Shareholder Welfare in Minority Freeze-Out Bids: Are Legal Protections Sufficient? Evidence from the U.S. Market

Anlegerschutz, Kleinaktionär, Diskriminierung, Vereinigte Staaten, Investor protection, Small shareholders, Discrimination, United States

Measurement of the inclusive isolated-photon cross section in pp collisions at √s = 13 TeV using 36 fb−1 of ATLAS data

The differential cross section for isolated-photon production in pp collisions is measured at a centre-of-mass energy of 13 TeV with the ATLAS detector at the LHC using an integrated luminosity of 36.1 fb. The differential cross section is presented as a function of the photon transverse energy in different regions of photon pseudorapidity. The differential cross section as a function of the absolute value of the photon pseudorapidity is also presented in different regions of photon transverse energy. Next-to-leading-order QCD calculations from Jetphox and Sherpa as well as next-to-next-to-leading-order QCD calculations from Nnlojet are compared with the measurement, using several parameterisations of the proton parton distribution functions. The predictions provide a good description of the data within the experimental and theoretical uncertainties. [Figure not available: see fulltext.

Vertical Integration to Avoid Contracting with Potential Competitors: Evidence from Bankers’ Banks

We examine a vertical integration decision within the commercial banking industry. During the last quarter of the 20th century, some community banks reduced their traditional reliance on correspondent banks for upstream products and services by joining bankers’ banks, a form of business cooperative. Research on vertical integration focuses primarily on firm-specific investment, market power, and government regulation. However, this case is difficult to explain in terms of these standard vertical integration motives. Our evidence suggests that bankers’ banks are a response to technological change and deregulation that results in increased costs faced by community banks in dealing with correspondent banks as both suppliers and potential competitors. For instance, loan participations require sharing proprietary information about major loan customers, something a community bank would not want to provide to a potential competitor.

Do Managers Listen to the Market?

There are competing theories as to whether managers learn from stock prices. Dye and Sridhar (2002), for example, argue that capital markets can be better informed than the firm itself, while Roll (1986) argues managers may ignore market signals due to hubris. In this paper, we examine whether managers listen to the market in making major corporate investments, and whether agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms help explain managers\u27 propensity to listen. We find that, on average, managers listen to the market: they are more likely to cancel investments when the market reacts unfavorably to the related announcement. Further, we find mixed evidence consistent with the notion that managers\u27 propensity to listen is related to agency costs. We find that firms tend to listen to the market more when more of their shares are held by large blockholders, and when their CEOs have higher pay-performance sensitivities

Boundaries of the Firm: Evidence from the Banking Industry

Agency theory implies that asset ownership and decision authority are complements. Using 1998 data from Texas commercial banks, we test whether the likelihood of local ownership of bank offices increases with the importance of granting local managers greater decision authority (for example, due to location or customer base). Our empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis. It suggests that complementarities between strategy and organizational structure can foster differentiation among firms in terms of location, customers, and products. It also supports the growing view that small locally-owned banks have a comparative advantage over large banks within specific environments

What Happens to CEOs After They Retire? New Evidence on Career Concerns, Horizon Problems, and CEO Incentives

This paper provides evidence on a previously unidentified source of managerial incentives: concerns about post-retirement board service. Both the likelihood that a retired CEO serves on his own board two years after departure, as well as the likelihood of serving as an outside director on other boards, are positively and strongly related to his performance while CEO. Retention on the CEO\u27s own board depends primarily on stock returns, while service on outside boards is better explained by accounting returns. The evidence also suggests that firms consider ability in choosing board members

The Determinants of Board Structure

Using a comprehensive sample of nearly 7,000 firms from 1990 to 2004, this paper examines corporate board structure, its trends, and its determinants. We study how board structure has evolved over time and, more importantly, we compare board structure across small and large firms in ways suggested by recent theoretical work. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms structure their boards in response to the costs and benefits of the board\u27s monitoring and advising roles. Our models explain as much as 45% of the observed variation in board structure. Further, small and large firms have dramatically different board structures. For example, board size was falling in the 1990s for large firms, a trend that reversed at the time of mandated reforms, while board size was relatively flat over the 1990s for small and medium-sized firms.