Bribery: Greed versus reciprocity

It is estimated that a trillion dollars are annually exchanged in bribes, distorting justice and economic efficiency. In a novel experiment, we investigate the drivers of bribery. Two participants compete for a prize; a referee picks the winner. Participants can bribe the referee. When the referee can keep only the winner's bribe, bribes distort her judgment. When the referee keeps the bribes regardless of the winner, bribes no longer influence her judgment. An extra-laboratory experiment in an Indian market confirms these results. Hence, our participants are influenced by bribes out of greed, and not because of a desire to reciprocate

Sistema integrato di previsione delle piene in tempo reale nel bacino idrografico Brenta-Bacchiglione

-Modello idrologico-idrodinamico per la previsione delle piene in tempo reale nel Brenta-Bacchiglione. -Interfaccia grafica GIS funzionale alla gestione delle emergenze in corso di evento. -Limitazione dell\u2019incertezza delle condizioni iniziali forzando il modello con misure di precipitazione e di livello. -Buona precisione e affidabilit\ue0 del sistema confermate dalle simulazioni di eventi passati

COVID-19 in rheumatic diseases in Italy: first results from the Italian registry of the Italian Society for Rheumatology (CONTROL-19)

OBJECTIVES: Italy was one of the first countries significantly affected by the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) epidemic. The Italian Society for Rheumatology promptly launched a retrospective and anonymised data collection to monitor COVID-19 in patients with rheumatic and musculoskeletal diseases (RMDs), the CONTROL-19 surveillance database, which is part of the COVID-19 Global Rheumatology Alliance. METHODS: CONTROL-19 includes patients with RMDs and proven severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) updated until May 3rd 2020. In this analysis, only molecular diagnoses were included. The data collection covered demographic data, medical history (general and RMD-related), treatments and COVID-19 related features, treatments, and outcome. In this paper, we report the first descriptive data from the CONTROL-19 registry. RESULTS: The population of the first 232 patients (36% males) consisted mainly of elderly patients (mean age 62.2 years), who used corticosteroids (51.7%), and suffered from multi-morbidity (median comorbidities 2). Rheumatoid arthritis was the most frequent disease (34.1%), followed by spondyloarthritis (26.3%), connective tissue disease (21.1%) and vasculitis (11.2%). Most cases had an active disease (69.4%). Clinical presentation of COVID-19 was typical, with systemic symptoms (fever and asthenia) and respiratory symptoms. The overall outcome was severe, with high frequencies of hospitalisation (69.8%), respiratory support oxygen (55.7%), non-invasive ventilation (20.9%) or mechanical ventilation (7.5%), and 19% of deaths. Male patients typically manifested a worse prognosis. Immunomodulatory treatments were not significantly associated with an increased risk of intensive care unit admission/mechanical ventilation/death. CONCLUSIONS: Although the report mainly includes the most severe cases, its temporal and spatial trend supports the validity of the national surveillance system. More complete data are being acquired in order to both test the hypothesis that RMD patients may have a different outcome from that of the general population and determine the safety of immunomodulatory treatments

Creative destruction in science

Drawing on the concept of a gale of creative destruction in a capitalistic economy, we argue that initiatives to assess the robustness of findings in the organizational literature should aim to simultaneously test competing ideas operating in the same theoretical space. In other words, replication efforts should seek not just to support or question the original findings, but also to replace them with revised, stronger theories with greater explanatory power. Achieving this will typically require adding new measures, conditions, and subject populations to research designs, in order to carry out conceptual tests of multiple theories in addition to directly replicating the original findings. To illustrate the value of the creative destruction approach for theory pruning in organizational scholarship, we describe recent replication initiatives re-examining culture and work morality, working parents\u2019 reasoning about day care options, and gender discrimination in hiring decisions. Significance statement It is becoming increasingly clear that many, if not most, published research findings across scientific fields are not readily replicable when the same method is repeated. Although extremely valuable, failed replications risk leaving a theoretical void\u2014 reducing confidence the original theoretical prediction is true, but not replacing it with positive evidence in favor of an alternative theory. We introduce the creative destruction approach to replication, which combines theory pruning methods from the field of management with emerging best practices from the open science movement, with the aim of making replications as generative as possible. In effect, we advocate for a Replication 2.0 movement in which the goal shifts from checking on the reliability of past findings to actively engaging in competitive theory testing and theory building. Scientific transparency statement The materials, code, and data for this article are posted publicly on the Open Science Framework, with links provided in the article

Essays in Behavioral Economics and Ethics

My dissertation examines the behavioral factors that affect the emergence of unethical behaviors and inequalities in today’s society. Using insights from behavioral economics and experimental methods, I investigate the drivers of phenomena such as corruption, dishonesty, ethnic-discrimination, and gender-based differences in preferences.Chapter 1 explores the mechanism through which receiving bribes leads evaluators to distort choices. In both a laboratory experiment in the US and an experiment in a market in India, evaluators receive bribes that distort their quality recommendations. We show that the driver of distortion is greed and not reciprocity.Chapter 2 examines how self-deception affects judgment distortion in the presence of incentives. We show that when evaluators can convince themselves that they are behaving ethically, they are more likely to distort their judgment. When self- deception is not possible, recommendations are more honest. This shows that in some cases people are able to behave unethically without suffering from feelings of guilt or shame, by convincing themselves that they are ethical.Chapter 3 explores individuals’ unwillingness to provide negative feedback to others, which results in a “must lie situation”. By asking experimental subjects to evaluate others’ attractiveness, we show that individuals prefer to lie rather than tell an undesirable truth, even if lying comes at a monetary cost to both the person who gives the feedback and the person who receives it.Chapter 4 studies prejudice-based ethnic discrimination, and shows that individuals are more likely to discriminate against others when discrimination can be disguised. We show that individuals do not discriminate in contexts where discrimination cannot be plausibly justified. However, discrimination emerges in contexts in which discriminatory behavior can be attributed to conformity to social or moral norms.Chapter 5 explores gender differences in preferences for competitiveness, which have been suggested to partly account for the relative lack of success of women in many sectors of the labor market. We introduce a novel measure that captures the extent of competitiveness. We find that the gender gap in competitiveness is larger than what had been documented before, with strikingly lower ratios of women at the top of the competitiveness distribution

Enabling or Limiting Cognitive Flexibility? Evidence of Demand for Moral Commitment

Moral behavior is more prevalent when individuals cannot easily distort their beliefs self-servingly. Do individuals seek to limit or enable their ability to distort beliefs? How do these choices affect behavior? Experiments with over 9,000 participants show preferences are heterogeneous—30 percent of participants prefer to limit belief distortion, while over 40 percent prefer to enable it, even if costly. A random assignment mechanism reveals that being assigned to the preferred environment is necessary for curbing or enabling self-serving behavior. Third parties can anticipate these effects, suggesting some sophistication about the cognitive constraints to belief distortion. (JEL C91, D82, D83, D91

Deception and reciprocity

We experimentally investigate the relationship between (un)kind actions and subsequent deception in a two-player, two-stage game. The first stage involves a dictator game. In the second-stage, the recipient in the dictator game has the opportunity to lie to her counterpart. We study how the fairness of dictator-game outcomes affects subsequent lying decisions where lying hurts one's counterpart. In doing so, we examine whether the moral cost of lying varies when retaliating against unkind actions is financially beneficial for the self (selfish lies), as opposed to being costly (spiteful lies). We find evidence that individuals engage in deception to reciprocate unkind behavior: The smaller the payoff received in the first stage, the higher the lying rate. Intention-based reciprocity largely drives behavior, as individuals use deception to punish unkind behavior and truth-telling to reward kind behavior. For selfish lies, individuals have a moral cost of lying. However, for spiteful lies, we find no evidence for such costs. Taken together, our data show a moral cost of lying that is not fixed but instead context-dependent

Bribery: Behavioral Drivers of Distorted Decisions

We experimentally investigate behavioral drivers of bribery, focusing on the role of self-interest, reciprocity, and moral costs associated with distorting judgment. In our laboratory experiment, two participants compete for a prize; a referee picks the winner. Participants can bribe the referee. When the referee can keep only the winner's bribe, bribes distort her judgment. When the referee keeps the bribes regardless of the winner, bribes no longer influence her decision. An experiment in an Indian market confirms these results. These findings imply that our participants are influenced by bribes out of self-interest, and not because of a desire to reciprocate. Further evidence shows that self-interest guides decisions to a greater extent when referees have scope for avoiding the moral costs associated with distorting judgment. As a result, limiting referees’ ability to form self-serving evaluations can significantly reduce the effectiveness of bribes

More Evidence on Gender Gaps in Self-Promotion and Ways to Close Them

This study is designed to investigate gender differences in self-promotion and possible ways to close these gaps