Audiences’ Communicative Agency in a Datafied Age: Interpretative, Relational and Increasingly Prospective

This article develops a conceptualization of audience agency in the face of datafication. We consider how people, as audiences and users of media and technologies, face transforming communicative conditions, and how these conditions challenge the power potentials of audiences in processes of communication—that is, their communicative agency. To develop our conceptualization, we unpack the concept of audiences’ communicative agency by examining its foundations in communication scholarship, in reception theory and sociology, arguing that agency is understood as interpretative and relational, and applied to make important normative assessments. We further draw on emerging scholarship on encounters with data in the everyday to discuss how audience agency is now challenged by datafication, arguing that communicative agency is increasingly prospective in a datafied age. Thereby, we provide a theoretical conceptualization for further analysis of audiences in transforming communicative conditions.publishedVersio

Cue‐induced effects on decision‐making distinguish subjects with gambling disorder from healthy controls

While an increased impact of cues on decision‐making has been associated with substance dependence, it is yet unclear whether this is also a phenotype of non‐substance‐related addictive disorders, such as gambling disorder (GD). To better understand the basic mechanisms of impaired decision‐making in addiction, we investigated whether cue‐induced changes in decision‐making could distinguish GD from healthy control (HC) subjects. We expected that cue‐induced changes in gamble acceptance and specifically in loss aversion would distinguish GD from HC subjects. Thirty GD subjects and 30 matched HC subjects completed a mixed gambles task where gambling and other emotional cues were shown in the background. We used machine learning to carve out the importance of cue dependency of decision‐making and of loss aversion for distinguishing GD from HC subjects. Cross‐validated classification yielded an area under the receiver operating curve (AUC‐ROC) of 68.9% (p = .002). Applying the classifier to an independent sample yielded an AUC‐ROC of 65.0% (p = .047). As expected, the classifier used cue‐induced changes in gamble acceptance to distinguish GD from HC. Especially, increased gambling during the presentation of gambling cues characterized GD subjects. However, cue‐induced changes in loss aversion were irrelevant for distinguishing GD from HC subjects. To our knowledge, this is the first study to investigate the classificatory power of addiction‐relevant behavioral task parameters when distinguishing GD from HC subjects. The results indicate that cue‐induced changes in decision‐making are a characteristic feature of addictive disorders, independent of a substance of abuseDFG, 103586207, GRK 1589: Sensory Computation in Neural System

Neural correlates of cue‐induced changes in decision‐making distinguish subjects with gambling disorder from healthy controls

In addiction, there are few human studies on the neural basis of cue-induced changes in value-based decision making (Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer, PIT). It is especially unclear whether neural alterations related to PIT are due to the physiological effects of substance abuse or rather related to learning processes and/or other etiological factors related to addiction. We have thus investigated whether neural activation patterns during a PIT task help to distinguish subjects with gambling disorder (GD), a nonsubstance-based addiction, from healthy controls (HCs). Thirty GD and 30 HC subjects completed an affective decision-making task in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanner. Gambling-associated and other emotional cues were shown in the background during the task. Data collection and feature modeling focused on a network of nucleus accumbens (NAcc), amygdala, and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (derived from PIT and substance use disorder [SUD] studies). We built and tested a linear classifier based on these multivariate neural PIT signatures. GD subjects showed stronger PIT than HC subjects. Classification based on neural PIT signatures yielded a significant area under the receiver operating curve (AUC-ROC) (0.70,p= 0.013). GD subjects showed stronger PIT-related functional connectivity between NAcc and amygdala elicited by gambling cues, as well as between amygdala and OFC elicited by negative and positive cues. HC and GD subjects were thus distinguishable by PIT-related neural signatures including amygdala-NAcc-OFC functional connectivity. Neural PIT alterations in addictive disorders might not depend on the physiological effect of a substance of abuse but on related learning processes or even innate neural traits

Modern Consumer and Organic Farming in Serbia: Perspectives of Organic Food Consumption

Modern agriculture is facing new challenges in the field of sustainable development and it is required not only to supply products of satisfactory quality, but also take into account the numerous environmental and social consequences of characters relating thereto, and which directly affect the overall society. The main reasons for the expansion of organic agriculture are the results of medical studies that show increased health risks in consuming foods originating from intensive conventional production. Risk had the most high frequency of disorders of development and health of infants, as well as disorders of fertility that have been demonstrated in humans and animals. The essence of this work is reflected in the specific field of view, the importance of marketing - consumer behavior, as well as our opportunities to join the new trends, both in production and consumption of organic products

Changes of mind and absolute evidence

To navigate the world safely, we often need to rapidly ‘change our mind’ about decisions. Current models assume that initial decisions and change-of-mind decisions draw upon common sources of sensory evidence. In two-choice scenarios, this evidence may be ‘relative’ or ‘absolute’. For example, when judging which of two objects is the brightest, the luminance difference and luminance ratio between the two objects are sources of ‘relative’ evidence, which are invariant across additive and multiplicative luminance changes. Conversely, the overall luminance of the two objects combined is a source of ‘absolute’ evidence, which necessarily varies across symmetric luminance manipulations. Previous studies have shown that initial decisions are sensitive to both relative and absolute evidence; however, it is unknown whether change-of-mind decisions are sensitive to absolute evidence. Here, we investigated this question across two experiments. In each experiment participants indicated which of two flickering greyscale squares was brightest. Following an initial decision, the stimuli remained on screen for a brief period and participants could change their response. To investigate the effect of absolute evidence, the overall luminance of the two squares was varied whilst either the luminance difference (Experiment 1) or luminance ratio (Experiment 2) was held constant. In both experiments we found that increases in absolute evidence led to faster, less accurate initial responses and slower changes of mind. Change-of-mind accuracy decreased when the luminance difference was held constant, but remained unchanged when the luminance ratio was fixed. The initial response effects could be explained by the presence of input-dependent noise within the decision process, varying either within or across trials. However, the change-of-mind effects could not be captured by existing models, nor by two modified models which included input-dependent noise sources. This suggests that that the continued integration of sensory evidence following an initial decision operates differently to that described in existing theoretical accounts

NEW RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPLYING THE HEPARIN IN ACUTE CORONARY SYNDROMES: A CRITICAL VIEW

The heparin therapy in acute myocardial infarct as well as in unstable anginapectoris is useful though risk-taking. New recommendations presented by competentassociations also included the results of the recent studies; thus, it is expected thatthey would improve the quality of daily work in the coronary unit. The cardiologistare obliged to get to know and to apply adequately the given exact advice as well asthe principles that the recommendations are based upon.Some possible shortcomings of these suggestions are also perceived; theiranalysis can help create an attitude implying that the advice is not to be taken as alaw. We consider it ethically proper to include, as an indispensable part, an explanationof one's own achievements and shortcomings in the recommendations. Thismeans that the doctors dealing with the respective urgent problems will have to takea critical view of the recommendations on the basis of their own knowledge,experience and logic