Cyberterroryzm jako naczelne wyzwanie dla systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP

Taking also into account the enormous dynamics of today's world, interpretation of legal acts cannot be limited to their literal interpretation. It is worth to use a dynamic one that allows to take into account the actual state of affairs, unless the wording of the provision is clearly opposed. At the same time, it is important not to forget about the others legal regulations concerning safety issues which often cause considerable interpretation difficulties.The rapid development of information and communication technology at the end of the twentieth century has led to a significant reduction in distance between people. The information so far obtained in a laborious manner becomes available in a short time both for those for whom they are a source of knowledge and for those who treat it as tool against the others. A well-guided information security policy is thus becoming a guarantor of military, financial and economic security, both locally as well as internationally, which is reflected in governmental strategies and governmental programs in information security. The purpose of this publication is to show the absence of legal regulations that explicitly sanction the functioning of a formal organizational structure called the national security system while indicating that the cause of anti-cyberterrorist policy is also the lack of appropriate mechanisms and regulations in this regard, so we are dealing with process of institutionalization. It should be stated that the anti-terrorist policy of Poland is not only an answer but also a major challenge for the proper functioning of the national security system of Poland. In this publication the Author discusses the change in the structure of the state apparatus responsible for internal affairs. The Author tries to present to a reader the advantages and disadvantages of the changes which in her opinion are necessary in Polish reality.Biorąc pod uwagę ogromną dynamikę dzisiejszego świata dokonując interpretacji aktów prawnych nie można ograniczać się do ich literalnego brzmienia. Warto posługiwać się wykładnią dynamiczną, która pozwala uwzględnić rzeczywisty stan rzeczy, chyba, że sprzeciwia się temu wyraźnie brzmienie przepisu. Jednocześnie nie należy zapominać o innych regulacjach prawnych dotyczących problematyki bezpieczeństwa co nieraz powoduje sporą trudność interpretacyjną. Gwałtowny rozwój technologii teleinformatycznych pod koniec XX w. stał się przyczyną znacznego zmniejszenia odległości między ludźmi. Informacje dotychczas zdobywane w mozolny sposób stają się dostępne w krótkim czasie zarówno dla tych dla których stanowią one źródło wiedzy, jak i dla tych którzy traktują je jako narzędzie przeciwko innym. Umiejętnie prowadzona polityka bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego staje się zatem gwarantem bezpieczeństwa militarnego, finansowego, gospodarczego, zarówno w skali lokalnej, jak i na arenie międzynarodowej, co znajduje odpowiedź w opracowanych i wdrażanych przez państwo polskie strategiach oraz programach rządowych w zakresie bezpieczeństwa informacyjnego. Założeniem niniejszej publikacji jest ukazanie braku istnienia regulacji prawnych jednoznacznie sankcjonujących funkcjonowanie sformalizowanej struktury organizacyjnej o nazwie: system bezpieczeństwa narodowego przy jednoczesnym wskazaniu, że przyczyną powstania polityki antycyberterrorystycznej jest również brak istnienia odpowiednich mechanizmów i regulacji w tym zakresie, w związku z czym mamy do czynienia z procesem instytucjonalizacji. Należy więc stwierdzić, że polityka antycyberterrorystyczna Polski jest nie tylko odpowiedzią, ale i naczelnym wyzwaniem dla poprawnego funkcjonowania systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego RP. W niniejszej publikacji Autorka rozważa zmianę struktury aparatu państwowego odpowiedzialnego za sprawy wewnętrzne. Stara się przedstawić czytelnikowi wady i zalety zmian, jakie jej zdaniem są konieczne w polskiej rzeczywistośc

Artificial intelligence versus human - a threat or a necessity of evolution?

Currently, technologies are actively shaping and intensifying the time of implementation of artificial intelligence (AI) systems, while at the same time the so-called soft skills that employers are looking for in future employees are becoming increasingly important. Thus, in today's situation, we have the possibility to use automatons and robots that successfully replace humans in many tasks, while at the same time there is a need to create teams based on such qualities as empathy, communication, ingenuity, intelligence and, above all, humanism, whose importance in creating a business perspective cannot be overestimated. The aim of this article is to analyse the research problem in case of social robots and the probable legal status of artificial intelligence in the future. The article will discuss the differences between artificial intelligence versus artificial consciousness. AI poses societal challenges, it is currently undergoing a number of important developments, and the law must be rapidly changed. Firstly, the difference between artificial intelligence and artificial consciousness is attempted to be demystified. Subsequently, the analysis of current legal status of Artificial Intelligence in EU will be conducted. Cyberspace and the Internet revolutionised human life. It brings benefits, but also hitherto unknown risks. However, this is an inherent problem of human development. Every new technology, every new invention has its advantages, but also disadvantages. It would seem that autonomous systems, using artificial intelligence, are a panacea for such problems. Perhaps so, but the security of cyberspace depends on a variety of factors that are sometimes beyond our control or, from another perspective, we ourselves create the threat, inspire it intentionally or through inadequacies, ignorance, and negligence

Challenges of EU Security on the Example of Cybeterrorism Policy

In addition to traditional threats to information as spying or leaking state secrets and business secrets appeared the new threats, among which the most dangerous is cyberterrorism. Taking into account the problems of cyber-terrorism, includes, in particular, the analysis of legislation aimed at ensuring the security of information systems of individual countries particular, this subject should be also recognized as requiring at the present time the insightful analysis. Therefore, this publication is an attempt of characteristics the determinants of this phenomenon and analysis of the latest legal solutions in the fight against cyber terrorism within the European Union. Moreover, it was made the attempt to find an answer to the question whether the current legal solutions of the European Union in the area of security are an effective tool in the fight against cyberterrorism

Reforma polityki cyberbezpieczństwa Unii Europejskiej

The EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy was adopted by the European Council on June 28, 2016. It defines the common interests of the EU and its member states. It was based on the following objectives: security of citizens and territory, prosperity, democracy, global order, which are to lead to the creation of a credible, reactive and cohesive European Union. The principles which the European Union began to follow are unity, cooperation with others, responsibility, and deepening external partnerships.It is worth noting that cybersecurity in the European Union is a prerogative of the Member States unlike cyberterrorism which is a shared competence. Nevertheless, the EU has a key role to play in creating the conditions for the ability of Member States to improve, cooperate and build trust.This article will attempt to demonstrate that the effectiveness of actions taken by European Union bodies in the field of cyber terrorism depends on the type of instruments at the disposal of the EU and the Member States and the legal basis of the relevant regulations. The problem is that there are legal inaccuracies and interpretation discrepancies in the provisions of legal regulations at the EU level regarding the division of competences regarding cyberspace protection, which in fact lead to a delay in the establishment of mutual cooperation between the EU and the Member States.  Globalna strategia UE na rzecz polityki zagranicznej i bezpieczeństwa została przyjęta przez Radę Europejską 28 czerwca 2016 r. Określa wspólne interesy UE i państw członkowskich. Opiera się na następujących celach: bezpieczeństwie obywateli i terytorium, dobrobycie, demokracji, ładzie światowym, które mają doprowadzić do stworzenia wiarygodnej, reaktywnej i spójnej Unii Europejskiej. Zasady, którymi zaczęła kierować się Unia Europejska, to jedność, współdziałanie z innymi, odpowiedzialność, pogłębianie partnerstw zewnętrznych.Warto zauważyć, że cyberbezpieczeństwo w Unii Europejskiej jest prerogatywą państw członkowskich w przeciwieństwie do cyberterroryzmu, który należy do kompetencji dzielonych. Mimo to UE ma do odegrania kluczową rolę w tworzeniu warunków dla zdolności państw członkowskich, aby ulepszać, współpracować i budować zaufanie. W niniejszym artykule zostanie podjęta próba wykazania, że na skuteczność działań podejmowanych przez organy Unii Europejskiej w zakresie polityki cyberterrorystycznej zależy od rodzaju instrumentów będących w dyspozycji UE i państw członkowskich oraz podstawy prawnej odpowiednich regulacji. Problemem pozostają nieścisłości prawne i rozbieżności interpretacyjne w zapisie regulacji prawnych na poziomie unijnym w zakresie podziału kompetencji dotyczących ochrony cyberprzestrzeni, które w rzeczywistości prowadzą do opóźnienia powstania wzajemnej współpracy między Unią a państwami członkowskimi[1] https://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_pl_.pdf. (dostęp: 3.02.2021 r.)

Rat Urinary Bladder Carcinogenesis by Dual-Acting PPARα + γ Agonists

Despite clinical promise, dual-acting activators of PPARα and γ (here termed PPARα+γ agonists) have experienced high attrition rates in preclinical and early clinical development, due to toxicity. In some cases, discontinuation was due to carcinogenic effect in the rat urothelium, the epithelial layer lining the urinary bladder, ureters, and kidney pelvis. Chronic pharmacological activation of PPARα is invariably associated with cancer in rats and mice. Chronic pharmacological activation of PPARγ can in some cases also cause cancer in rats and mice. Urothelial cells coexpress PPARα as well as PPARγ, making it plausible that the urothelial carcinogenicity of PPARα+γ agonists may be caused by receptor-mediated effects (exaggerated pharmacology). Based on previously published mode of action data for the PPARα+γ agonist ragaglitazar, and the available literature about the role of PPARα and γ in rodent carcinogenesis, we propose a mode of action hypothesis for the carcinogenic effect of PPARα+γ agonists in the rat urothelium, which combines receptor-mediated and off-target cytotoxic effects. The proposed mode of action hypothesis is being explored in our laboratories, towards understanding the human relevance of the rat cancer findings, and developing rapid in vitro or short-term in vivo screening approaches to faciliate development of new dual-acting PPAR agonist compounds

WHERE ARE THE CHANGES IN EU CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION LEADING?

Cybersecurity policy is a response to the growing instability of the virtual world and the threats emanating from this area. This article tries to show how changes in legislative and strategic provisions can affect the EU’s cybersecurity policy. The analysis of the field of cybersecurity in the European Union, the subject of which is the union itself, allows the authors to demonstrate the existence of such a policy in the EU. The subject of the analysis is the phenomenon of cyberterrorism as a threat and its specificity as a form of violence. The article shows how policy and strategy are interrelated, paying particular attention to the security concept of the European Union. The starting point of the research is the analysis of issues related to the specific nature of EU cyberterrorism policy and the most important legal bases in this field, on which EU cybersecurity policy is built. The preliminary study defines the concepts of cyberterrorism, cybercrime, and cyberwar, showing their impacts on the national security policy of the information society and, thus, also on the cybersecurity policy of the EU

Genetic and antigenic characterization of complete genomes of Type 1 Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome viruses (PRRSV) isolated in Denmark over a period of 10 years

AbstractPorcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome (PRRS) caused by the PRRS virus (PRRSV) is considered one of the most devastating swine diseases worldwide. PRRS viruses are divided into two major genotypes, Type 1 and Type 2, with pronounced diversity between and within the genotypes. In Denmark more than 50% of the herds are infected with Type 1 and/or Type 2 PRRSV. The main objective of this study was to examine the genetic diversity and drift of Type 1 viruses in a population with limited introduction of new animals and semen. A total of 43 ORF5 and 42 ORF7 nucleotide sequences were obtained from viruses collected from 2003 to February 2013. Phylogenetic analysis of ORF5 nucleotide sequences showed that the Danish isolates formed two major clusters within the subtype 1. The nucleotide identity to the subtype 1 protogenotype Lelystad virus (LV) spanned 84.9–98.8% for ORF5 and 90.7–100% for ORF7. Among the Danish viruses the pairwise nucleotide identities in ORF5 and ORF7 were 81.2–100% and 88.9–100%, respectively. Sequencing of the complete genomes, including the 5′- and 3′-end nucleotides, of 8 Danish PRRSV Type 1 showed that the genome lengths differed from 14,876 to 15,098 nucleotides and the pairwise nucleotide identity among the Danish viruses was 86.5–97.3% and the identity to LV was 88.7–97.9%. The study strongly indicated that there have been at least two independent introductions of Type 1 PRRSV in Denmark and analysis of the full genomes revealed a significant drift in several regions of the virus

Genetic dissection of complete genomes of Type 2 PRRS viruses isolated in Denmark over a period of 15 years

AbstractType 2 Porcine Reproductive and Respiratory Syndrome Virus (PRRSV) was first detected in Europe in 1996 co-incident with the introduction of a live attenuated vaccine. Since then, only limited ORF5 and ORF7 sequences of Type 2 PRRS viruses have been reported throughout Europe. In the present study, the genetic and antigenic diversity of 11 complete genomes and 49 ORF5 and 55 ORF7 nucleotide sequences obtained from 57 viruses in Denmark from 2003 to 2012 were examined. The genetic identity of the 11 complete genomes to the vaccine strain (Ingelvac PRRS MLV) ranged between 93.6 and 99.6% while the 49 ORF5 sequences examined were 94.0–99.8% identical to the vaccine strain. Among the Danish sequences, the pairwise nucleotide identity was 90.9–100% and 93.0–100.0% for ORF5 and ORF7, respectively. Analysis of the genetic region encoding NSP2 revealed high diversity among the Danish viruses with an 86.6–98.9% range in similarity. Furthermore, several of the sequenced viruses harbored deletions in the NSP2 coding region. Phylogenetic analysis in a global Type 2 PRRSV framework classified all Danish isolates to a single cluster (sub-lineage 5.1) which comprised strains closely-related to the Type 2 prototype isolate VR2332

Genetic analysis of ORF5 of recent Korean porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome viruses (PRRSVs) in viremic sera collected from MLV-vaccinating or non-vaccinating farms

The 23 open reading frame (ORF) 5 sequences of Korean type II porcine reproductive and respiratory syndrome virus (PRRSV) were collected from viremic sera from the (modified live vaccine) MLV-vaccinating and non-vaccinating farms from 2007 to 2008. The samples were phylogenetically analyzed with previous ORF5 sequences, including type I Korean PRRSV, and previously reported or collected sequences from 1997 to 2008. A MN184-like subgroup of type II Korean PRRSV was newly identified in the viremic sera collected from 2007 to 2008. And of the type I PRRSVs, one subgroup had 87.2~88.9% similarity with the Lelystad virus, showing a close relationship with the 27~2003 strain of Spain. The maximum parsimony tree of type II PRRSV from 1997 to 2008 showed that they had evolved to four lineages, subgroups 1, 2, 3 and 4. Most of the recently collected type II PRRSVs belonged to subgroup 4 (48%). The region of three B-cell epitopes and two T-cell epitopes of ORF5 amino acids sequences was considerably different from the MLV in subgroups 3 and 4. In conclusion, the existence of type I PRRSV, which was genetically different from Lelystad virus (Prototype of type I PRRSV), and heterologous type II PRRSVs of viremic pigs detected even in the MLV-vaccinating farms indicated the need for new vaccine approaches for the control of PRRSV in Korea