José Gaos and the Spanish civil war

Este texto es la reproducción de una parte del prólogo al volumen primero de las Obras Completas de José Gaos. El volumen, que lleva por título Escritos españoles (1928- 1938), es de inminente aparición, y en él se ofrecen como novedades editoriales una serie de conferencias e intervenciones públicas del filósofo durante los años de la guerra civil española. Mis palabras consideran la peculiar comprensión que Gaos hizo de la contienda desde su fidelidad a la República. Y atienden también a cómo la filosofía de Ortega siguió siendo para él la inspiración fundamental a la hora de afrontar la destrucción de la circunstancia española y de asumir una tradición de pensamiento en español. El texto hace referencia asimismo a la peripecia biográfica de Gaos en estos añosThis text reproduces a part of the Prologue to the first volume of Complete Works by José Gaos. The volume, that bears the title “Spanish Writings (1928-1938)”, is forthcoming, and it offers a number of unpublished speeches and discourses that the philosopher held during the years of the Spanish Civil War. My article takes into account Gaos’ peculiar understanding of the war from a Republican perspective, and considers how Ortega’s philosophy remained for him the main source in order to face the destruction of the Spanish circumstance and in order to assume a Spanish tradition of thinking. It also pays some attention to his biographical vicissitudes in these year

Homenaje al filósofo José Gaos en su tierra natal

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Fenomenología trascendental y filosofía analítica en torno al concepto de nóema.

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Fenomenología trascendental y filosofía analítica en torno al concepto de nóema.

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Lester Embree por las cuestas de Segovia

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El dolor de los marcianos. Un análisis fenomenológico contra Rorty

My paper tries to show that Rorty’s fiction of a scientifically developed civilization whose inhabitants should not feel pain as a first-person experience, but would grasp it rather as an objective state of their nervous system, is unsustainable from a phenomenological point of view. I point out several doubts concerning the facts that such an objective apprehension would be in an indefinite process of theoretical reconstruction, and that even in that other galaxy it could not be valid as the original pain situation (for example, among children). But then I focus on the principles that to have a physiological state cannot be equiva-lent to grasping it, and second that to grasp several objective features cannot be equivalent to suffering or to undergoing pain. I conclude by suggesting that Rorty’s eagerness to discard mental representations made him neglect the lived body as implied in everyday experience: the body, not the mind, comes to the fore in the experience of pain.Mi ensayo trata de mostrar que es insostenible la ficción de Rorty de una civilización avanzada científicamente cuyos habitantes no sintieran el dolor como una vivencia sufrida en primera persona y que únicamente lo captaran como una excitación objetiva de su sistema nervioso. Entre otras dudas relativas a que esa captación objetiva y exacta se hallaría en indefinida reconstrucción teórica y a que ella no puede ser la experiencia primera del dolor ni siquiera en esa otra galaxia, aduzco que tener un estado fisiológico no equivale por principio a captarlo y que captar determinados rasgos objetivos no puede equivaler por principio a sufrir, a padecer. Concluyo señalando que Rorty, en su empeño por impugnar las representaciones mentales, pierde de vista cómo la experiencia del dolor manifiesta sobre todo la condición originaria del cuerpo vivido.My paper tries to show that Rorty’s fiction of a scientifically developed civilization whose inhabitants should not feel pain as a first-person experience, but would grasp it rather as an objective state of their nervous system, is unsustainable from a phenomenological point of view. I point out several doubts concerning the facts that such an objective apprehension would be in an indefinite process of theoretical reconstruction, and that even in that other galaxy it could not be valid as the original pain situation (for example, among children). But then I focus on the principles that to have a physiological state cannot be equiva-lent to grasping it, and second that to grasp several objective features cannot be equivalent to suffering or to undergoing pain. I conclude by suggesting that Rorty’s eagerness to discard mental representations made him neglect the lived body as implied in everyday experience: the body, not the mind, comes to the fore in the experience of pain