Peculiaridades da argumentação sobre fatos no campo do direito

Resumo: A argumentação jurídica é frequentemente caracterizada como uma espécie particularmente formal, engessada ou “institucionalg de argumentação. Autores que concordam com essa caracterização da argumentação jurídica costumam ter em mente argumentos jurídicos práticos, como o silogismo jurídico, as analogias jurídicas, os argumentos baseados em precedentes judiciais etc. O principal objetivo deste artigo é mostrar que a mesma ideia é aplicável à argumentação sobre fatos: argumentos sobre fatos também costumam ser particularmente institucionais quando formulados dentro do processo legal. Para mostrar que esse é o caso, contrastamos o uso de “inferências à melhor explicação” no contexto legal com o emprego científico dessa forma importante de inferência.Abstract: Legal reasoning is often characterized as a particularly formal, constrained or "institutional" type of reasoning. Authors who agree with this characterization of legal reasoning are usually concerned with practical arguments, such as the legal syllogism, legal analogies, precedent-based reasoning, and so on. The main goal of this paper is to show that the same general idea applies to arguments about facts: they tend to be particularly institutional when formulated within the legal process. To establish this claim, we contrast the use of "inferences to the best explanation" in the legal context with the way in which this important form of inference is used in scientific inquiry.

ASPECTOS FILOSÓFICOS E PSICOLÓGICOS DAS PUNIÇÕES: reunindo algumas peças do quebra-cabeça

O emprego de sanções é corriqueiro e geralmente associado a uma expectativa de se aumentar a força normativa das regras. Alguns experimentos confirmam essa intuição e indicam que punições fazem com que as pessoas cooperem mais. Filósofos, no entanto, debatem, sem consenso, sobre quais devem ser os propósitos das punições. A despeito da discussão normativa, estudos psicológicos apontam para uma tendência punitiva retributivista no julgamento das pessoas comuns. Além disso, a psicologia tem apontado para algumas assimetrias no comportamento punitivo, como a diferença de preferências na escolha das pessoas na projeção das normas e no seu julgamento; a influência dos juízos morais na atribuição de intencionalidade para os julgamentos punitivos; e certas perplexidades envolvendo punição de acidentes. O filósofo do direito deveria fazer um esforço para integrar as diferentes informações sobre as punições para fornecer uma explicação mais adequada do fenômeno jurídico e para construir teorias normativas mais factíveis. PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Sanção. Punição. Filosofia. Psicologia. Direito. PHILOSOPHICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF PUNISHMENTS: Gathering some Pieces of the Puzzle Noel Struchiner Pedro H. V. Chrismann The use of sanctions is a commonplace and it is usually associated with an expectation to increase the strength of a rule’s normative force. Some experiments confirm this intuition and indicate that punishments make people cooperate more. Philosophers, however, debate without consensus on what should be the purpose of punishment. Despite the normative discussion, psychological studies show that ordinary people tend to make retributivist judgments. Moreover, psychology has pointed out some asymmetries in punitive behavior, such as the difference in people’s standpoints when projecting norms and when they must apply the same norms; the influence of moral judgments in assigning intentionality in punitive judgments; and the perplexities involving punishment of accidents. The philosopher of law should aim at achieving an integrative view of the different information concerning punishment both to describe law more adequately and to construct a viable normative theory of law. KEYWORDS: Sanction. Punishment. Philosophy. Psychology. Law ASPECTS PHILOSOPHIQUES ET PSYCHOLOGIQUES DES SANCTIONS: réunissant quelques pièces du puzzle Noel Struchiner Pedro H. V. Chrismann Le recours à des sanctions est courant et généralement associé à une attente qui se veut d’augmenter la force normative des règles. Certaines expériences confirment cette intuition et indiquent que les punitions font en sorte que les personnes coopèrent plus. Les philosophes débattent cependant, sans en arriver à un consensus, sur les propos des punitions. En dépit d’un débat normatif, des études psychologiques démontrent que, dans leur jugement, les personnes communes ont une tendance punitive capable de rétribution. De plus, la psychologie nous rend attentifs à certaines asymétries dans le comportement punitif, comme la différence de préférences dans le choix des personnes pour la projection de normes et dans le jugement de celles-ci ; l’influence des jugements moraux dans l’attribution de l’intentionnalité pour les jugements punitifs et une certaine perplexité autour des accidents impliquant une punition. Le philosophe du droit devrait faire l’effort d’intégrer les différentes informations concernant les peines afin de fournir une explication plus adéquate du phénomène juridique et de construire des théories normatives plus réalisables. MOTS-CLÉS: sanction; punition; philosophie; psychologie; droit. Publicação Online do Caderno CRH no Scielo: http://www.scielo.br/ccrh  Publicação Online do Caderno CRH: http://www.cadernocrh.ufba.b

An experimental guide to vehicles in the park

Prescriptive rules guide human behavior across various domains of community life, including law, morality, and etiquette. What, specifically, are rules in the eyes of their subjects, i.e., those who are expected to abide by them? Over the last sixty years, theorists in the philosophy of law have offered a useful framework with which to consider this question. Some, following H. L. A. Hart, argue that a rule’s text at least sometimes suffices to determine whether the rule itself covers a case. Others, in the spirit of Lon Fuller, believe that there is no way to understand a rule without invoking its purpose — the benevolent ends which it is meant to advance. In this paper we ask whether people associate rules with their textual formulation or their underlying purpose. We find that both text and purpose guide people’s reasoning about the scope of a rule. Overall, a rule’s text more strongly contributed to rule infraction decisions than did its purpose. The balance of these considerations, however, varied across experimental conditions: In conditions favoring a spontaneous judgment, rule interpretation was affected by moral purposes, whereas analytic conditions resulted in a greater adherence to textual interpretations. In sum, our findings suggest that the philosophical debate between textualism and purposivism partly reflects two broader approaches to normative reasoning that vary within and across individuals.National Council for Scientific and Technological Development (CNPq)Carlos Chagas Filho Foundation for Research Support of the State of Rio de Janeiro (FAPERJ

Purposes in law and in life: An experimental investigation of purpose attribution

There has been considerable debate in legal philosophy about how to attribute purposes to rules. Separately, within cognitive science, there has been a growing body of research concerned with questions about how people ordinarily attribute purposes. Here, we argue that these two separate fields might be connected by experimental jurisprudence. Across four studies, we find evidence for the claim that people use the same criteria to attribute purposes to physical objects and to rules. In both cases, purpose attributions appear to be governed not so much by original intention or by moral value as by current practice. We argue that these findings in the cognitive science of purpose attribution have implications for jurisprudential questions involving purposivist legal interpretation

A infeliz busca por felicidade no direito

Apesar da ausência de previsão expressa na Constituição, o posicionamento que vem ganhando destaque entre os juristas é o de que o direito à felicidade está implícito em nosso ordenamento, já tendo, inclusive, sido invocado por ministros do STF na resolução de casos emblemáticos. Sendo assim, torna-se importante compreender o conceito de felicidade. Pesquisas empíricas recentes - na contramão do usualmente defendido por psicólogos e alguns filósofos que estudam o tema - têm revelado que, quando um indivíduo avalia a felicidade de outro, são tipicamente levados em consideração tanto elementos descritivos (e.g. se o sujeito apresenta emoções positivas e satisfação com sua vida) quanto normativos (e.g. se o sujeito leva uma vida moralmente boa). No presente artigo, apresentamos os resultados de dois experimentos que investigam se o conceito de “felicidade” e, por extensão, o “direito à felicidade”, também dependem de valorações descritivas e normativas. Por fim, discutimos algumas implicações e riscos advindos do uso de um conceito moralmente carregado, como é a felicidade, na prática judicial

Gender stereotypes underlie child custody decisions

Using hypothetical divorce cases we examine the role of gender stereotypes in decisions about child custody. Good mothers received greater custody allocations than did good fathers across a tightly-matched pair of vignettes in three culturally-distinct samples: Argentina, Brazil and the United States (Study 1). Two follow-up studies indicated that the warmth dimension of stereotype content partly accounted for the asymmetry in custody awards: The proportion of maternal-primary custody was predicted by the tendency to ascribe warmth-related traits—such as friendliness, generosity or trustworthiness—to mothers (Study 2) and associate them to female over male nouns (Study 3). We also found that endorsing shared custody mitigated the asymmetry in custody awards documented in our studies. Together, these results highlight the interplay of stereotyped attitudes and egalitarian commitments in the context of judicial decisions about child custody.El material suplementario contiene los estudios citados en el resumen.Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educació

The Ship of Theseus Puzzle

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, speaking eighteen different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence

Are There Cross-Cultural Legal Principles? Modal Reasoning Uncovers Procedural Constraints on Law

Despite pervasive variation in the content of laws, legal theorists and anthropologists have argued that laws share certain abstract features and even speculated that law may be a human universal. In the present report, we evaluate this thesis through an experiment administered in 11 different countries. Are there cross-cultural principles of law? In a between-subjects design, participants (N = 3,054) were asked whether there could be laws that violate certain procedural principles (e.g., laws applied retrospectively or unintelligible laws), and also whether there are any such laws. Confirming our preregistered prediction, people reported that such laws cannot exist, but also (paradoxically) that there are such laws. These results document cross-culturally and –linguistically robust beliefs about the concept of law which defy people’s grasp of how legal systems function in practice

De Pulchritudine non est Disputandum? A cross-cultural investigation of the alleged intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment

Since at least Hume and Kant, philosophers working on the nature of aesthetic judgment have generally agreed that common sense does not treat aesthetic judgments in the same way as typical expressions of subjective preferences—rather, it endows them with intersubjective validity, the property of being right or wrong regardless of disagreement. Moreover, this apparent intersubjective validity has been taken to constitute one of the main explananda for philosophical accounts of aesthetic judgment. But is it really the case that most people spontaneously treat aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity? In this paper, we report the results of a cross-cultural study with over 2,000 respondents spanning 19 countries. Despite significant geographical variations, these results suggest that most people do not treat their own aesthetic judgments as having intersubjective validity. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for theories of aesthetic judgment and the purpose of aesthetics in general.info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersio

Nothing at Stake in Knowledge

Many philosophers hold that stakes affect ordinary knowledge ascriptions. Here’s a version of a pair of cases aimed at supporting this: Bob and his wife are driving home on Friday and considering whether to stop at the bank to deposit a check. The lines at the bank are very long and so Bob considers coming back on Saturday. In the low stakes version, nothing of importance hinges on whether the check is deposited; in the high stakes version, it is very important that the check be deposited. Bob’s wife asks whether the bank will be open on Saturday. Bob says he drove past the bank last Saturday, and it was open. However, his wife points out that banks sometimes change their hours. Bob says “I know the bank will be open tomorrow”. In the low stakes case, many philosophers maintain that Bob does indeed know that the bank will be open; in the high stakes case, these philosophers maintain that Bob is ignorant – his statement that he knows the bank will be open tomorrow is false. These philosophers also maintain that this pattern of judgments is what we would expect from competent speakers confronted with this and similar cases (e.g., Cohen, 1999, 2013; DeRose, 1992, 2009; Fantl and McGrath, 2002; Nagel, 2008; Rysiew, 2001; Stanley, 2005). Though many philosophers agree that stakes play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, there is disagreement about what explains this. One view, epistemic contextualism, holds that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions can vary across conversational contexts (e.g., DeRose, 2009). For instance, Bob’s statement “I know the bank will be open tomorrow” can be true in low stakes contexts and false in high stakes contexts. Another view, interest-relative invariantism, denies that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that the truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions vary according to conversational contexts. Instead, cases like the Bank cases show that practical factors—i.e., stakes—play a distinctive role in determining whether the knowledge relation obtains (e.g., Stanley, 2005). Yet another alternative, which we’ll call classical invariantism, denies that “to know” is a context sensitive verb and that practical factors, such as stakes, play a direct role in determining whether the knowledge relation obtains. Instead, stakes affect knowledge ascriptions only by affecting our assessment of factors that have traditionally been taken to constitute or be necessary for knowledge, such as e.g., belief, quality of evidence, etc. (e.g., Bach, 2005; Weatherson, 2005; Ganson, 2007; Nagel, 2008). If this is right, then the role of stakes in knowledge ascriptions fails to motivate such surprising views as epistemic contextualism or interest-relative invariantism. Naturally, epistemic contextualists and interest-relative invariantists deny this, claiming that even when the factors that have traditionally been taken to constitute or be necessary for knowledge are held fixed, stakes continue to play a role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions (e.g., DeRose, 2009; Lawlor, 2013). So we see a dispute over what best explains the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascriptions. It is thus extremely surprising that a wide range of empirical evidence suggests that ordinary knowledge ascriptions fail to display any sensitivity to stakes (e.g., Buckwalter, 2010; Buckwalter and Schaffer, 2015; Feltz and Zarpentine, 2010; May, Sinnott-Armstrong, Hull, and Zimmerman, 2010; Turri, forthcoming; though see e.g., Pinillos, 2012; Pinillos and Simpson, 2014; Sripada and Stanley, 2012). If stakes really do not play any role in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, one of the main motivations for epistemic contextualism and interest relative invariantism would be undermined. Perhaps these different explanations of the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascription are born out of nothing more than a myth (Schaffer and Knobe, 2009). If so, classical invariantism about knowledge might be best supported—not because it provides the best explanation of the role of stakes in ordinary knowledge ascriptions, but rather because the failure of stakes to play a role in ordinary knowledge ascription would undercut an important motivation for its two competitors, epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. These radical alternatives to classical invariantism, lacking evidence in support of one of their important motivations, should perhaps then fall. Classical invariantism would stand. In the remainder of this article, we’ll disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We’ll accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism