40 research outputs found
Negative and positive externalities in intergroup conflict: exposure to the opportunity to help the outgroup reduces the inclination to harm it
Outgroup hate, in the context of intergroup conflict, can be expressed by harming the outgroup, but also by denying it help. Previous work established that this distinctionâwhether the externality on the outgroup is negative or positiveâhas an important effect on the likelihood of outgroup hate emerging as a motivation for individual participation in intergroup conflict. The current work uses a within-subject design to examine the behavior of the same individuals in intergroup conflict with negative and positive externalities on the outgroup. Each participant made two choices, one for each type of externality, and the order was counter balanced. The main results are that (1) behavior is fairly consistent across negative and positive externalities, i.e., the tendency to display outgroup hate by harming the outgroup is correlated with the tendency to display outgroup hate by avoiding to help the outgroup; (2) People are reluctant to harm the outgroup after being exposed to the opportunity to help it; (3) Groupnessâthe degree to which people care about their group and its well-beingâis related to outgroup hate only when participants encounter the opportunity to harm the outgroup first (before they encounter the opportunity to help it). In this setting the relationship between groupness and outgroup hate spilled over to the subsequent interaction, where it was possible to help the outgroup. When the opportunity to help the outgroup was encountered first, groupness was not related to outgroup hate
Social motives in intergroup conflict
We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one's own influence on the outcome of the out-group. The way in which this harm is presented and perceived dramatically alters participation decisions. When people perceive their group to be under threat, they are mobilized to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally under threat, they are driven to do what is good for themselves and withhold their contribution. The first phenomenon is attributed to group identity, possibly combined with a concern for social welfare. The second phenomenon is attributed to a novel victim effect. Another social motive - reciprocity - is ruled out by the data
âIngroup loveâ and âoutgroup hateâ in intergroup conflict between natural groups
We report on two studies investigating the motivations (âingroup loveâ and âoutgroup hateâ) underlying individual participation in intergroup conflict between natural groups (fans of football clubs, supporters of political parties), by employing the Intergroup Prisoner's Dilemma Maximizing-Difference (IPD-MD) game. In this game group members can contribute to the ingroup (at a personal cost) and benefit ingroup members with or without harming members of an outgroup. Additionally, we devised a novel version of the IPD-MD in which the choice is between benefiting ingroup members with or without helping members of the outgroup. Our results show an overall reluctance to display outgroup hate by actively harming outgroup members, except when the outgroup was morality-based. More enmity between groups induced more outgroup hate only when it was operationalized as refraining from help
The collaborative roots of corruption
Cooperation is essential for completing tasks that individuals cannot accomplish alone. Whereas the benefits of cooperation are clear, little is known about its possible negative aspects. Introducing a novel sequential dyadic die-rolling paradigm, we show that collaborative settings provide fertile ground for the emergence of corruption. In the main experimental treatment the outcomes of the two players are perfectly aligned. Player A privately rolls a die, reports the result to player B, who then privately rolls and reports the result as well. Both players are paid the value of the reports if, and only if, they are identical (e.g., if both report 6, each earns âŹ6). Because rolls are truly private, players can inflate their profit by misreporting the actual outcomes. Indeed, the proportion of reported doubles was 489 higher than the expected proportion assuming honesty, 48 higher than when individuals rolled and reported alone, and 96 higher than when lies only benefited the other player. Breaking the alignment in payoffs between player A and player B reduced the extent of brazen lying. Despite player B's central role in determining whether a double was reported, modifying the incentive structure of either player A or player B had nearly identical effects on the frequency of reported doubles. Our results highlight the role of collaborationâparticularly on equal termsâin shaping corruption. These findings fit a functional perspective on morality. When facing opposing moral sentimentsâto be honest vs. to join forces in collaborationâpeople often opt for engaging in corrupt collaboration
Negative and positive externalities in intergroup conflict: exposure to the opportunity to help the outgroup reduces the inclination to harm it
Outgroup hate, in the context of intergroup conflict, can be expressed by harming the outgroup, but also by denying it help. Previous work established that this distinctionâwhether the externality on the outgroup is negative or positiveâhas an important effect on the likelihood of outgroup hate emerging as a motivation for individual participation in intergroup conflict. The current work uses a within-subject design to examine the behavior of the same individuals in intergroup conflict with negative and positive externalities on the outgroup. Each participant made two choices, one for each type of externality, and the order was counter balanced. The main results are that (1) behavior is fairly consistent across negative and positive externalities, i.e., the tendency to display outgroup hate by harming the outgroup is correlated with the tendency to display outgroup hate by avoiding to help the outgroup; (2) People are reluctant to harm the outgroup after being exposed to the opportunity to help it; (3) Groupnessâthe degree to which people care about their group and its well-beingâis related to outgroup hate only when participants encounter the opportunity to harm the outgroup first (before they encounter the opportunity to help it). In this setting the relationship between groupness and outgroup hate spilled over to the subsequent interaction, where it was possible to help the outgroup. When the opportunity to help the outgroup was encountered first, groupness was not related to outgroup hate
Tournaments and piece rates revisited: A theoretical and experimental study of premium incentives
Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research focused on fixed-prize tournaments, i.e., on tournaments where the prize or prize sum to be awarded is set in advance, we introduce a new type of tournament into the literature: premium incentives. While premium incentives, just like fixed-prize tournaments, are based on relative performance, the prize to be awarded is not set in advance but is a function of the firm's success: the prize is high if the firm is successful and low if it is not successful. Relying on a simple model of cost minimization, we are able to show that premium incentives outperform fixed-prize tournaments as well as piece rates. Our theoretical result is qualitatively confirmed by a controlled laboratory experiment and has important practical implications for the design of organizational incentive systems
A Flexible z-Tree Implementation of the Social Value Orientation Slider Measure (Murphy et al. 2011) â Manual
This manual describes a z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) implementation of the paper-based Social Vaule Orientation (SVO) Slider Measure by Murphy et al. (2011). Using the paper-based version instead of the slider-based version (as implemented on the SVO-Website) avoids server-traffic related delays we experienced in the latter implementation
Social motives in intergroup conflict: group identity and perceived target of threat
We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the perceived target of threatâgroups or individualsâand the symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on oneâs own influence on the outcome of the out-group. The perceived target of threat dramatically alters decisions to participate in conflict. When people perceive their group to be under threat, they are mobilized to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally under threat, they are driven to do what is good for themselves and withhold their contribution. The first phenomenon is attributed to group identity, possibly combined with a concern for social welfare. The second phenomenon is attributed to a novel victim effect. Another social motiveâreciprocityâis ruled out by the data
Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments
Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research focused on fixed-prize tournaments where the prize to be awarded is set in advance, we introduce âoutput-dependent prizesâ where the tournament prize is endogenously determined by agentsâ outputâit is high when the output is high and low when the output is low. We show that tournaments with output-dependent prizes outperform fixed-prize tournaments and piece rates. A multi-agent experiment supports the theoretical result
Reply to Nielsen et al. social mindfulness is associated with countriesâ environmental performance and individual environmental concern
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio