Mechanistic unity of the predictive mind

It is often recognized that cognitive science employs a diverse explanatory toolkit. It has also been argued that cognitive scientists should embrace this explanatory diversity rather than pursue search for some grand unificatory framework or theory. This pluralist stance dovetails with the mechanistic view of cognitive-scientific explanation. However, one recently proposed theory – based on an idea that the brain is a predictive engine – opposes the spirit of pluralism by unapologetically wearing unificatory ambitions on its sleeves. In this paper, my aim is to investigate those pretentions to elucidate what sort of unification is on offer. I challenge the idea that explanatory unification of cognitive science follows from the Free Energy Principle. I claim that if the predictive story is to provide an explanatory unification, it is rather by proposing that many distinct cognitive mechanisms fall under the same functional schema that pertains to prediction error minimization. Seen this way, the brain is not simply a predictive mechanism – it is a collection of predictive mechanisms. I also pursue a more general aim of investigating the value of unificatory power for mechanistic explanations. I argue that even though unification is not an absolute evaluative criterion for mechanistic explanations, it may play an epistemic role in evaluating the credibility of an explanation relative to its direct competitors

Individual Differences in Moral Behaviour: A Role for Response to Risk and Uncertainty?

Investigation of neural and cognitive processes underlying individual variation in moral preferences is underway, with notable similarities emerging between moral- and risk-based decision-making. Here we specifically assessed moral distributive justice preferences and non-moral financial gambling preferences in the same individuals, and report an association between these seemingly disparate forms of decision-making. Moreover, we find this association between distributive justice and risky decision-making exists primarily when the latter is assessed with the Iowa Gambling Task. These findings are consistent with neuroimaging studies of brain function during moral and risky decision-making. This research also constitutes the first replication of a novel experimental measure of distributive justice decision-making, for which individual variation in performance was found. Further examination of decision-making processes across different contexts may lead to an improved understanding of the factors affecting moral behaviour

Measuring the effects through time of the influence of visuomotor and visuotactile synchronous stimulation on a virtual body ownership illusion

Previous studies have examined the experience of owning a virtual surrogate body or body part through specific combinations of cross-modal multisensory stimulation. Both visuomotor (VM) and visuotactile (VT) synchronous stimulation have been shown to be important for inducing a body ownership illusion, each tested separately or both in combination. In this study we compared the relative importance of these two cross-modal correlations, when both are provided in the same immersive virtual reality setup and the same experiment. We systematically manipulated VT and VM contingencies in order to assess their relative role and mutual interaction. Moreover, we present a new method for measuring the induced body ownership illusion through time, by recording reports of breaks in the illusion of ownership ("breaks") throughout the experimental phase. The balance of the evidence, from both questionnaires and analysis of the breaks, suggests that while VM synchronous stimulation contributes the greatest to the attainment of the illusion, a disruption of either (through asynchronous stimulation) contributes equally to the probability of a break in the illusion

The Human Touch: Skin Temperature During the Rubber Hand Illusion in Manual and Automated Stroking Procedures

Rohde M, Wold A, Karnath H-O, Ernst MO. The Human Touch: Skin Temperature During the Rubber Hand Illusion in Manual and Automated Stroking Procedures. PLoS ONE. 2013;8(11): e80688.A difference in skin temperature between the hands has been identified as a physiological correlate of the rubber hand illusion (RHI). The RHI is an illusion of body ownership, where participants perceive body ownership over a rubber hand if they see it being stroked in synchrony with their own occluded hand. The current study set out to replicate this result, i.e., psychologically induced cooling of the stimulated hand using an automated stroking paradigm, where stimulation was delivered by a robot arm (PHANToMTM force-feedback device). After we found no evidence for hand cooling in two experiments using this automated procedure, we reverted to a manual stroking paradigm, which is closer to the one employed in the study that first produced this effect. With this procedure, we observed a relative cooling of the stimulated hand in both the experimental and the control condition. The subjective experience of ownership, as rated by the participants, by contrast, was strictly linked to synchronous stroking in all three experiments. This implies that hand-cooling is not a strict correlate of the subjective feeling of hand ownership in the RHI. Factors associated with the differences between the two designs (differences in pressure of tactile stimulation, presence of another person) that were thus far considered irrelevant to the RHI appear to play a role in bringing about this temperature effect

Models, Brains, and Scientific Realism

Prediction Error Minimization theory (PEM) is one of the most promising attempts to model perception in current science of mind, and it has recently been advocated by some prominent philosophers as Andy Clark and Jakob Hohwy. Briefly, PEM maintains that “the brain is an organ that on average and over time continually minimizes the error between the sensory input it predicts on the basis of its model of the world and the actual sensory input” (Hohwy 2014, p. 2). An interesting debate has arisen with regard to which is the more adequate epistemological interpretation of PEM. Indeed, Hohwy maintains that given that PEM supports an inferential view of perception and cogni-tion, PEM has to be considered as conveying an internalist epistemological perspective. Contrary to this view, Clark maintains that it would be incorrect to interpret in such a way the indirectness of the link between the world and our inner model of it, and that PEM may well be combined with an externalist epistemological perspective. The aim of this paper is to assess those two opposite interpretations of PEM. Moreover, it will be suggested that Hohwy’s position may be considerably strengthened by adopting Carlo Cellucci’s view on knowledge (2013)

Fractionation of parietal function in bistable perception probed with concurrent TMS-EEG

When visual input has conflicting interpretations, conscious perception can alternate spontaneously between these possible interpretations. This is called bistable perception. Previous neuroimaging studies have indicated the involvement of two right parietal areas in resolving perceptual ambiguity (ant-SPLr and post-SPLr). Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies that selectively interfered with the normal function of these regions suggest that they play opposing roles in this type of perceptual switch. In the present study, we investigated this fractionation of parietal function by use of combined TMS with electroencephalography (EEG). Specifically, while participants viewed either a bistable stimulus, a replay stimulus, or resting-state fixation, we applied single pulse TMS to either location independently while simultaneously recording EEG. Combined with participant’s individual structural magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans, this dataset allows for complex analyses of the effect of TMS on neural time series data, which may further elucidate the causal role of the parietal cortex in ambiguous perception

Structural representations: causally relevant and different from detectors

This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a ‘‘fuel of success’’, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two

Increased spontaneous MEG signal diversity for psychoactive doses of ketamine, LSD and psilocybin

What is the level of consciousness of the psychedelic state? Empirically, measures of neural signal diversity such as entropy and Lempel-Ziv (LZ) complexity score higher for wakeful rest than for states with lower conscious level like propofol-induced anesthesia. Here we compute these measures for spontaneous magnetoencephalographic (MEG) signals from humans during altered states of consciousness induced by three psychedelic substances: psilocybin, ketamine and LSD. For all three, we find reliably higher spontaneous signal diversity, even when controlling for spectral changes. This increase is most pronounced for the single-channel LZ complexity measure, and hence for temporal, as opposed to spatial, signal diversity. We also uncover selective correlations between changes in signal diversity and phenomenological reports of the intensity of psychedelic experience. This is the first time that these measures have been applied to the psychedelic state and, crucially, that they have yielded values exceeding those of normal waking consciousness. These findings suggest that the sustained occurrence of psychedelic phenomenology constitutes an elevated level of consciousness - as measured by neural signal diversity