Weight‐of‐Evidence Approach for Assessing Removal of Metals from the Water Column for Chronic Environmental Hazard Classification

The United Nations and the European Union have developed guidelines for the assessment of long‐term (chronic) chemical environmental hazards. This approach recognizes that these hazards are often related to spillage of chemicals into freshwater environments. The goal of the present study was to examine the concept of metal ion removal from the water column in the context of hazard assessment and classification. We propose a weight‐of‐evidence approach that assesses several aspects of metals including the intrinsic properties of metals, the rate at which metals bind to particles in the water column and settle, the transformation of metals to nonavailable and nontoxic forms, and the potential for remobilization of metals from sediment. We developed a test method to quantify metal removal in aqueous systems: the extended transformation/dissolution protocol (T/DP‐E). The method is based on that of the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD). The key element of the protocol extension is the addition of substrate particles (as found in nature), allowing the removal processes to occur. The present study focused on extending this test to support the assessment of metal removal from aqueous systems, equivalent to the concept of “degradability” for organic chemicals. Although the technical aspects of our proposed method are different from the OECD method for organics, its use for hazard classification is equivalent. Models were developed providing mechanistic insight into processes occurring during the T/DP‐E method. Some metals, such as copper, rapidly decreased (within 96 h) under the 70% threshold criterion, whereas others, such as strontium, did not. A variety of method variables were evaluated and optimized to allow for a reproducible, realistic hazard classification method that mimics reasonable worst‐case scenarios. We propose that this method be standardized for OECD hazard classification via round robin (ring) testing to ascertain its intra‐ and interlaboratory variability. Environ Toxicol Chem 2019;38:1839–1849. © 2019 SETAC.Peer Reviewedhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/151334/1/etc4470_am.pdfhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/151334/2/etc4470.pd

If cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game

Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.Comment: 15 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON

Analysing and controlling the tax evasion dynamics via majority-vote model

Within the context of agent-based Monte-Carlo simulations, we study the well-known majority-vote model (MVM) with noise applied to tax evasion on simple square lattices, Voronoi-Delaunay random lattices, Barabasi-Albert networks, and Erd\"os-R\'enyi random graphs. In the order to analyse and to control the fluctuations for tax evasion in the economics model proposed by Zaklan, MVM is applied in the neighborhod of the noise critical $q_{c}$. The Zaklan model had been studied recently using the equilibrium Ising model. Here we show that the Zaklan model is robust and can be reproduced also through the nonequilibrium MVM on various topologies.Comment: 18 pages, 7 figures, LAWNP'09, 200

What happens if you single out? An experiment

We present an experiment investigating the effects of singling out an individual on trust and trustworthiness. We find that (a) trustworthiness falls if there is a singled out subject; (b) non-singled out subjects discriminate against the singled out subject when they are not responsible of the distinct status of this person; (c) under a negative frame, the singled out subject returns significantly less; (d) under a positive frame, the singled out subject behaves bimodally, either selecting very low or very high return rates. Overall, singling out induces a negligible effect on trust but is potentially disruptive for trustworthiness

Identifying discrete behavioural types: A re-analysis of public goods game contributions by hierarchical clustering

We propose a framework for identifying discrete behavioural types in experimental data. We re-analyse data from six previous studies of public goods voluntary contributions games. Using hierarchical clustering analysis, we construct a typology of behaviour based on a simi- larity measure between strategies. We identify four types with distinct sterotypical behaviours, which together account for about 90% of participants. Compared to previous approaches, our method produces a classification in which different types are more clearly distinguished in terms of strategic behaviour and the resulting economic implications

Dispositional free riders do not free ride on punishment

Strong reciprocity explains prosocial cooperation by the presence of individuals who incur costs to help those who helped them (‘strong positive reciprocity’) and to punish those who wronged them (‘strong negative reciprocity’). Theories of social preferences predict that in contrast to ‘strong reciprocators’, self-regarding people cooperate and punish only if there are sufficient future benefits. Here, we test this prediction in a two-stage design. First, participants are classified according to their disposition towards strong positive reciprocity as either dispositional conditional cooperators (DCC) or dispositional free riders (DFR). Participants then play a one-shot public goods game, either with or without punishment. As expected, DFR cooperate only when punishment is possible, whereas DCC cooperate without punishment. Surprisingly, dispositions towards strong positive reciprocity are unrelated to strong negative reciprocity: punishment by DCC and DFR is practically identical. The ‘burden of cooperation’ is thus carried by a larger set of individuals than previously assumed

Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 3 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Report

Temporal Dynamics of Preferential Flow to a Subsurface Drain

We conducted a sequential tracer leaching study on a 24.4 by 42.7 m field plot to investigate the temporal behavior of chemical movement to a 1.2-m deep field drain during irrigation and subsequent rainfall events over a 14-d period. The herbicides atrazine [6-chloroN-ethyl-N′-(1-methylethyl)-1,3,5-triazine-2,4-diamine], and alachlor [2-chloro-N-(2,6-diethylphenyl)-N-(methoxymethyl)acetamide] along with the conservative tracer Br were applied to a 1-m wide strip, offset 1.5 m laterally from a subsurface drain pipe, immediately before an 11.3-h long, 4.2-mm h−1 irrigation. Three additional conservative tracers, pentafluorobenzoate (PF), o-trifluoromethylbenzoate (TF), and difluorobenzoate (DF) were applied to the strip during the irrigation at 2-h intervals. Breakthrough of Br and the two herbicides occurred within the first 2-h of irrigation, indicating that a fraction of the solute transport was along preferential flow paths. Retardation and attenuation of the herbicides indicated that there was interaction between the chemicals and the soil lining the preferential pathways. The conservative tracers applied during the later stages of irrigation arrived at the subsurface drain much faster than tracers applied earlier. The final tracer, applied 6 h after the start of irrigation (DF), took only 15 min and 1 mm of irrigation water to travel to the subsurface drain. Model simulations using a two-dimensional, convective, and dispersive numerical model without an explicit preferential flow component failed to reproduce Br tracer concentrations in the drain effluent, confirming the importance of preferential flow. This study showed that preferential flow in this soil is not a uniform process during a leaching event