Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory

matter of knowing that -- that injustice is wrong, courage is valuable, and care is As a result, what I'll be doing is primarily defending in general -- and due. Such knowledge is embodied in a range of capacities, abilities, and skills.

Perception-driven sparse graphs for optimal motion planning

Most existing motion planning algorithms assume that a map (of some quality) is fully determined prior to generating a motion plan. In many emerging applications of robotics, e.g., fast-moving agile aerial robots with constrained embedded computational platforms and visual sensors, dense maps of the world are not immediately available, and they are computationally expensive to construct. We propose a new algorithm for generating plan graphs which couples the perception and motion planning processes for computational efficiency. In a nutshell, the proposed algorithm iteratively switches between the planning sub-problem and the mapping sub-problem, each updating based on the other until a valid trajectory is found. The resulting trajectory retains a provable property of providing an optimal trajectory with respect to the full (unmapped) environment, while utilizing only a fraction of the sensing data in computational experiments.Comment: 2018 IEEE/RSJ International Conference on Intelligent Robots and System

Perception-driven optimal motion planning under resource constraints

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Applied Ocean Science & Engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution February 2019.Over the past few years there has been a new wave of interest in fully autonomous robots operating in the real world, with applications from autonomous driving to search and rescue. These robots are expected to operate at high speeds in unknown, unstructured environments using only onboard sensing and computation, presenting significant challenges for high performance autonomous navigation. To enable research in these challenging scenarios, the first part of this thesis focuses on the development of a custom high-performance research UAV capable of high speed autonomous flight using only vision and inertial sensors. This research platform was used to develop stateof-the-art onboard visual inertial state estimation at high speeds in challenging scenarios such as flying through window gaps. While this platform is capable of high performance state estimation and control, its capabilities in unknown environments are severely limited by the computational costs of running traditional vision-based mapping and motion planning algorithms on an embedded platform. Motivated by these challenges, the second part of this thesis presents an algorithmic approach to the problem of motion planning in an unknown environment when the computational costs of mapping all available sensor data is prohibitively high. The algorithm is built around a tree of dynamically feasible and free space optimal trajectories to the goal state in configuration space. As the algorithm progresses it iteratively switches between processing new sensor data and locally updating the search tree. We show that the algorithm produces globally optimal motion plans, matching the optimal solution for the case with the full (unprocessed) sensor data, while only processing a subset of the data. The mapping and motion planning algorithm is demonstrated on a number of test systems, with a particular focus on a six-dimensional thrust limited model of a quadrotor

Multi-modal survey of Adélie penguin mega-colonies reveals the Danger Islands as a seabird hotspot

© The Author(s), 2018. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. The definitive version was published in Scientific Reports 8 (2018): 3926, doi:10.1038/s41598-018-22313-w.Despite concerted international effort to track and interpret shifts in the abundance and distribution of Adélie penguins, large populations continue to be identified. Here we report on a major hotspot of Adélie penguin abundance identified in the Danger Islands off the northern tip of the Antarctic Peninsula (AP). We present the first complete census of Pygoscelis spp. penguins in the Danger Islands, estimated from a multi-modal survey consisting of direct ground counts and computer-automated counts of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) imagery. Our survey reveals that the Danger Islands host 751,527 pairs of Adélie penguins, more than the rest of AP region combined, and include the third and fourth largest Adélie penguin colonies in the world. Our results validate the use of Landsat medium-resolution satellite imagery for the detection of new or unknown penguin colonies and highlight the utility of combining satellite imagery with ground and UAV surveys. The Danger Islands appear to have avoided recent declines documented on the Western AP and, because they are large and likely to remain an important hotspot for avian abundance under projected climate change, deserve special consideration in the negotiation and design of Marine Protected Areas in the region.We gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Dalio Foundation, Inc. through the Dalio Explore Fund, which provided all the financing for the Danger Island Expedition. We would like to thank additional support for analysis from the National Science Foundation (NSF PLR&GSS 1255058 - H.J.L. and P.M.; NSF PLR 1443585 – M.J.P.) and the National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NNX14AC32G; H.J.L. and M.S.). Geospatial support for the analysis of high resolution satellite imagery provided by the Polar Geospatial Center under NSF PLR awards 1043681 & 1559691

Science's immunity to moral refutation

Our moral convictions cannot, on the face of it, count in evidence against scientific claims with which they happen to conflict. Moral anti-realists of whatever stripe can explain this easily: science is immune to moral refutation because moral discourse is defective as a trustworthy source of true and objective judgments. Moral realists, they can add, are unable to explain this immunity. After describing how anti-realists might implement this reasoning, the paper argues that the only plausible realist comeback turns on the practical nature of moral reasoning. This comeback, however, places significant constraints on the structure of evidence for moral judgments. These constraints cannot be met by coherentist defenders of reflective-equilibrium methodology or by anyone sympathetic to bottom-up, case-driven foundationalism, including those who claim we have perceptual or perception-like access to moral truths. Unfortunately for realists in these categories, alternative realism-friendly accounts of science’s apparent moral immunity are unpromising. These neither explain nor explain away our unwillingness to infer an is from an ought, as Hume might have put it. Science’s apparent immunity to moral refutation therefore poses a serious problem for any realist unhappy with top-down, theory-driven conceptions of the structure of moral evidence

Mathematics, Morality, and Self-Effacement

I argue that certain species of belief, such as mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, are insulated from a form of Harman-style debunking argument whereas moral beliefs, the primary target of such arguments, are not. Harman-style arguments have been misunderstood as attempts to directly undermine our moral beliefs. They are rather best given as burden-shifting arguments, concluding that we need additional reasons to maintain our moral beliefs. If we understand them this way, then we can see why moral beliefs are vulnerable to such arguments while mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs are not—the very construction of Harman-style skeptical arguments requires the truth of significant fragments of our mathematical, logical, and normative beliefs, but requires no such thing of our moral beliefs. Given this property, Harman-style skeptical arguments against logical, mathematical, and normative beliefs are self-effacing; doubting these beliefs on the basis of such arguments results in the loss of our reasons for doubt. But we can cleanly doubt the truth of morality

Minds and morals

In this paper, I argue that an externalist theory of thought content provides the means to resolve two debates in moral philosophy. The first—that between judgement internalism and judgement externalism—concerns the question of whether there is a conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation. The second—that between reasons internalism and reasons externalism—concerns the relationship between moral reasons and an agent’s subjective motivational set. The resolutions essentially stem from the externalist claim that concepts can be grasped partially, and a new moral theory, which I call ‘moral externalism’, emerges