Transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) and the Face Inversion Effect: Anodal stimulation at Fp3 reduces recognition for upright faces

This is the final version of the article. Available from the publisher via the link in this record.Perceptual learning is a key perceptual skill that people possess, in particular, it contributes to their ability to distinguish between faces thus recognize individuals. Recently, we showed that anodal transcranial Direct Current Stimulation (tDCS) at Fp3 abolishes the inversion effect (that would otherwise exist) for familiar checkerboards created from a prototype. Because of the close analogy between the inversion effect obtained with checkerboards, which we use as a marker for perceptual learning, and the traditional face inversion effect (upright faces recognized better than inverted ones), we investigated the effects of anodal tDCS at Fp3 during an old/new recognition task for upright and inverted faces. Results showed that stimulation significantly reduced the face inversion effect compared to controls. The effect was strongest in reducing recognition performance to upright faces. This result supports our account of perceptual learning and its role as a key factor in face recognitio

Beyond the Libet clock: modality variants for agency measurements

The Sense of Agency (SoA) refers to our capability to control our own actions and influence the world around us. Recent research in HCI has been exploring SoA to provide users an instinctive sense of “I did that” as opposed to “the system did that”. However, current agency measurements are limited. The Intentional Binding (IB) paradigm provides an implicit measure of the SoA. However, it is constrained by requiring high visual attention to a “Libet clock” onscreen. In this paper, we extend the timing stimulus through auditory and tactile cues. Our results demonstrate that audio timing through voice commands and haptic timing through tactile cues on the hand are alternative techniques to measure the SoA using the IB paradigm. They both address limitations of the traditional method (e.g., lack of engagement and visual demand). We discuss how our results can be applied to measure SoA in tasks involving different interactive scenarios common in HCI

How a Lateralized Brain Supports Symmetrical Bimanual Tasks

A large repertoire of natural object manipulation tasks require precisely coupled symmetrical opposing forces by both hands on a single object. We asked how the lateralized brain handles this basic problem of spatial and temporal coordination. We show that the brain consistently appoints one of the hands as prime actor while the other assists, but the choice of acting hand is flexible. When study participants control a cursor by manipulating a tool held freely between the hands, the left hand becomes prime actor if the cursor moves directionally with the left-hand forces, whereas the right hand primarily acts if it moves with the opposing right-hand forces. In neurophysiological (electromyography, transcranial magnetic brain stimulation) and functional magnetic resonance brain imaging experiments we demonstrate that changes in hand assignment parallels a midline shift of lateralized activity in distal hand muscles, corticospinal pathways, and primary sensorimotor and cerebellar cortical areas. We conclude that the two hands can readily exchange roles as dominant actor in bimanual tasks. Spatial relationships between hand forces and goal motions determine hand assignments rather than habitual handedness. Finally, flexible role assignment of the hands is manifest at multiple levels of the motor system, from cortical regions all the way down to particular muscles

Physical and mental effort disrupts the implicit sense of agency

We investigated the effect of effort on implicit agency ascription for actions performed under varying levels of physical effort or cognitive load. People are able to estimate the interval between two events accurately, but they underestimate the interval between their own actions and their outcomes. This effect is known as ‘intentional binding’, and may provide feedback regarding the consequences of our actions. Concurrently with the interval reproduction task, our participants pulled sports resistance bands at high and low resistance levels (Experiments 1 and 2), or performed a working memory task with high and low set-sizes (Experiment 3). Intentional binding was greater under low than high effort. When the effort was task-related (Experiment 1), this effect depended on the individual’s explicit appraisal of exertion, while the effect of effort was evident at the group level when the effort was task-unrelated (physical, Experiment 2; mental, Experiment 3). These findings imply that the process of intentional binding is compromised when cognitive resources are depleted, either through physical or mental strain. We discuss this notion in relation to the integration of direct sensorimotor feedback with signals of agency and other instances of cognitive resource depletion and action control during strain

Free will debates: Simple experiments are not so simple

The notion that free will is an illusion has achieved such wide acceptance among philosophers and neuroscientists that it seems to be acquiring the status of dogma. Nonetheless, research in this area continues, and this review offers a new analysis of the design limitations and data interpretations of free-will experiments. This review presents 12 categories of questionable conclusions that some scholars use to promote the idea that free will is an illusion. The next generation of less ambiguous experiments is proposed

Protein Glycosylation in Helicobacter pylori: Beyond the Flagellins?

Glycosylation of flagellins by pseudaminic acid is required for virulence in Helicobacter pylori. We demonstrate that, in H. pylori, glycosylation extends to proteins other than flagellins and to sugars other than pseudaminic acid. Several candidate glycoproteins distinct from the flagellins were detected via ProQ-emerald staining and DIG- or biotin- hydrazide labeling of the soluble and outer membrane fractions of wild-type H. pylori, suggesting that protein glycosylation is not limited to the flagellins. DIG-hydrazide labeling of proteins from pseudaminic acid biosynthesis pathway mutants showed that the glycosylation of some glycoproteins is not dependent on the pseudaminic acid glycosylation pathway, indicating the existence of a novel glycosylation pathway. Fractions enriched in glycoprotein candidates by ion exchange chromatography were used to extract the sugars by acid hydrolysis. High performance anion exchange chromatography with pulsed amperometric detection revealed characteristic monosaccharide peaks in these extracts. The monosaccharides were then identified by LC-ESI-MS/MS. The spectra are consistent with sugars such as 5,7-diacetamido-3,5,7,9-tetradeoxy-L-glycero-L-manno-nonulosonic acid (Pse5Ac7Ac) previously described on flagellins, 5-acetamidino-7-acetamido-3,5,7,9-tetradeoxy-L-glycero-L-manno-nonulosonic acid (Pse5Am7Ac), bacillosamine derivatives and a potential legionaminic acid derivative (Leg5AmNMe7Ac) which were not previously identified in H. pylori. These data open the way to the study of the mechanism and role of protein glycosylation on protein function and virulence in H. pylori

How does it feel to act together?

This paper on the phenomenology of joint agency proposes a foray into a little explored territory at the intersection of two very active domains of research: joint action and sense of agency. I explore two ways in which our experience of joint agency may differ from our experience of individual agency. First, the mechanisms of action specification and control involved in joint action are typically more complex than those present in individual actions, since it is crucial for joint action that people coordinate their plans and actions. I discuss the implications that these coordination requirements might have for the strength of the sense of agency an agent may experience for a joint action. Second, engagement in joint action may involve a transformation of agentive identity and a partial or complete shift from a sense of self-agency to a sense of we-agency. I discuss several factors that may contribute to shaping our sense of agentive identity in joint action