Social Ontology : some Basic Principles

The aim of this article is to explore the problem of social ontology, by developing the argument presented in The Construction of Social Reality (1995). After some preliminary distinctions (section 1), the article describes the logical structure of society using three concepts: collective intentionality, the assignment of function, and constitutive rules and procedures (section 2). Some further developments of this approach are presented: the analysis of status indicators, and the case of institutions where there is a status function but no physical object on which it is imposed (section 3). Some remarks are also made about the taxonomy of institutional facts (section 4), about the relationship between conceptual analysis and empirical data (section 5), and, finally, about the concept of institutional facts (section 6).El objetivo de este artículo es explorar el problema de la ontología social, desarrollando el argumento presentado en La construcción de la realidad social (1995). Después de hacer algunas distinciones preliminares (sección 1), el artículo describe la estructura lógica de la sociedad usando tres conceptos: intencionalidad colectiva, asignación de función, y reglas y procedimientos constitutivos (sección 2). Se presentan algunos desarrollos posteriores de este enfoque: el análisis de indicadores de status, y el caso de las instituciones donde existe una función de status pero no un objeto físico sobre el que la misma se impone (sección 3). Se hacen también algunas observaciones sobre la taxonomía de los hechos institucionales (sección 4), sobre la relación entre el análisis conceptual y los datos empíricos (sección 5), y, finalmente, sobre el concepto de hechos institucionales (sección 6)

What is Language? Some Preliminary Remarks

There are three essential I want to get across in this article in addition to the analysis of relations of nonlinguistic to linguistic intentionality. First I want to emphasize how the structure of prelinguistic intentionality enables us to solve the problems of the relation of reference and predication and the problem of the unity of the proposition. The second point is about deontology. The basic intellectual motivation that drives this second part of his argument is the following: there is something left out of the standard textbook accounts of language as consisting of syntax, semantics and phonology with an extra-linguistic pragmatics thrown in. Basically what is left out is the essential element of commitment involved in having a set of conventional devices that encode the imposition of conditions of satisfaction on conditions of satisfaction. The third part of the article is about the creation of a social and institutional ontology by linguistically representing certain facts as existing, thus creating the facts. When we understand this third point we will get a deeper insight into the constitutive role of language in the construction of society and social institutions

El trasfondo de la intencionalidad

This lecture describes some of the functions of those capacities of the brain that are called "the Background". The Background would enable linguistic and perceptual interpretation to take place. Also, it would give structure to all our conscious life generally and to the temporal sequences of events in our lives. And it would be the source of our motivational dispositions for coping with our environment, facilitating a certain kind of readiness. Finally, the Background would make possible certain sorts of behaviors and certain sorts of responses, but not others. It is suggested that if we did apply these ideas in our cognitive sciences, we would get an approach quite different from the traditional computational approach

The basic reality and the human reality: Introductory chapter to the Münster’s volume

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Artigo de Reflexão Filosofia em um novo século

The central intellectual fact of the present era is that knowledge grows. This growth of knowledge is quietly transforming philosophy, making it possible to do a new kind of philosophy. With the abandonment of the epistemic bias in the subject, such a philosophy can go far beyond anything imagined by the philosophy of a half century ago. It begins, not with skepticism, but with what we know about the real world. It begins with such facts as those stated by the atomic theory of matter and the evolutionary theory of biology, as well as such “common sense” facts we are all conscious that we all really have intentional mental states, that we form social groups and create institutional facts. Such a philosophy is theoretical, comprehensive, systematic, and universal in subject matter. Key words: knowledge, philosophy, post-skepticism.O fato intelectual central da presente era é que o conhecimento cresce. Tal avanço está gradativamente transformando a filosofia, fazendo possível a prática de um novo tipo filosófico. Com o abandono da tendência epistêmica centrada no sujeito, tal filosofia pode ir bem além de qualquer coisa imaginada pela filosofia da metade do século passado. Ela começa não com o ceticismo, mas com aquilo que nós conhecemos acerca do mundo real. Começa a partir de fatos, tais como aqueles determinados pela teoria atômica da matéria e pela teoria evolucionista da biologia, assim como com aqueles fatos tidos como do senso comum, segundo os quais todos nós somos conscientes, possuímos estados mentais intencionais, formamos grupos sociais e criamos fatos institucionais. Uma filosofia como essa é teórica, ampla, sistemática e universal, no que concerne ao seu objeto de análise. Palavras-chave: conhecimento, filosofia, pós-ceticismo

Felsefe ve nörobiyolojide bir problem olarak benlik

Psikoloji, nörobiyoloji, felsefe ve diğer pek çok disiplinde benliğe ilişkin çok sayıda farklı problemler var. Nörobiyolojide, çalışılan benlik problemlerinin pek çoğunun patolojinin çeşitli formlarıyla ilgili olduğu izlenimine sahibim –dürüstlükteki sorunlar, tutarlılık veya benliğin işlevi. Bu patolojiler hakkında söyleyecek hiçbir şeyim yok çünkü neredeyse onlar hakkında hiçbir şey bilmiyorum. Ben bu patolojilere yalnızca ayrık-beyin hastaları gibi doğrudan benliğin problemleriyle ilgiliyseler değineceğim

Human Social Reality and Language

My question, in this work, will be: How do human beings create such complex phenomena as money, government, property, and marriage? Here, I will maintain four theses. First, all of human institutional reality is created in its initial form by a certain type of linguistic representation that has the same logical structure as Declarations and as these create Status Functions, I call them Status Function Declarations. Secondly, institutional reality is maintained in its continuing existence by Status Function Declarations. Third, the status functions without exception function to create power. So the purpose of institutional facts is to create power relations. Fourth, the powers in question have a very peculiar status, because they function by creating reasons for action that are independent of the desires or inclinations of the agents in question. All institutional facts are created by Status Function Declarations, and these Status Function Declarations create deontic powers, and Deontic powers, when recognized, give desire independent reasons for action

Derechos humanos

This article is mostly about nature of and the relations among institutions, institutional facts, status functions, and deontic powers. Prominent among the nouns that name these deontic power is «right,» along with others such as «obligation,» «duty,» «entitlement,» and «authorization.» Most of the rights that one can think of exist within institutions. It is generally agreed that there area such things as human rights, even universal human rights that I do not have in virtue of my institutional memberships, such as the rights of a citizen, a professor, or a husband; but rights that I have solely in virtue of being a human being. How can there be such things?Este artículo, principalmente, aborda la naturaleza de y las relaciones entre instituciones, hechos institucionales, funciones de estatus y poderes deónticos. Destacan entre los sustantivos que nombran a esos poderes deónticos el «derecho», junto a otros como «obligación», «deber», «habilitación» y «autorización». La mayoría de los derechos en los que uno pueda pensar existen dentro de instituciones. Está comúnmente aceptado que hay cosas tales como los derechos humanos, incluso derechos humanos universales que no poseo en virtud de mi pertenencia institucional, tales como los derechos de un ciudadano, un profesor, o un marido; sino derechos que tengo únicamente por el hecho de ser un ser humano. ¿Cómo pueden ser tales cosas?This article is mostly about nature of and the relations among institutions, institutional facts, status functions, and deontic powers. Prominent among the nouns that name these deontic power is «right,» along with others such as «obligation,» «duty,» «entitlement,» and «authorization.» Most of the rights that one can think of exist within institutions. It is generally agreed that there area such things as human rights, even universal human rights that I do not have in virtue of my institutional memberships, such as the rights of a citizen, a professor, or a husband; but rights that I have solely in virtue of being a human being. How can there be such things?

¿Qué es una institución?

Cuando era un estudiante universitario en Oxford, nos enseñaban economía como si fuera una ciencia natural. La materia objeto de la economía podría ser diferente de la física, pero sólo en la medida en la que el contenido de la química o la biología son diferentes de la física. Los resultados propiamente dichos nos fueron presentados como si fuesen teorías científicas. Por ello cuando aprendimos que los ahorros equivalen a la inversión, se nos enseñaba en el mismo tono de voz en el que uno aprende que la fuerza es igual a la masa por la aceleración. Y aprendimos que los empresarios juiciosos venden cuando el coste marginal iguala al beneficio marginal de la misma manera en la que una vez aprendimos que los cuerpos se atraen con una fuerza directamente proporcional al producto de sus masas e inversamente proporcional al cuadrado de la distancia que los separa. En ningún momento se planteó que la realidad descrita por la teoría económica fuera dependiente de las creencias y otras actitudes humanas de una manera que era completamente distinta de la realidad descrita por la física o la química

Ligand selectivity in stabilising tandem parallel folded G-quadruplex motifs in human telomeric DNA sequences

Biophysical studies of ligand interactions with three human telomeric repeat sequences (d(AGGG(TTAGGG)n, n = 3, 7 and 11)) show that an oxazole-based ‘click’ ligand, which induces parallel folded quadruplexes, preferentially stabilises longer telomeric repeats providing evidence for selectivity in binding at the interface between tandem quadruplex motifs