Inequality, Technology, and the Social Contract

The distribution of human capital and income lies at the center of a nexus of forces that shape a country’s economic, institutional and technological structure. I develop here a unified model to analyze these interactions and their growth consequences. Five main issues are addressed. First, I identify the key factors that make both European-style “welfare state” and US-style “laissez-faire” social contracts sustainable.; I also compare the growth rates of these two politico-economic steady states, which are no Pareto-rankable. Second, I examine how technological evolutions affect the set of redistributive institutions that can be durably sustained, showing in particular how skill-biased technical change may cause the welfare state to unravel. Third, I model the endogenous determination of technology or organizational form that results from firms’ tailoring the flexibility of their production processes to the distribution of workers’ skills. The greater is human capital heterogeneity, the more flexible and wage-disequalizing is the equilibrium technology. Moreover, firms’ choices tend to generate excessive flexibility, resulting in suboptimal growth or even self-sustaining technology-inequality traps. Fourth, I examine how institutions also shape the course of technology; thus, a world-wide shift in the technology frontier results in different evolutions of production processes and skill premia across countries with different social contracts. Finally, I ask what joint configurations of technology, inequality and redistributive policy are feasible in the long run, when all three are endogenous. I show in particular how the diffusion of technology leads to the “exporting” of inequality across borders; and how this, in turn, generates spillovers between social contracts that make it more difficult for nations to maintain distinct institutions and social structures.inequality, welfare state, technical change, skill bias, human capital, redistribution, social contract, political economy

Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

We build a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. The presence of rewards or punishments creates doubt as to the true motive for which good deeds are performed, and this overjustification effect can result in a net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. The model also allows us to identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms of behavior, and those where disclosing one’s generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the equilibrium contracts offered by sponsors, including the level and confidentiality or publicity of incentives. Sponsor competition may cause rewards to bid down rather than up, and can even reduce social welfare by requiring agents to engage in inefficient sacrifices.altruism, rewards, motivation, overjustification effect, crowding out, identity, social norms

Identity, Dignity and Taboos: Beliefs as Assets

We analyze social and economic phenomena involving beliefs which people value and invest in, for affective or functional reasons. Individuals are at times uncertain about their own deep values and infer them from their past choices, which then come to define who they are. Identity investments increase when information is scarce or when a greater endowment of some asset (wealth, career, family, culture) raises the stakes on viewing it as valuable (escalating commitments). Taboos against transactions or the mere contemplation of tradeoffs arise to protect fragile beliefs about the priceless value of certain assets (life, freedom, love, faith) or things one would never do. Whether such behaviors are welfare-enhancing or reducing depends on whether beliefs are sought for a functional value (sense of direction, self-discipline) or for mental consumption motives (self-esteem, anticipatory feelings). Escalating commitments can thus lead to a hedonic treadmill, and competing identities cause dysfunctional failures to invest in high-return activities (education, adapting to globalization, assimilation), or even the destruction of productive assets. In social interactions, norm violations elicit a forceful response (exclusion, harassment) when they threaten a strongly held identity, but further erode morale when it was initially weak. Concerns for pride, dignity or wishful thinking lead to the inefficient breakdown of Coasian bargaining even under symmetric information, as partners seek to self-enhance and shift blame by turning down insultingly low offers.identity, self-serving beliefs, self-image, memory, wishful thinking, anticipatory utility, self control, hedonic treadmill, inefficient bargaining, taboos, religion.

Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility

Society’s demands for individual and corporate social responsibility as an alternative response to market and distributive failures are becoming increasingly prominent. We first draw on recent developments in the “psychology and economics” of prosocial behavior to shed light on this trend, which reflects a complex interplay of genuine altruism, social or self image concerns, and material incentives. We then link individual concerns to corporate social responsibility, contrasting three possible understandings of the term: the adoption of a more long-term perspective by firms, the delegated exercise of prosocial behavior on behalf of stakeholders, and insider-initiated corporate philanthropy. For both individuals and firms we discuss the benefits, costs and limits of socially responsible behavior as a means to further societal goals.Corporate Social Responsibility, Socially Responsible Investment, Image Concerns, Shareholder Value

Incentives and Prosocial Behavior

We develop a theory of prosocial behavior that combines heterogeneity in individual altruism and greed with concerns for social reputation or self-respect. Rewards or punishments (whether material or image-related) create doubt about the true motive for which good deeds are performed and this "overjustification effect" can induce a partial or even net crowding out of prosocial behavior by extrinsic incentives. We also identify settings that are conducive to multiple social norms and those where disclosing one's generosity may backfire. Finally, we analyze the choice by public and private sponsors of incentive levels, their degree of confidentiality and the publicity given to agents' behavior. Sponsor competition is shown to potentially reduce social welfare.

Genèse d’une épopée absente

Pour réconcilier en lui l'enfant juif marocain, l'universitaire parisien et l'écrivain oulipien, Marcel B. rêvait, une fois de plus, de produire un « objet littéraire original ». Il analyse ici comment il est parvenu, par approximations successives, à une esquisse conforme à ses voeux. Son « épopée familiale» se présente comme un livre aux éléments étroitement entrelacés, q ui renvoie sans cesse à sa propre genèse, porte en abyme sa propre image, et qui, feignant d'établir le diagnosticd'un mal dont il est en réalité le remède, dénonce son impossibilité au moment même où il réussit à en venir, au moins partiellement, à bout.Out of the disparate elements of his Moroccan jewish childhood, and his career as a Parisian academic and a writer, Marcel B. has set about to forge an "original literary object. " This article proposes to analyze how he bas managed to realize this intention through successive approximations. When all is said and done, his "familial epic" emerges as a construct of tightlyknit com-porients. Obsessed with its own genesis and intent on diagnosing the ills whose cure it in facts is, the work ultimately succeeds, at least partly, in accomplishing its purpose, just as Bénabou despairs of the possibility of its doing so