Counter-Mortar Operational Research in the 21 Army Group

The campaign in Northwest Europe has been the subject of thousands of books and articles, including a number based on careful documentary research. But even the best accounts pay insufficient attention to the German weapons systems that inflicted the majority of Allied casualties. The mortar and the Nebelwerfer were chiefly responsible for the Wehrmacht’s temporary success in stablizing the front in Normandy, and for the balance of the war they played a major role in demoralizing and reducing the strength of Allied infantry units. The Allies did not foresee the central role these weapons would play in Northwest Europe and all three armies left counter-mortar operations to the initiative of individual divisional commanders. This paper focuses on the work of 21 Army Group’s No. 2 Operational Research Section (ORS) in developing a systematic and ultimately successful system of neutralizing enemy mortar and Nebelwerfer fire. Other attempts to deal with the problem were undertaken concurrently in the Mediterranean theatre and in First American Army but they are not examined here

Fifth Brigade at Verrieres Ridge

The Fifth Canadian Infantry Brigade arrived in France on 16 July 1944 during the worst days of the battle of Normandy. The Allies had expected heavy losses on the D-Day beaches and then, once through the Atlantic Wall, lighter casualties in a war of rapid movement. The opposite had happened. The coastal defences had been quickly breached, but then there were only slow movement and horrendous casualties. In one month more than 40,000 U.S. troops were killed, wounded or missing, while almost 38,000 British and Canadian troops shared the same fate. The Allied air forces enjoyed total air superiority over the battlefield, but in June alone the cost was 6,200 aircrew. Soldiers on both sides were beginning to say that it was 1914–1918 all over again—a static battle of attrition with gains measured in yards and thousands of dead

21st Army Group in Normandy: Towards a New Balance Sheet

The purpose of this article is to offer further evidence in support of the view that the combat performance of the Anglo-Canadian armies in Normandy has been greatly underrated and the effectiveness of the German forces vastly overrated. This argument informs my study of the Canadians in Normandy, published under the title Fields of Fire, but the intention here is to consider questions about combat between British and German units in Normandy

To the Last Canadian?: Casualties in the 21st Army Group

In Normandy, Canadian infantry divisions suffered a higher rate of casualties than British divisions engaged in similar operations. These figures have been used by some historians to prove Canadian failure on the battlefield. However, by using statistics gathered by operational research scientists during the war, this article shows that the “considerably heavier casualties” suffered by the Canadians in Normandy and beyond were the product of a greater number of days in close combat with the enemy, not evidence of operational inexperience or tactical failure

The Decision to Reinforce Hong Kong: September 1941

In November 1941 the Canadian government, reacting to a British request, despatched “C” Force to reinforce the garrison at Hong Kong. Shortly after the Canadians arrived, the Japanese army attacked and captured the British colony. The entire Canadian contingent of almost 2,000 men was either killed or captured in the battle. Recriminations began immediately as Canadians tried to understand the reasons behind the despatch of the force. This argument was neatly summed up by Carl Vincent in his book titled, No Reason Why. Ignoring the simplicity of hindsight, this article re–examines the political and strategic situation of 1941 to better understand the decision–making process which led to the despatch of “C” Force. The article concludes that there were many reasons why the Canadians were sent to Hong Kong