‘Township democracy’: A comparative analysis of ‘township democracy’ and ‘centralist democracy’ in Tocqueville’s ‘political philosophy’

Why ‘democracy,’ as a philosophical concept, thrives in some societies and not in others, and it has different shapes in different societies? Why, in some societies, ‘democracy’ is ‘from bottom-up,’ and ‘township-based,’ but it is ‘top-down,’ and ‘centralist’ in some other societies? What are the merits and advantages of ‘township democracies’ and disadvantages of ‘centralist democracies?’ This paper tries to answer to these questions by a comparative analysis of these two democracies according to Tocqueville’s political philosophy. Having shown the causes of these two different kinds of democracy, it analyzes their consequences, advantages, and disadvantages and shows that democracy is more a cultural concept as a way of life than a political concept as a way of governing and without ‘cultural democracy’ and ‘democratic culture and mores,’ ‘political democracy’ will itself become a new kind of ‘tyranny’ and ‘centralist democracy’ that neglects the towns and only cares about the capital is incompatible with the ‘philosophical spirit of dempcracy.

Mill’s Inconsistent Distinctions: An Analysis of the Consistency of J‌. S‌. Mill’s Utilitarianism and Liberalism

This paper analyzes the inconsistency of Mill’s utilitarianism in moral philosophy and his liberalism in political philosophy, the efforts of Ten and Dworkin for their consistency and the distinction that Leob and Driver use for reconciling them‌. The distinction is between decision-procedure and criterion of evaluation or the metaphysics and epistemology of right‌. In the next step, it shows a new inconsistency between Mill’s moral and political philosophy‌. It seems that Mill cannot accept the non-consequentialist ‘doing/allowing harm’ distinction in moral philosophy because he himself is a consequentialist‌. The rejection of this distinction makes it inconsistent with his harm principle and his main distinction in political philosophy: the distinction between ‘self-regarding’ and ‘other-regarding’ actions‌. These criticisms show the difficulty of reconciling Mill’s utilitarianism with his liberalism and his moral philosophy with his political philosophy in the framework of the classic triple (virtue, deontological and consequentialist ethics) in normative ethics‌. Therefore, in order to solve this problem, I combined the classic triple with the modern triple (minimalist, moderate, and extremist morality) in normative ethics. In this way, we can regard Mill as a consistent utilitarian who regards liberty as the essential condition for personal development and maximization of the good, and tries to raise a moderate and sophisticated version of utilitarianism by decreasing its pervasiveness‌‌

Moderate Morality: An Interest-Based Contractarian Defense & its Applied Result in the Political Ethics of International Relations

What is morality’s scope? Should all our actions be evaluated morally? Is it necessary to be causally responsible for harm to have a responsibility to reduce it? Is there a morally relevant distinction between those consequences of our actions which we intend or do and those which we foresee but do not intend or allow but do not do? Is helping others a matter of supererogation (i.e. beyond the call of moral duty) or a matter of obligation? These are crucial questions that need to be debated in normative and applied ethics. However, they were not raised seriously and independently until the last decades of the 20th century. There are several answers to these questions. This paper defends the answers of an approach which is called “moderate morality.” So, at first, it defines “moderate morality,” and pays heed to the views of its opponents, including Peter Singer, Shelly Kagan, and Peter Unger. Then, it tries to defend “moderate morality” based on “interest-based contractarianism.” Finally, it examines “its result in applied ethics” and tries to find a reasonable answer to a crucial question in the “political ethics of international relations” in our globalized era: What moral obligation, if any, do we have individually and as a society toward the people whose basic human rights are being violated not only in our country but also all over the world

A Consensus in Hypocrisy: An Analysis of the Global Consequences of Our Everyday Morality

Our everyday morality puts constraint on 'allowing harm that is merely foreseen as an unintended side-effect,' provided that it does not impose a disproportionate burden on the agent. However, few of us act in accordance with our everyday moderate morality. Nowadays, and of course in the past, human is indifferent toward harms and violating the rights of human’s who are not her near and dear and usually does nothing to stop them. Meanwhile, based on our considered moral judgments in theory, 'allowing harm that is merely foreseen as an unintended side-effect,' is immoral in many cases. Regardless of the advantages of our everyday moderate morality, this paper tries to show the contrast between theory and practice in human’s behavior on a global scale. در اخلاق رایج کنونی در سراسر جهان ـ البته با درجاتی از شدت و ضعف ـ هلیدن رخداد ناخوشایند، مشروط به اینکه دخالت کنش‌گر و جلوگیری او از پدید آمدن آن چندان برایش پرهزینه نباشد، غیراخلاقی است؛ اما این اخلاق میانه‌گرا، با وجود مزایای مختلفش در سپهر نظر، در سپهر عمل چندان مراعات نمی‌شود. آدمی در جهان امروز ـ و البته در جهان دیروز ـ نسبت به پدید آمدن رخدادهای ناخوشایند و نادیده گرفتن حقوق انسان‌هایی که چندان با او نزدیک نیستند، غالباً بی‌تفاوت است و کار چندان درخوری برای جلوگیری از آن انجام نمی‌دهد. این در حالی است که، بنا بر داوری‌های اخلاقی جاافتاده ما در سپهر نظر، هلیدن رخداد ناخوشایند، در بسیاری از موارد، امری غیراخلاقی است. این مقاله می‌کوشد، فارغ از مزایای نظری اخلاق میانه‌‌گرای رایج، ناسازگاری رفتار آدمیان در حوزه جهانی و شکاف میان نظر و عمل در بشر امروز را نشان دهد