The heuristics-and-biases inventory: An open-source tool to explore individual differences in rationality

Over the last two decades, there has been a growing interest in the study of individual differences in how people’s judgments and decisions deviate from normative standards. We conducted a systematic review of heuristics-and-biases tasks for which individual differences and their reliability were measured, which resulted in 41 biases measured over 108 studies, and suggested that reliable measures are still needed for some biases described in the literature. To encourage and facilitate future studies on heuristics and biases, we centralized the task materials in an online resource: The Heuristics-and-Biases Inventory (HBI; https://sites.google.com/view/hbiproject). We discuss how this inventory might help research progress on major issues such as the structure of rationality (single vs. multiple factors) and how biases relate to cognitive ability, personality, and real-world outcomes. We also consider how future research should improve and expand the HBI

NOBEL, LE JEU DE LA DECOUVERTE SCIENTIFIQUE

Popper a rompu avec une tradition épistémologique ancienne en introduisant une dissymétrie entre vérifiabilité et réfutation. Cette conception a d'importantes répercussions sur la manière d'envisager la croissance des connaissances scientifiques et l'activité du chercheur. La vérité, qui avait pu être considérée comme un but pour la recherche scientifique, est placée hors d'atteinte. Sans indicateur évident pour marquer le terme de ses recherches, le chercheur doit alors faire, en fonction de ses motivations, un compromis entre l'exploration des théories possibles et des manières de les tester, et l'exploitation de théories qui auront été suffisamment corroborées. Si les thèses épistémologiques de Popper sont pertinentes, ce compromis exploration/exploitation au niveau du chercheur a des conséquences notables sur le développement des connaissances scientifiques et notamment, sur la fiabilité des théories acceptées. Ce sont ces conséquences que nous nous proposons d'étudier par une approche analytique, expérimentale et computationnelle, dont nous présentons ici les grandes lignes et les premiers résultats. Au delà de préoccupations purement épistémologiques, cette étude cherche à proposer un schéma générique pour l'approche d'un vaste ensemble de phénomènes d'élaboration collective et distribuée de connaissances ou d'artefacts.découverte collective, développement de la connaissance, compromis exploration/exploitation, épistemologie popperienne, knowledge managment distribué

Exploring the relation between Metacognition, Multi-tasking and stress

When people do multiple tasks at the same time, it is often found that their performance is worse relative to when they do those same tasks in isolation. Indeed, error rates and response times (the Type 1 performance) have been repeatedly found to increase when multitasking. However, one aspect that has received little empirical attention in comparison, is whether observers are aware of these effects (their Type 2 performance). In a previous study, using a simple dual-task visual paradigm, we found that metacognition was unaffected by multitasking. In order to understand if this result could be generalised to other types of multitasking, we further developed a multi-modal paradigm, involving a motor tracking task, a visual detection task, and an auditory n-back task. We made participants perform these tasks in different combinations of single-, dual-, and tripletasking, and asked them to assess their own performance on a trial-by-trial basis. Comparing these different conditions, we discuss our results in the light of the influence that multitasking, and the specific type of task, has both on type 1 and type 2 performance, as well as on participants’ metacognitive bias. Finally, we explore how stress impact these different measures

Does social context impact metacognition? Evidence from stereotype threat in a visual search task

While recent studies have emphasized the role of metacognitive judgments in social interactions, whether social context might reciprocally impact individuals’ metacognition remains an open question. It has been proposed that such might be the case in situations involving stereotype threat. Here, we provide the first empirical test of this hypothesis. Using a visual search task, we asked participants, on a trial-by-trial basis, to monitor the unfolding and accuracy of their search processes, and we developed a computational model to measure the accuracy of their metacognition. Results indicated that stereotype threat enhanced metacognitive monitoring of both outcomes and processes. Our study thus shows that social context can actually affect metacognition

Accurate rapid averaging of multihue ensembles is due to a limited capacity subsampling mechanism

It is claimed that the extraction of average features from rapidly presented ensembles is holistic, with attention distributed across the whole set. We investigated whether observers’ extraction of mean hue is holistic or could reflect subsampling. Analysis of selections for the mean hue revealed a distribution that peaked at the expected mean hue. However, an ideal observer simulation suggested that a subsampling mechanism incorporating just two items from each ensemble would suffice to reproduce the precision of most observers. The results imply that hue may not be averaged as holistically and efficiently as other attributes

Robust averaging protects decisions from noise in neural computations

An ideal observer will give equivalent weight to sources of information that are equally reliable. However, when averaging visual information, human observers tend to downweight or discount features that are relatively outlying or deviant (‘robust averaging’). Why humans adopt an integration policy that discards important decision information remains unknown. Here, observers were asked to judge the average tilt in a circular array of high-contrast gratings, relative to an orientation boundary defined by a central reference grating. Observers showed robust averaging of orientation, but the extent to which they did so was a positive predictor of their overall performance. Using computational simulations, we show that although robust averaging is suboptimal for a perfect integrator, it paradoxically enhances performance in the presence of “late” noise, i.e. which corrupts decisions during integration. In other words, robust decision strategies increase the brain’s resilience to noise arising in neural computations during decision-making

Fleeting Perceptual Experience and the Possibility of Recalling Without Seeing

We explore an intensely debated problem in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy: the degree to which the “phenomenological consciousness” of the experience of a stimulus is separable from the “access consciousness” of its reportability. Specifically, it has been proposed that these two measures are dissociated from one another in one, or both directions. However, even if it was agreed that reportability and experience were doubly dissociated, the limits of dissociation logic mean we would not be able to conclusively separate the cognitive processes underlying the two. We take advantage of computational modelling and recent advances in state-trace analysis to assess this dissociation in an attentional/experiential blink paradigm. These advances in state-trace analysis make use of Bayesian statistics to quantify the evidence for and against a dissociation. Further evidence is obtained by linking our finding to a prominent model of the attentional blink – the Simultaneous Type/Serial Token model. Our results show evidence for a dissociation between experience and reportability, whereby participants appear able to encode stimuli into working memory with little, if any, conscious experience of them. This raises the possibility of a phenomenon that might be called sight-blind recall, which we discuss in the context of the current experience/reportability debate