Solidarität und transnationale Netzwerkeinbettung: Einstellungen zu länderspezifischer Finanzhilfe in zwei europäischen Ländern

Die Europäische Finanzkrise stellt eine der härtesten Prüfungen für die EU dar. Ausgelöst von einer globalen Finanzkrise gerieten mehr und mehr EU Staaten in Staatsschuldenkrisen, die sie ohne Hilfe der EU nicht selbst lösen konnten. Da weder Kredite des IWF und der EU, noch die temporäre „Europäische Finanzstabilisierungsfazilität“ ausreichten, wurde nach der Ergänzung des Lissabon-Vertrages um Artikel 136(3) der dauerhafte „Europäische Stabilitätsmechanismus“ implementiert, der als Einstieg in eine europäische Finanzpolitik gewertet werden kann. Soziologisch betrachtet finden wir hier eine bedeutende Vertiefung europäischer Systemintegration vor. Nun stellt sich die Frage, welche Effekte diese Systemintegration auf die europäischen Bürger ausübt, d.h. ob der Systemintegration auch eine Sozialintegration folgt. Als Indikator für geglückte Sozialintegration wird das Bestehen grenzüberschreitender informeller Solidarität unter den europäischen Bürgern herangezogen, die über Einstellungen zur länderspezifischen Finanzhilfe an die EU Mitgliedsstaaten Irland, Griechenland, Spanien und Italien operationalisiert wird. Analysiert werden Daten einer Umfragestudie „Fiskalische Solidarität in der Europäischen Union“ (FSEU), die 2012 in Deutschland und Portugal durchgeführt wurde.Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen, dass die der beschleunigten Systemintegration folgende Sozialintegration begrenzt ist. Solidarische Einstellungen werden vorwiegend von der eigenen Betroffenheit bestimmt. So befürworten Portugiesen, deren Land selbst stark von der Finanzkrise stark betroffen ist, Finanzhilfe eher als Deutsche, die in einem wirtschaftlich stabilen Land leben. Personen mit europäischer Identität favorisieren länderspezifische Finanzhilfe, während nationalistisch eingestellte Personen diese zurückweisen. Zudem beeinflusst Netzwerkeinbettung die Entscheidung, ob Finanzhilfe gewährt werden soll. Regelmäßige Kontakte zu EU Ausländern rufen Ablehnung von Finanzhilfe an südeuropäische Länder und Irland hervor. Trennt man die Netzwerkkontakte nach Kontakten in die südeuropäischen EU-Mitgliedstaaten und Irland auf, so  zeigt sich, dass Netzwerkeinbettung in Erstere Ablehnung und in Letzteres Akzeptanz von Finanzhilfe hervorrufen. So scheint die Netzwerkeinbettung die Einschätzung, ob bestimmte Länder würdige Empfänger von Finanzhilfe sind, die aus öffentlich zugänglichen Informationen getroffen werden, zu verstärken. Südeuropäische Länder scheinen in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung selbstverschuldet in die Krise geraten zu sein und die Rückzahlungskapazität der Finanzhilfe erscheint begrenzt, da hier starke korrupte Strukturen vorherrschen, die wiederum durch auf Statuserhalt angelegte Wohlfahrtsysteme gefestigt werden. Zudem zeigen massive öffentliche Demonstrationen auf, dass die Finanzhilfe und Austeritätspolitik von den Bürgern unerwünscht ist. Irland hingegen erscheint als würdig bedürftig, da es weniger korrupte staatliche Strukturen aufweist, ein auf Eigeninitiative angelegtes liberales Wohlfahrtssystem hat und derart massive Demonstrationen gegen die Sparpolitik, wie sie in Südeuropa stattfanden, nicht erfolgten

Is there a European solidarity?: Attitudes towards fiscal assistance for debt-ridden European Union member states

This paper analyses if European citizens are willing to show solidarity with debt-ridden EU member states during the recent crisis. Based on a theoretical concept comprehending four di-mensions of solidarity - generalised willingness to support, existence of social cleavages, rea-sons of supporting others, acceptance of conditions a crisis country has to meet to receive as-sistance - we derived hypotheses stating that the existence of a European wide solidarity is rather unlikely. We analysed data from two Eurobarometer surveys 2010 and 2011 and a unique survey conducted in Germany and Portugal in 2012. Descriptive and multilevel analyses indi-cated that in 2010 and 2011, a narrow majority of all EU citizens supported fiscal assistance for crisis countries, and socio-economic and cultural cleavages in attitudes regarding financial as-sistance for crisis countries were rather low. Findings from the two country comparison showed that the willingness to show solidarity was predominantly guided by moral reasoning instead of the respondent’s self-interest. However, German and Portuguese respondents disagree on austerity measures, with the exception of social spending cuts. Taken all together, we come to the conclusion that recent years have brought a new legitimacy to the use of EU bailout measures which are now a given European practice

The EU crisis and citizens support for a European welfare state

"Some scholars have argued that the only way to resolve the Euro crisis would be to further pursue the path of deepening the integration process by institutionalising a European welfare state. In this paper we question whether a Europeanised welfare system would be supported by European citizens. We argue that the legitimacy of a harmonisation of national welfare regimes is established if two conditions are met: Firstly, if a majority of citizens support a Europeanised social policy, and secondly, if potential cleavages which structure attitudes towards European social policy are relatively weak. Using data from a survey conducted in Germany, Poland, and Spain, descriptive findings show that a majority supports the idea of Europeanisation of social policy. Further, multivariate analysis prompts the conclusion that the chances of the emergence of social cleavages are relatively small. This brings us to an optimistic conclusion: We suppose that the potential for political mobilisation against Europeanisation of social policy is rather low." (author's abstract

Towards the Methodological Foundation of Social Capital Theory. How (not) to Measure it in the Czech Republic.

The field of social capital still lacks a recognized general theory. Accordingly, various and sometimes inappropriate measurements are used for it. The present monograph contributes to filling in this gap and provides progress towards the creation of a formalized social capital theory. Starting with the basic concepts of social capital of Bourdieu [1983] and Coleman [1988] we derive a general definition of social capital. Social capital is a property of relationships among individuals that are a resource actors can use and benefit from. Because neither Bourdieu's nor Coleman's concepts are appropriate as a general social capital theory the more current concepts of Putnam [2000], Burt [1992] and Lin [2001] are contested for this purpose. The discussions show that we can distinguish between cultural social capital (generalized trust, norms of reciprocity) and structural social capital (networks) and that we should focus on one of the two. Thus, we focus the latter but we take into account that cultural social capital is a preconditions as well as an outcome of structural social capital. Structural social capital is further influenced by collective assets (economy and historical or technological background) and individual characteristics (gender, age or ethnicity). Access to structural social capital or social..

K metodologickému základu teorie sociálního kapitálu. Jak ho (ne)měřit v ČR .

The field of social capital still lacks a recognized general theory. Accordingly, various and sometimes inappropriate measurements are used for it. The present monograph contributes to filling in this gap and provides progress towards the creation of a formalized social capital theory. Starting with the basic concepts of social capital of Bourdieu [1983] and Coleman [1988] we derive a general definition of social capital. Social capital is a property of relationships among individuals that are a resource actors can use and benefit from. Because neither Bourdieu's nor Coleman's concepts are appropriate as a general social capital theory the more current concepts of Putnam [2000], Burt [1992] and Lin [2001] are contested for this purpose. The discussions show that we can distinguish between cultural social capital (generalized trust, norms of reciprocity) and structural social capital (networks) and that we should focus on one of the two. Thus, we focus the latter but we take into account that cultural social capital is a preconditions as well as an outcome of structural social capital. Structural social capital is further influenced by collective assets (economy and historical or technological background) and individual characteristics (gender, age or ethnicity). Access to structural social capital or social...Department of SociologyKatedra sociologieFaculty of Social SciencesFakulta sociálních vě

Item battery for measurement of bridging social capital: the comparison of ISSP 2007 and CVVM 2007 datasets

This study introduces a simple tool for measuring Bridging Social Capital (referred to as BSC) by means of a battery of questions regarding the differences in the circle of friends. It was first used in the public opinion poll “Our Society 2007-04” (CVVM) and the modified version was employed in the international survey ISSP 2007 “Leisure Time and Sports”. The main purpose of this study is to compare results from both datasets to assess the reliability and validity. For that, we use the intersection of the same items included in both surveys. First, we verify convergent and discriminant validity of this tool using explorative and confirmative factor analysis. The results show that BSC in this case must be considered in two unlike dimensions: different interests/lifestyle and outgroups. Furthermore, we verify the construct validity using structural equation modelling. The starting point is the theoretical model of positive effects of the structural dimension of social capital (diversity in friendship bonding) on its cultural dimension (tolerance and trust). In conclusion, we suggest taking advantage of the BSC battery in subsequent research

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Is there a European solidarity?: Attitudes towards fiscal assistance for debt-ridden European Union member states

This paper analyses if European citizens are willing to show solidarity with debt-ridden EU member states during the recent crisis. Based on a theoretical concept comprehending four di-mensions of solidarity - generalised willingness to support, existence of social cleavages, rea-sons of supporting others, acceptance of conditions a crisis country has to meet to receive as-sistance - we derived hypotheses stating that the existence of a European wide solidarity is rather unlikely. We analysed data from two Eurobarometer surveys 2010 and 2011 and a unique survey conducted in Germany and Portugal in 2012. Descriptive and multilevel analyses indi-cated that in 2010 and 2011, a narrow majority of all EU citizens supported fiscal assistance for crisis countries, and socio-economic and cultural cleavages in attitudes regarding financial as-sistance for crisis countries were rather low. Findings from the two country comparison showed that the willingness to show solidarity was predominantly guided by moral reasoning instead of the respondent’s self-interest. However, German and Portuguese respondents disagree on austerity measures, with the exception of social spending cuts. Taken all together, we come to the conclusion that recent years have brought a new legitimacy to the use of EU bailout measures which are now a given European practice

Is there a European solidarity?: Attitudes towards fiscal assistance for debt-ridden European Union member states

This paper analyses if European citizens are willing to show solidarity with debt-ridden EU member states during the recent crisis. Based on a theoretical concept comprehending four di-mensions of solidarity - generalised willingness to support, existence of social cleavages, rea-sons of supporting others, acceptance of conditions a crisis country has to meet to receive as-sistance - we derived hypotheses stating that the existence of a European wide solidarity is rather unlikely. We analysed data from two Eurobarometer surveys 2010 and 2011 and a unique survey conducted in Germany and Portugal in 2012. Descriptive and multilevel analyses indi-cated that in 2010 and 2011, a narrow majority of all EU citizens supported fiscal assistance for crisis countries, and socio-economic and cultural cleavages in attitudes regarding financial as-sistance for crisis countries were rather low. Findings from the two country comparison showed that the willingness to show solidarity was predominantly guided by moral reasoning instead of the respondent’s self-interest. However, German and Portuguese respondents disagree on austerity measures, with the exception of social spending cuts. Taken all together, we come to the conclusion that recent years have brought a new legitimacy to the use of EU bailout measures which are now a given European practice