Simultaneous assimilation of satellite and eddy covariance data for improving terrestrial water and carbon simulations at a semi-arid woodland site in Botswana

Terrestrial productivity in semi-arid woodlands is strongly susceptible to changes in precipitation, and semi-arid woodlands constitute an important element of the global water and carbon cycles. Here, we use the Carbon Cycle Data Assimilation System (CCDAS) to investigate the key parameters controlling ecological and hydrological activities for a semi-arid savanna woodland site in Maun, Botswana. Twenty-four eco-hydrological process parameters of a terrestrial ecosystem model are optimized against two data streams separately and simultaneously: daily averaged latent heat flux (LHF) derived from eddy covariance measurements, and decadal fraction of absorbed photosynthetically active radiation (FAPAR) derived from the Sea-viewing Wide Field-of-view Sensor (SeaWiFS). Assimilation of both data streams LHF and FAPAR for the years 2000 and 2001 leads to improved agreement between measured and simulated quantities not only for LHF and FAPAR, but also for photosynthetic CO2 uptake. The mean uncertainty reduction (relative to the prior) over all parameters is 14.9% for the simultaneous assimilation of LHF and FAPAR, 8.5% for assimilating LHF only, and 6.1% for assimilating FAPAR only. The set of parameters with the highest uncertainty reduction is similar between assimilating only FAPAR or only LHF. The highest uncertainty reduction for all three cases is found for a parameter quantifying maximum plant-available soil moisture. This indicates that not only LHF but also satellite-derived FAPAR data can be used to constrain and indirectly observe hydrological quantities

Application of an aviation model of incident reporting and investigation to the neurosurgical scenario: method and preliminary data

Object. Incident reporting systems are universally recognized as important tools for quality improvement in all complex adaptive systems, including the operating room. Nevertheless, introducing a safety culture among neurosurgeons is a slow process, and few studies are available in the literature regarding the implementation of an incident reporting system within a neurosurgical department. The authors describe the institution of an aviation model of incident reporting and investigation in neurosurgery, focusing on the method they have used and presenting some preliminary results. Methods. In 2010, the Inpatient Safety On-Board project was developed through cooperation between a team of human factor and safety specialists with aviation backgrounds (DgSky team) and the general manager of the Fondazione Istituto Neurologico Carlo Besta. In 2011, after specific training in safety culture, the authors implemented an aviation-derived prototype of incident reporting within the Department of Neurosurgery. They then developed an experimental protocol to track, analyze, and categorize any near misses that happened in the operating room. This project officially started in January 2012, when a dedicated team of assessors was established. All members of the neurosurgical department were asked to report near misses on a voluntary, confidential, and protected form (Patient Incident Reporting System form, Besta Safety Management Programme). Reports were entered into an online database and analyzed by a dedicated team of assessors with the help of a facilitator, and an aviation-derived root cause analysis was performed. Results. Since January 2012, 14 near misses were analyzed and classified. The near-miss contributing factors were mainly related to human factors (9 of 14 cases), technology (1 of 14 cases), organizational factors (3 of 14 cases), or procedural factors (1 of 14 cases). Conclusions. Implementing an incident reporting system is quite demanding; the process should involve all of the people who work within the environment under study. Persistence and strong commitment are required to enact the culture change essential in shifting from a paradigm of infallible operators to the philosophy of errare humanum est. For this paradigm shift to be successful, contributions from aviation and human factor experts are critical