Choice-induced preference change in the free-choice paradigm: a critical methodological review

Choices not only reflect our preference, but they also affect our behavior. The phenomenon of choice-induced preference change has been of interest to cognitive dissonance researchers in social psychology, and more recently, it has attracted the attention of researchers in economics and neuroscience. Preference modulation after the mere act of making a choice has been repeatedly demonstrated over the last 50 years by an experimental paradigm called the “free-choice paradigm.” However, Chen and Risen (2010) pointed out a serious methodological flaw in this paradigm, arguing that evidence for choice-induced preference change is still insufficient. Despite the flaw, studies using the traditional free-choice paradigm continue to be published without addressing the criticism. Here, aiming to draw more attention to this issue, we briefly explain the methodological problem, and then describe simple simulation studies that illustrate how the free-choice paradigm produces a systematic pattern of preference change consistent with cognitive dissonance, even without any change in true preference. Our stimulation also shows how a different level of noise in each phase of the free-choice paradigm independently contributes to the magnitude of artificial preference change. Furthermore, we review ways of addressing the critique and provide a meta-analysis to show the effect size of choice-induced preference change after addressing the critique. Finally, we review and discuss, based on the results of the stimulation studies, how the criticism affects our interpretation of past findings generated from the free-choice paradigm. We conclude that the use of the conventional free-choice paradigm should be avoided in future research and the validity of past findings from studies using this paradigm should be empirically re-established

Insensitivity to social reputation in autism

People act more prosocially when they know they are watched by others, an everyday observation borne out by studies from behavioral economics, social psychology, and cognitive neuroscience. This effect is thought to be mediated by the incentive to improve one's social reputation, a specific and possibly uniquely human motivation that depends on our ability to represent what other people think of us. Here we tested the hypothesis that social reputation effects are selectively impaired in autism, a developmental disorder characterized in part by impairments in reciprocal social interactions but whose underlying cognitive causes remain elusive. When asked to make real charitable donations in the presence or absence of an observer, matched healthy controls donated significantly more in the observer's presence than absence, replicating prior work. By contrast, people with high-functioning autism were not influenced by the presence of an observer at all in this task. However, both groups performed significantly better on a continuous performance task in the presence of an observer, suggesting intact general social facilitation in autism. The results argue that people with autism lack the ability to take into consideration what others think of them and provide further support for specialized neural systems mediating the effects of social reputation

A common neural code for social and monetary rewards in the human striatum

Although managing social information and decision making on the basis of reward is critical for survival, it remains uncertain whether differing reward type is processed in a uniform manner. Previously, we demonstrated that monetary reward and the social reward of good reputation activated the same striatal regions including the caudate nucleus and putamen. However, it remains unclear whether overlapping activations reflect activities of identical neuronal populations or two overlapping but functionally independent neuronal populations. Here, we re-analyzed the original data and addressed this question using multivariate-pattern-analysis and found evidence that in the left caudate nucleus and bilateral nucleus accumbens, social vs monetary reward were represented similarly. The findings suggest that social and monetary rewards are processed by the same population of neurons within these regions of the striatum. Additional findings demonstrated similar neural patterns when participants experience high social reward compared to viewing others receiving low social reward (potentially inducing schadenfreude). This is possibly an early indication that the same population of neurons may be responsible for processing two different types of social reward (good reputation and schadenfreude). These findings provide a supplementary perspective to previous research, helping to further elucidate the mechanisms behind social vs non-social reward processing

Neural activity in the reward-related brain regions predicts implicit self-esteem: A novel validity test of psychological measures using neuroimaging

Self-esteem, arguably the most important attitudes an individual possesses, has been a premier research topic in psychology for more than a century. Following a surge of interest in implicit attitude measures in the 90s, researchers have tried to assess self-esteem implicitly in order to circumvent the influence of biases inherent in explicit measures. However, the validity of implicit self-esteem measures remains elusive. Critical tests are often inconclusive, as the validity of such measures is examined in the backdrop of imperfect behavioral measures. To overcome this serious limitation, we tested the neural validity of the most widely used implicit self-esteem measure, the implicit association test (IAT). Given (1) the conceptualization of self-esteem as attitude toward the self, and (2) neuroscience findings that the reward-related brain regions represent an individual’s attitude or preference for an object when viewing its image, individual differences in implicit self-esteem should be associated with neural signals in the reward-related regions during passive-viewing of self-face (the most obvious representation of the self). Using multi-voxel pattern analyses (MVPA) on functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) data, we demonstrated that the neural signals in the reward-related regions were robustly associated with implicit (but not explicit) self-esteem, thus providing unique evidence for the neural validity of the self-esteem IAT. In addition, both implicit and explicit self-esteem were related, although differently, to neural signals in regions involved in self-processing. Our finding highlights the utility of neuroscience methods in addressing fundamental psychological questions and providing unique insights into important psychological constructs

Implicit and explicit attitudes toward sex and romance in asexuals

Despite the recent surge of interest in sexuality, asexuality has remained relatively underresearched. Distinct from abstinence or chastity, asexuality refers to a lack of sexual attraction toward others. Past research suggests asexuals have negative attitudes toward sex, though no research has examined implicit attitudes. While preliminary evidence suggests that many asexuals are interested in engaging in romantic relationships, these attitudes have yet to be examined thoroughly, implicitly, or compared with a control group. This study investigated explicit and implicit attitudes toward sex and romance in a group of asexuals (N = 18, age M = 21.11) and a group of controls (N = 27, age M = 21.81), using the Asexuality Identification Scale (AIS), the Triangular Love Scale (TLS), semantic differentials, an Implicit Association Task (IAT), and two Single Category IATs. It was found that asexuals exhibited more negative explicit and implicit attitudes toward sex, as well as more negative explicit attitudes toward romance, relative to controls. There was no significant difference between groups on implicit romantic attitudes. Moreover, aromantic asexuals demonstrated significantly more negative explicit attitudes toward romance than romantic asexuals, though there was no significant difference between groups on implicit measures. Explanations and implications of these findings are discussed

A causal role for posterior medial prefrontal cortex in choice-induced preference change

After a person chooses between two items, preference for the chosen item will increase and preference for the unchosen item will decrease because of the choice made. In other words, we tend to justify or rationalize our past behavior by changing our attitude. This phenomenon of choice-induced preference change has been traditionally explained by cognitive dissonance theory. Choosing something that is disliked or not choosing something that is liked are both cognitively inconsistent, and in order to reduce this inconsistency, people tend to change their subsequently stated preference in accordance with their past choices. Previously, neuroimaging studies identified posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC) as a key brain region involved in cognitive dissonance. However, it still remains unknown whether the pMFC plays a causal role in inducing preference change following cognitive dissonance. Here, we demonstrate that 25-min 1-Hz repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) applied over the pMFC significantly reduces choice-induced preference change compared to sham stimulation, or control stimulation over a different brain region, demonstrating a causal role for the pMFC

Neural correlates of cognitive dissonance and choice-induced preference change

According to many modern economic theories, actions simply reflect an individual's preferences, whereas a psychological phenomenon called “cognitive dissonance” claims that actions can also create preference. Cognitive dissonance theory states that after making a difficult choice between two equally preferred items, the act of rejecting a favorite item induces an uncomfortable feeling (cognitive dissonance), which in turn motivates individuals to change their preferences to match their prior decision (i.e., reducing preference for rejected items). Recently, however, Chen and Risen [Chen K, Risen J (2010) J Pers Soc Psychol 99:573–594] pointed out a serious methodological problem, which casts a doubt on the very existence of this choice-induced preference change as studied over the past 50 y. Here, using a proper control condition and two measures of preferences (self-report and brain activity), we found that the mere act of making a choice can change self-report preference as well as its neural representation (i.e., striatum activity), thus providing strong evidence for choice-induced preference change. Furthermore, our data indicate that the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex tracked the degree of cognitive dissonance on a trial-by-trial basis. Our findings provide important insights into the neural basis of how actions can alter an individual's preferences

Social equality in the number of choice options is represented in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex

A distinct aspect of the sense of fairness in humans is that we care not only about equality in material rewards but also about equality in non-material values. One such value is the opportunity to choose freely among many options, often regarded as a fundamental right to economic freedom. In modern developed societies, equal opportunities in work, living, and lifestyle are enforced by anti-discrimination laws. Despite the widespread endorsement of equal opportunity, no studies have explored how people assign value to it. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to identify the neural substrates for subjective valuation of equality in choice opportunity. Participants performed a two-person choice task in which the number of choices available was varied across trials independently of choice outcomes. By using this procedure, we manipulated the degree of equality in choice opportunity between players and dissociated it from the value of reward outcomes and their equality. We found that activation in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex tracked the degree to which the number of options between the two players was equal. In contrast, activation in the ventral striatum tracked the number of options available to participants themselves but not the equality between players. Our results demonstrate that the vmPFC, a key brain region previously implicated in the processing of social values, is also involved in valuation of equality in choice opportunity between individuals. These findings may provide valuable insight into the human ability to value equal opportunity, a characteristic long emphasized in politics, economics, and philosophy

Neural predictors of evaluative attitudes towards celebrities

Our attitudes towards others influence a wide range of everyday behaviors, and have been the most extensively studied concept in the history of social psychology. Yet they remain difficult to measure reliably and objectively, since both explicit and implicit measures are typically confounded by other psychological processes. We here address the feasibility of decoding incidental attitudes based on brain activations. Participants were presented with pictures of members of a Japanese idol group inside an fMRI scanner while performing an unrelated detection task, and subsequently (outside the scanner) performed an incentive-compatible choice task that revealed their attitude toward each celebrity. We used a real-world election scheme that exists for this idol group, which confirmed both strongly negative and strongly positive attitudes towards specific individuals. Whole-brain multivariate analyses (searchlight-based support vector regression) showed that activation patterns in the anterior striatum predicted each participant’s revealed attitudes (choice behavior) using leave-one-out (as well as 4-fold) cross-validation across participants. By contrast, attitude extremity (unsigned magnitude) could be decoded from a distinct region in the posterior striatum. The findings demonstrate dissociable striatal representations of valenced attitude and attitude extremity, and constitute a first step toward an objective and process-pure neural measure of attitudes