing a failed project, voters approve politicians of their same identity group significantly more often than in the control and compared to politicians of a different identity group. This is partially driven by a belief on same-identity politicians being more honest. We also observe that subjects acting as politicians embezzle funds less often than expected by the equilibrium prediction

Bribing to Queue-Jump: An experiment on cultural differences in bribing attitudes among Greeks and Germans

We study the role of culture on bribing attitudes in a new dynamic bribery game, where the purpose of bribing is to receive a service earlier by bribing to queue-jump. Our queue-jumping game allows us to distinguish between two classes of bribes: (i) queue-jumping bribes, which aim to increase the briber's expected earnings by jumping the queue, and (ii) counter bribes, which aim to maintain the briber's expected earnings by upholding the current order in the queue. In a laboratory experiment, comprised of four treatments that differ in the number of Greeks and Germans in each group, we analyze both cross-cultural and inter-cultural differences in bribing attitudes. In our cross-cultural treatments, we find that Greeks tend to bribe more often than Germans, but only in the early periods of the game. As time progresses, the Germans quickly catch-up, bribing as often as the Greeks. However, the observed differences in bribe rates in the early periods of the game are driven by queue-jumping bribes rather than counter-bribes. As the ratio of counter-bribes to queue-jumping bribes is significantly lower among Greeks relative to Germans, bribing to queue-jump is more profitable in the Greek groups. In our inter-cultural treatments, we find that minorities, irrespective of nationality, bribe less, despite there are no prospects for monetary or reputational gains. We interpret this result as evidence of outgroup favoritism by minority groups