A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency

This paper offers a probabilistic treatment of the conditions for argument cogency as endorsed in informal logic: acceptability, relevance, and sufficiency. Treating a natural language argument as a reason-claim-complex, our analysis identifies content features of defeasible argument on which the RSA conditions depend, namely: change in the commitment to the reason, the reason’s sensitivity and selectivity to the claim, one’s prior commitment to the claim, and the contextually determined thresholds of acceptability for reasons and for claims. Results contrast with, and may indeed serve to correct, the informal understanding and applications of the RSA criteria concerning their conceptual dependence, their function as update-thresholds, and their status as obligatory rather than permissive norms, but also show how these formal and informal normative approachs can in fact align

Can anticipatory feelings explain anomalous choices of information sources?

The well-being of agents is often directly affected by their beliefs, in the form of anticipatory feelings such as anxiety and hopefulness. Economists have tried to model this effect by introducing beliefs as arguments in decision makers' vNM utility function. One might expect that such a model would be capable of explaining anomalous attitudes to information that we observe in reality. We show that the model has several shortcomings in this regard, as long as Bayesian updating is retained. (c) 2005 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved

Reasoning with comparative moral judgements: an argument for Moral Bayesianism

The paper discusses the notion of reasoning with comparative moral judgements (i.e judgements of the form “act a is morally superior to act b”) from the point of view of several meta-ethical positions. Using a simple formal result, it is argued that only a version of moral cognitivism that is committed to the claim that moral beliefs come in degrees can give a normatively plausible account of such reasoning. Some implications of accepting such a version of moral cognitivism are discussed

A General Framework for Updating Belief Distributions

We propose a framework for general Bayesian inference. We argue that a valid update of a prior belief distribution to a posterior can be made for parameters which are connected to observations through a loss function rather than the traditional likelihood function, which is recovered under the special case of using self information loss. Modern application areas make it is increasingly challenging for Bayesians to attempt to model the true data generating mechanism. Moreover, when the object of interest is low dimensional, such as a mean or median, it is cumbersome to have to achieve this via a complete model for the whole data distribution. More importantly, there are settings where the parameter of interest does not directly index a family of density functions and thus the Bayesian approach to learning about such parameters is currently regarded as problematic. Our proposed framework uses loss-functions to connect information in the data to functionals of interest. The updating of beliefs then follows from a decision theoretic approach involving cumulative loss functions. Importantly, the procedure coincides with Bayesian updating when a true likelihood is known, yet provides coherent subjective inference in much more general settings. Connections to other inference frameworks are highlighted.Comment: This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the article "A General Framework for Updating Belief Distributions", which has been accepted for publication in the Journal of Statistical Society - Series B. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archivin

Character and theory of mind: an integrative approach

Traditionally, theories of mindreading have focused on the representation of beliefs and desires. However, decades of social psychology and social neuroscience have shown that, in addition to reasoning about beliefs and desires, human beings also use representations of character traits to predict and interpret behavior. While a few recent accounts have attempted to accommodate these findings, they have not succeeded in explaining the relation between trait attribution and belief-desire reasoning. On my account, character-trait attribution is part of a hierarchical system for action prediction, and serves to inform hypotheses about agents’ beliefs and desires, which are in turn used to predict and interpret behavior

Philosophy and the practice of Bayesian statistics

A substantial school in the philosophy of science identifies Bayesian inference with inductive inference and even rationality as such, and seems to be strengthened by the rise and practical success of Bayesian statistics. We argue that the most successful forms of Bayesian statistics do not actually support that particular philosophy but rather accord much better with sophisticated forms of hypothetico-deductivism. We examine the actual role played by prior distributions in Bayesian models, and the crucial aspects of model checking and model revision, which fall outside the scope of Bayesian confirmation theory. We draw on the literature on the consistency of Bayesian updating and also on our experience of applied work in social science. Clarity about these matters should benefit not just philosophy of science, but also statistical practice. At best, the inductivist view has encouraged researchers to fit and compare models without checking them; at worst, theorists have actively discouraged practitioners from performing model checking because it does not fit into their framework.Comment: 36 pages, 5 figures. v2: Fixed typo in caption of figure 1. v3: Further typo fixes. v4: Revised in response to referee