Does social context impact metacognition? Evidence from stereotype threat in a visual search task

While recent studies have emphasized the role of metacognitive judgments in social interactions, whether social context might reciprocally impact individuals’ metacognition remains an open question. It has been proposed that such might be the case in situations involving stereotype threat. Here, we provide the first empirical test of this hypothesis. Using a visual search task, we asked participants, on a trial-by-trial basis, to monitor the unfolding and accuracy of their search processes, and we developed a computational model to measure the accuracy of their metacognition. Results indicated that stereotype threat enhanced metacognitive monitoring of both outcomes and processes. Our study thus shows that social context can actually affect metacognition

Robust averaging protects decisions from noise in neural computations

An ideal observer will give equivalent weight to sources of information that are equally reliable. However, when averaging visual information, human observers tend to downweight or discount features that are relatively outlying or deviant (‘robust averaging’). Why humans adopt an integration policy that discards important decision information remains unknown. Here, observers were asked to judge the average tilt in a circular array of high-contrast gratings, relative to an orientation boundary defined by a central reference grating. Observers showed robust averaging of orientation, but the extent to which they did so was a positive predictor of their overall performance. Using computational simulations, we show that although robust averaging is suboptimal for a perfect integrator, it paradoxically enhances performance in the presence of “late” noise, i.e. which corrupts decisions during integration. In other words, robust decision strategies increase the brain’s resilience to noise arising in neural computations during decision-making

Fleeting Perceptual Experience and the Possibility of Recalling Without Seeing

We explore an intensely debated problem in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy: the degree to which the “phenomenological consciousness” of the experience of a stimulus is separable from the “access consciousness” of its reportability. Specifically, it has been proposed that these two measures are dissociated from one another in one, or both directions. However, even if it was agreed that reportability and experience were doubly dissociated, the limits of dissociation logic mean we would not be able to conclusively separate the cognitive processes underlying the two. We take advantage of computational modelling and recent advances in state-trace analysis to assess this dissociation in an attentional/experiential blink paradigm. These advances in state-trace analysis make use of Bayesian statistics to quantify the evidence for and against a dissociation. Further evidence is obtained by linking our finding to a prominent model of the attentional blink – the Simultaneous Type/Serial Token model. Our results show evidence for a dissociation between experience and reportability, whereby participants appear able to encode stimuli into working memory with little, if any, conscious experience of them. This raises the possibility of a phenomenon that might be called sight-blind recall, which we discuss in the context of the current experience/reportability debate

Individual differences in first- and second-order temporal judgment

The ability of subjects to identify and reproduce brief temporal intervals is influenced by many factors whether they be stimulus-based, task-based or subject-based. The current study examines the role individual differences play in subsecond and suprasecond timing judgments, using the schizoptypy personality scale as a test- case approach for quantifying a broad range of individual differences. In two experiments, 129 (Experiment 1) and 141 (Experiment 2) subjects completed the O-LIFE personality questionnaire prior to performing a modified temporal-bisect ion task. In the bisection task, subjects responded to two identical instantiations of a luminance grating presented in a 4deg window, 4deg above fixation for 1.5 s Experiment 1) or 3 s (Experiment 2). Subjects initiated presentation with a button- press, and released the button when they considered the stimulus to be half-way through (750/1500 ms). Subjects were then asked to indicate their ‘most accurate estimate’ of the two intervals. In this way we measure both performance on the task (a first-order measure) and the subjects’ knowledge of their performance (a second-order measure). In Experiment 1 the effect of grating-drift and feedback on performance was also examined. Experiment 2 focused on the static/no-feedback condition. For the group data, Experiment 1 showed a significant effect of presentation order in the baseline condition (no feedback), which disappeared when feedback was provided. Moving the stimulus had no effect on perceived duration. Experiment 2 showed no effect of stimulus presentation order. This elimination of the subsecond order-effect was at the expense of accuracy, as the mid-point of the suprasecond interval was generally underestimated. Response precision increased as a proportion of total duration, reducing the variance below that predicted by Weber’s law. This result is consistent with a breakdown of the scalar properties of time perception in the early suprasecond range. All subjects showed good insight into their own performance, though that insight did not necessarily correlate with the veridical bisection point. In terms of personality, we found evidence of significant differences in performance along the Unusual Experiences subscale, of most theoretical interest here, in the subsecond condition only. There was also significant correlation with Impulsive Nonconformity and Cognitive Disorganisation in the sub- and suprasecond conditions, respectively. Overall, these data support a partial dissocation of timing mechanisms at very short and slightly longer intervals. Further, these results suggest that perception is not the only critical mitigator of confidence in temporal experience, since individuals can effectively compensate for differences in perception at the level of metacognition in early suprasecond time. Though there are individual differences in performance, these are perhaps less than expected from previous reports and indicate an effective timing mechanism dealing with brief durations independent of the influence of significant personality trait differences

Priming by the variability of visual information.

According to recent theories, perception relies on summary representations that encode statistical information about the sensory environment. Here, we used perceptual priming to characterize the representations that mediate categorization of a complex visual array. Observers judged the average shape or color of a target visual array that was preceded by an irrelevant prime array. Manipulating the variability of task-relevant and task-irrelevant feature information in the prime and target orthogonally, we found that observers were faster to respond when the variability of feature information in the prime and target arrays matched. Critically, this effect occurred irrespective of whether the element-by-element features in the prime and target array overlapped or not, and was even present when prime and target features were drawn from opposing categories. This "priming by variance" phenomenon occurred with prime-target intervals as short as 100 ms. Further experiments showed that this effect did not depend on resource allocation, and occurred even when prime and target did not share the same spatial location. These results suggest that human observers adapt to the variability of visual information, and provide evidence for the existence of a low-level mechanism by which the range or dispersion of visual information is rapidly extracted. This information may in turn help to set the gain of neuronal processing during perceptual choice

Human Scalp Electroencephalography Reveals that Repetition Suppression Varies with Expectation.

Repetitions of a sensory event elicit lower levels of brain activity than its initial presentation ("repetition suppression," RS). According to one view, RS depends on the biophysics of neuronal discharge, and is thus an automatic consequence of stimulus processing ("fatigue" model). Another account suggests that RS depends on the statistical structure of the environment, and occurs when repeated stimuli are less surprising than novel stimuli ("surprise reduction" model). In support of the latter view, functional magnetic resonance imaging studies have shown that RS is modulated by the local probability of repetition. However, single-cell recordings from macaque inferotemporal area (IT) have failed to replicate this finding. Here, we recorded scalp electroencephalography from human participants viewing pairs of faces that repeated (face(1)-face(1)) or alternated (face(1)-face(2)), in contexts in which repetitions were expected or unexpected. As previously described, event-related potentials in the range of 100-400 ms recorded at posterior electrode sites and at the vertex differed between repetitions and alternations. Critically, at central electrodes, we observed that the difference between repeated and alternating stimuli was attenuated when repetitions were unexpected, as predicted by the surprise reduction model. These findings demonstrate that the modulation of RS by repetition probability is observable using direct neural recording methods in human participants, and that it occurs relatively late (>300 ms) post-stimulus. Finally, we found that theta-band (4-8 Hz) spectral power over central electrodes varied with the three-way interaction between of repetition, expectation, and the rate of change of the environment, consistent with recent reports that frontal theta may be a hallmark of learning processes originating in the anterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex