Limbah Koran Sebagai Bahan Campuran Pembuatan Papan Plafon

The material of ceiling cover in a room could be plywood, asbestos, gypsum, glass reinforce cement, et cetera. This research was triggered by the large number of newspaper waste which was improperly dumped and caused contamination to the environment. Newspaper pulp is produced by finely grinding the newspaper or by crushing the newspaper in wet condition using blender. This pulp is then mixed with Portland cement and formed as wanted. In this research, the composition of Portland cement to newspaper pulp are 50:50; 55:45 and 60:40 and formed into board with the thickness of 10 mm. The objective of the research is to discover the proper proportion of newspaper pulp and Portland cement to obtain the consistent quality. It is intended that this research discover the substituting material for gypsum ceiling. This research was tested in the PNJ Civil Engineering Laboratory. There were some variants of test to obtain the proportion of Portland cement and newspaper pulp which conforms to standards. There were some stage of material test, which were absorption test, tension strenght test, and flexural strength test. The data processing was done by averaging the value of test result. The absorption and fracture strength showed that the greater the proportion of cement, the higher the fracture strength. In this research, it was obtained in the proportion of 60:40 with the value of 20,497 kg/cm2. While the absorption test showed that the increase in proportion of cement reduced the water absorption. In this research, it was obtained in the composition of 60:40 with the amount of 48.93%

Historical controversies about the thalamus: from etymology to function

The authors report on and discuss the historical evolution of the 3 intellectual and scientific domains essential for the current understanding of the function of the human thalamus: 1) the identification of the thalamus as a distinct anatomical and functional entity, 2) the subdivision of thalamic gray matter into functionally homogeneous units (the thalamic nuclei) and relative disputes about nuclei nomenclature, and 3) experimental physiology and its limitations.Galen was allegedly the first to identify the thalamus. The etymology of the term remains unknown although it is hypothesized that Galen may have wanted to recall the thalamus of Odysseus. Burdach was the first to clearly and systematically define the thalamus and its macroscopic anatomy, which paved the way to understanding its internal microarchitecture. This structure in turn was studied in both nonhuman primates (Friedemann) and humans (Vogt and Vogt), leading to several discrepancies in the findings because of interspecies differences. As a consequence, two main nomenclatures developed, generating sometimes inconsistent (or nonreproducible) anatomo-functional correlations. Recently, considerable effort has been aimed at producing a unified nomenclature, based mainly on functional data, which is indispensable for future developments. The development of knowledge about macro- and microscopic anatomy has allowed a shift from the first galenic speculations about thalamic function (the "thalamus opticorum nervorum") to more detailed insights into the sensory and motor function of the thalamus in the 19th and 20th centuries. This progress is mostly the result of lesion and tracing studies. Direct evidence of the in vivo function of the human thalamus, however, originates from awake stereotactic procedures only.Our current knowledge about the function of the human thalamus is the result of a long process that occurred over several centuries and has been inextricably intermingled with the increasing accumulation of data about thalamic macro- and microscopic anatomy. Although the thalamic anatomy can currently be considered well understood, further studies are still needed to gain a deeper insight into the function of the human thalamus in vivo

Vitalism and the Resistance to Experimentation on Life in the Eighteenth Century

There is a familiar opposition between a ‘Scientific Revolution’ ethos and practice of experimentation, including experimentation on life, and a ‘vitalist’ reaction to this outlook. The former is often allied with different forms of mechanism – if all of Nature obeys mechanical laws, including living bodies, ‘iatromechanism’ should encounter no obstructions in investigating the particularities of animal-machines – or with more chimiatric theories of life and matter, as in the ‘Oxford Physiologists’. The latter reaction also comes in different, perhaps irreducibly heterogeneous forms, ranging from metaphysical and ethical objections to the destruction of life, as in Margaret Cavendish, to more epistemological objections against the usage of instruments, the ‘anatomical’ outlook and experimentation, e.g. in Locke and Sydenham. But I will mainly focus on a third anti-interventionist argument, which I call ‘vitalist’ since it is often articulated in the writings of the so-called Montpellier Vitalists, including their medical articles for the Encyclopédie. The vitalist argument against experimentation on life is subtly different from the metaphysical, ethical and epistemological arguments, although at times it may borrow from any of them. It expresses a Hippocratic sensibility – understood as an artifact of early modernity, not as some atemporal trait of medical thought – in which Life resists the experimenter, or conversely, for the experimenter to grasp something about Life, it will have to be without torturing or radically intervening in it. I suggest that this view does not have to imply that Nature is something mysterious or sacred; nor does the vitalist have to attack experimentation on life in the name of some ‘vital force’ – which makes it less surprising to find a vivisectionist like Claude Bernard sounding so close to the vitalists

Tres medici, duo athei? The Physician as Atheist and the Medicalization of the Soul

Until recently, examinations of the ‘mind-body problem’ in historical context paid only cursory attention to its specifically medical dimension, if at all. At best, some ‘folk physiology’ was entertained, usually to laugh at it (the pineal gland, animal spirits). Conversely, historians of neuroscience or of artificial intelligence (Jeannerod 1985, Dupuy 2000) often present figures like La Mettrie as heroic early cases of ‘naturalization’, giving an experimental basis to materialism: their symmetrically inverse mistake is to take professions of medical authority too literally (although there are genuine cases where all of the above does coalesce – where ‘actors’ categories mysteriously transcend historiographic projections –, such as Hieronymus Gaub’s reflections on the ‘regimen of the mind’ in the mid-eighteenth century, or, more theoretically, Guillaume Lamy’s Epicurean-inflected Anatomical Discourses on the Soul, eighty years earlier). Contrary to the denial of the relevance of medicine in early modern philosophy, as regards issues such as the body-soul (then body-mind) relation among others, it seems patently difficult to separate medical theory, medically nourished philosophical speculation, and metaphysics. This is the case, whether in Descartes, Gaub, the ‘animist’ Georg-Ernest Stahl, or materialists such as Guillaume Lamy and La Mettrie: medicine, or rather ‘a certain idea of medicine’, is everywhere. Here I focus on the motif of a radical medicine – a medical precursor of the Radical Enlightenment (Israel 2001, 2006, 2007), symbolized negatively by the slogan, tres medici, duo athei, or ‘where there are three doctors, there are two atheists’, i.e. medicine as a basis for atheism. This theme runs through various works of medical or medico-theological propaganda: Thomas Browne’s 1643 De religio medici begins with Browne regretting rumors of doctors being atheists as the “general scandal of my Profession”; Germain de Bezançon’s 1677 Les médecins à la censure works hard at rebutting the saying, “Bon Physicien, mauvais chrétien.” But these are examples of the fear of a radical medicine – a medicine that denies the existence of an immortal soul, or even defends materialism and atheism. Are there positive statements of this doctrine? Indeed, attacks on it are much more common than statements identifying with it, like medical versions of natural theology in general. In fact, just as there were theologically motivated medical works, there were also medically motivated works of radical or heretical theology, like William Coward’s Second Thoughts on the Human Soul (Coward 1702, building on Overton 1644), which engaged in polemics concerning the nature of the soul – mortal or immortal? (Thomson 2008). Parallel to the mortalist trend, but flowing into a common genre of radical, medico-materialist texts (sometimes anonymous, such as L’Âme Matérielle, from the 1720s) are at least two other strands of radical medicine: a post-Cartesian focus on medicina mentis and the nature of the mind (Henricus Regius, Hieronymus Gaub, Antoine Le Camus), and an Epicurean medicine, in which mind and body are organismically united, with an additional hedonistic component, notably in Lamy, Mandeville and La Mettrie (Wright 1991, Wolfe and van Esveld 2014). The focus on a medicine of the mind (Corneanu, ms. 2013) is obviously connected to a ‘medicalization of the soul’: there was a body-soul problem in and for medicine, a sort of medicalized ‘pneumatology’. Radical medicine is located somewhere in between the early forms of ‘naturalization’ or ‘medicalization’ of the soul and the pose of scientific neutrality that is characteristic of early nineteenth-century medicine (as in Cabanis, Bichat or Bernard): it is a short-lived episode. I seek to reconstruct this intellectual figure, in which mortalist, post-Cartesian and Epicurean strands intersect and sometimes come together. I suggest that medically influenced materialism in the Radical Enlightenment (e.g. in the later French cases, La Mettrie, Ménuret and Diderot), is different from later, more experimentally focused and more quantitatively oriented forms of medical materialism, precisely because of its radical dimension. This radical medicine often insists on vitality, as opposed to “anatomie cadavérique”: it is vital and hedonistic, a medicine concerned with maintaining bodily pleasure.Until recently, examinations of the 'mind-body problem' in historical context paid only cursory attention to its specifically medical dimension, if at all. At best, some 'folk physiology' was entertained, usually to laugh at it (the pineal gland, animal spirits). Conversely, historians of neuroscience or of artificial intelligence (Jeannerod M, The brain machine. The development of neurophysiological thought, trans. D. Urion, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985; Dupuy J-P, The mechanization of the mind: on the origins of cognitive science, trans. M.B. DeBevoise, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000) often present figures like La Mettrie as heroic early cases of 'naturalization', giving an experimental basis to materialism: their symmetrically inverse mistake is to take professions of medical authority too literally (although there are genuine cases where all of the above does coalesce where 'actors' categories mysteriously transcend historiographic projections -, such as Hieronymus Gaub's reflections on the 'regimen of the mind' in the mid-eighteenth century, or, more theoretically, Guillaume Lamy's Epicurean-inflected Anatomical Discourses on the Soul, eighty years earlier). Contrary to the denial of the relevance of medicine in early modern philosophy, as regards issues such as the body-soul (then body-mind) relation among others, it seems patently difficult to separate medical theory, medically nourished philosophical speculation, and metaphysics. This is the case, whether in Descartes, Gaub, the 'animist' Georg-Ernest Stahl, or materialists such as Guillaume Lamy and La Mettrie: medicine, or rather 'a certain idea of medicine', is everywhere.Here I focus on the motif of a radical medicine - a medical precursor of the Radical Enlightenment (Israel J, Radical enlightenment. Philosophy and the making of modernity, 1650-1750, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001; Israel J, Enlightenment contested. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006, Israel J, Enlightenment, radical enlightenment and the "medical revolution" of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In: Grell OP, Cunningham A (ed) Medicine and religion in enlightenment Europe. Ashgate, Aldershot, pp 5-28, 2007), symbolized negatively by the slogan, tres medici, duo athei, or 'where there are three doctors, there are two atheists', i.e. medicine as a basis for atheism. This theme runs through various works of medical or medico-theological propaganda: Thomas Browne's 1643 De religio medici begins with Browne regretting rumors of doctors being atheists as the "general scandal of my Profession"; Germain de Bezancon's 1677 Les medecins a la censure works hard at rebutting the saying, "Bon Physicien, mauvais chretien." But these are examples of the fear of a radical medicine - a medicine that denies the existence of an immortal soul, or even defends materialism and atheism. Are there positive statements of this doctrine? Indeed, attacks on it are much more common than statements identifying with it, like medical versions of natural theology in general.In fact, just as there were theologically motivated medical works, there were also medically motivated works of radical or heretical theology, like William Coward's Second Thoughts on the Human Soul (Coward W, Second thoughts on the human soul. R. Basset, London, 1702, building on Overton 1644), which engaged in polemics concerning the nature of the soul - mortal or immortal? (Thomson A, Bodies of thought: science, religion, and the soul in the early enlightenment. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008). Parallel to the mortalist trend, but flowing into a common genre of radical, medico-materialist texts (sometimes anonymous, such as L'Ame Materielle, from the 1720s) are at least two other strands of radical medicine: a post-Cartesian focus on medicina mentis and the nature of the mind (Henricus Regius, Hieronymus Gaub, Antoine Le Camus), and an Epicurean medicine, in which mind and body are organismically united, with an additional hedonistic component, notably in Lamy, Mandeville and La Mettrie (Wright JP, Locke, Willis, and the seventeenth-century epicurean soul. In: Osler MJ (ed) Atoms, Pneuma, and Tranquillity: Epicurean and stoic themes in European thought. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 239-258, 1991; Wolfe CT, van Esveld M, The material soul: strategies for naturalising the soul in an early modern epicurean context. In: Kambaskovic D (ed) Conjunctions: body, soul and mind from Plato to the enlightenment. Springer, Dordrecht, pp 371-421, 2014). The focus on a medicine of the mind (Corneanu, (ms. 2013), The care of the whole man: medicine and theology in the late renaissance, 2013) is obviously connected to a 'medicalization of the soul': there was a body-soul problem in and for medicine, a sort of medicalized 'pneumatology'. Radical medicine is located somewhere in between the early forms of 'naturalization' or 'medicalization' of the soul and the pose of scientific neutrality that is characteristic of early nineteenth-century medicine (as in Cabanis, Bichat or Bernard): it is a short-lived episode. I seek to reconstruct this intellectual figure, in which mortalist, post-Cartesian and Epicurean strands intersect and sometimes come together. I suggest that medically influenced materialism in the Radical Enlightenment (e.g. in the later French cases, La Mettrie, Menuret and Diderot), is different from later, more experimentally focused and more quantitatively oriented forms of medical materialism, precisely because of its radical dimension. This radical medicine often insists on vitality, as opposed to "anatomie cadaverique": it is vital and hedonistic, a medicine concerned with maintaining bodily pleasure

Iohannis Riolani senioris, Regii quondam Medici Parisiens. celeberrimi, Artis medicinalis, Theoricae & Practicae seiunctim hactenus multoties excusae, systema

Ioannis Riolani senioris Parisini Medici Morborum curandorum ratio generalis particularis / Opera Emman. Stupani, Philos. et Medic. Doctoris, ac Professoris in inclyta Basileens. Academia Ordinarii, eiusdemque ordinis p.t. Decani, locupletior, & correctior editaab Emmanuele Stupano, Philosopho & Medico Basileense, Theoric. Profess. ordinar. & p.t. Collegii Medici Decurione, in iatrices cultorum, & admiratorum gratiam, rerum, & verborum Indice gemino annexo Hac Forma adornatum, recognitum & studiosissime emendatumMit Druckermarken (Königs?)Enthaltenes Werk mit eigenem Titelblatt u. eig. Blattzählung; Bogensignatur fortlaufen

Universae medicinae compendia

Per Ioannem Riolanum, Parisiensem MedicumKolophon: "BASILEAE impensis LVDOVICI REGIS, Anno M D CI.

Schola anatomica novis et raris observationibus illustrata, cui adjuncta est accurata foetus humani historia

authore Johanne Riolano filio, anat. & pharm. profess. regi

IOANNIS || RIOLANI || IN LIBROS || Fernelij || Partim PHYSIOLOGICOS,par=||tim THERAPEV-||TICOS || Commentarij.|| Accesserunt eiusdem RIOLANI, De Primis || Principiis rerum naturalium,|| LIB. III.||

Vorlageform des Erscheinungsvermerks: Mompelgarti || per IACOBVM FOYLLET.|| M D XIIC.|