The Moving Middle: Migration, Place Premiums and Human Development in Bolivia

Over half of Bolivian heads of household are lifetime migrants. This paper looks at the long term impact of internal migration over human development in Bolivia. Three issues frame these effects. First, twenty five years of rural to urban migration have transformed the demographic profile of Bolivian society. The new middle third is younger, more bilingual and better educated, with more access to social services than in the past. The poorest of the poor, however, did not migrate to the extent of the non-poor. Second, urban workers make approximately four times as much wages as identical workers in rural areas, controlling for age, ethnicity, and years of schooling. Two caveats dampen this place premium effect: schooling quality and informal insurance mechanisms that make migration more costly. Third, increases in human development can be associated to an “urbanization dividend” that made social services more accessible to first and second generation migrants over a twenty-five year period. Future increases in human development, however, are likely to depend on providing quality services and expanding socials services to the rural poor, rather on gains from urbanization. The key policy challenges of the future include both an expansion of services to the poorest of the poor in rural areas and breaking down discrimination barriers against women and indigenous people in urban labor markets.Migration, human development, poverty, employment, schooling

The Moving Middle: Migration, Place Premiums and Human Development in Bolivia

Over half of Bolivian heads of household are lifetime migrants. This paper looks at the long term impact of internal migration over human development in Bolivia. Three issues frame these effects. First, twenty five years of rural to urban migration have transformed the demographic profile of Bolivian society. The new middle third is younger, more bilingual and better educated, with more access to social services than in the past. The poorest of the poor, however, did not migrate to the extent of the non-poor. Second, urban workers make approximately four times as much wages as identical workers in rural areas, controlling for age, ethnicity, and years of schooling. Two caveats dampen this place premium effect: schooling quality and informal insurance mechanisms that make migration more costly. Third, increases in human development can be associated to an “urbanization dividend” that made social services more accessible to first and second generation migrants over a twenty-five year period. Future increases in human development, however, are likely to depend on providing quality services and expanding socials services to the rural poor, rather on gains from urbanization. The key policy challenges of the future include both an expansion of services to the poorest of the poor in rural areas and breaking down discrimination barriers against women and indigenous people in urban labor markets.Migration, human development, poverty, employment, schooling

Human Development Trends since 1970: A Social Convergence Story

This paper uses a unique data set of the Human Development Index to describe long-run human development trends for 111 countries, from 1970 to 2005. The first part of the paper shows trends by region, period and index subcomponent. We find that 110 of the 111 countries show progress in their HDI levels over a 35-year period. HDI growth is fastest for low-HDI and middle-HDI countries in the pre-1990 period. The life-expectancy and education subcomponents grow faster than income. The assessment of HDI progress is sensitive to choice of measurement. The second part of the paper focuses on the differences between income and non-income determinants of human development. First, HDI growth converges, both absolutely and conditionally, when running HDI growth rates on initial levels of HD. Second, we find that the income and non-income components of HDI change have a near-zero correlation. Third, we look at determinants of the non-income components of the HDI. We find that income is not a significant determinant of HDI change once we include urbanization, fertility and female schooling. Fourth, we test the effects of institutions, geography and gender on HDI growth. We find that the most robust predictors of HDI growth are fertility and female schooling. We check this result using years of women’s suffrage as an instrument for changes in gender relations, and find that it is a significant predictor of HDI progress for the whole sample.human development, education, health and demographic trends, cross-country comparisons, measurement and analysis of poverty

Transparency and Accountability in Bolivia: Does Voice Matter?

Using a survey of clients, doctors and nurses in thirty municipal hospitals, this study examines the scope and determinants of corruption in Bolivia`s public health sector. The authors find that `voice` mechanisms such as citizen activism and oversight are significant in exposing bribery and deterring the overpricing of medical supplies. The existence of `exit` options, such as recourse to private health service providers, additionally serves to deter corruption. Hierarchical controls, such as administrative regulations and procedures, seem to have little impact on hospital corruption, though further research is needed to verify this finding.

The Moving Middle: Migration, Place Premiums and Human Development in Bolivia

Over half of Bolivian heads of household are lifetime migrants. This paper looks at the long term impact of internal migration over human development in Bolivia. Three issues frame these effects. First, twenty five years of rural to urban migration have transformed the demographic profile of Bolivian society. The new middle third is younger, more bilingual and better educated, with more access to social services than in the past. The poorest of the poor, however, did not migrate to the extent of the non-poor. Second, urban workers make approximately four times as much wages as identical workers in rural areas, controlling for age, ethnicity, and years of schooling. Two caveats dampen this place premium effect: schooling quality and informal insurance mechanisms that make migration more costly. Third, increases in human development can be associated to an “urbanization dividend” that made social services more accessible to first and second generation migrants over a twenty-five year period. Future increases in human development, however, are likely to depend on providing quality services and expanding socials services to the rural poor, rather on gains from urbanization. The key policy challenges of the future include both an expansion of services to the poorest of the poor in rural areas and breaking down discrimination barriers against women and indigenous people in urban labor markets

Pobreza y activos en Bolivia: Qué rol juega el capital social?

Análisis recientes de la pobreza en Bolivia muestran que, a pesar de un ligero descenso en el porcentaje de la población que vive en condiciones de pobreza a lo largo de la última década, el número absoluto de hogares pobres continúa en ascenso (Jiménez y Yañez 1997a y b; Vos et al. 1997; Banco Mundial 1996). El bajo nivel de crecimiento de los ingresos de los hogares más pobres sugiere que los esfuerzos sostenidos por mantener niveles de crecimiento económico moderados e incrementar la eficiencia en la asignación del gasto e inversión pública no han sido suficientes para revertir las condiciones de pobreza crónica que caracterizan al país. Los enfoques analíticos que sostuvieron la aplicación de políticas de crecimiento y redes de protección en la región también se encuentran en un periodo de cuestionamiento y reformulación. Perspectivas que enfatizaban la medición de la pobreza por insuficiencia de ingresos o necesidades básicas (Lipton y van der Gaag 1993; Boltvinik 1992), se encuentran interpelados por modelos alternativos que procuran analizar patrones de causalidad entre pobreza y el acceso a mercados de activos de capital humano, capital físico (público y privado) y capital social (Birdsall y Londoño 1997a y b; Moser 1998; Collier 1998). Este estudio procura contribuir al análisis de la pobreza desde la perspectiva de recursos y activos, y describir los alcances de este enfoque aplicado al caso boliviano.

Fiscal Policy and Income Redistribution in Latin America: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom

Conventional wisdom states that fiscal policy redistributes little in Latin America. Lower tax revenues and, above all, lower and less progressive transfers have been identified as the main cause. Existing studies show that, while in Europe the distribution of all transfers combined (cash and in-kind) is egalitarian, the bulk of transfers in Latin America accrue to the upper quintile. Through an in-depth fiscal incidence analysis applied to Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and Peru we argue that conventional wisdom may be wrong. First, the extent and effectiveness of income redistribution and poverty reduction, revenue-collection, and spending patterns vary so significantly across countries that speaking of "Latin America" as a unity is misleading. The (after direct taxes and transfers) Gini, for example, declines by over 10 percent in Argentina but by only 2.4 percent in Bolivia. In Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia government revenues are close to 40 percent of GDP, whereas in Mexico and Peru they are around 20 percent. Social spending (excluding contributory pensions) as a share of GDP ranges from 17 percent in Brazil to 5.2 percent in Peru. Second, social spending does not accrue to the richest quintile. On the contrary, concentration coefficients for social spending are highly negative (progressive in absolute terms) for Argentina and slightly so for Bolivia and Mexico. In Brazil and Peru social spending is progressive in relative terms only. Third, there is no obvious correlation between the size of government and the size of social spending, on the one hand, and the extent and effectiveness of redistribution, on the other: government size is similar for Argentina and Bolivia but they are on opposite sides in terms of the extent of redistribution.Fourth, due to indirect taxes households are net payers to the "fisc" beginning in the third decile in Bolivia and Brazil; for Argentina, Mexico and Peru this happens in the fifth decile. Fifth, corrective measures differ too: in Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil they may involve the reduction in revenues and total spending, while revenues and social spending (especially direct transfers to the poor) should be increased in Mexico and Peru. Bolivia and Brazil need to introduce changes to their tax and transfer system so that net payers to the "fisc" start at higher incomes. All five countries need to improve the of progressivity of their spending, including non-social spending components.fiscal incidence, fiscal policy, inequality, poverty, redistribution, social policy, taxes, transfers, Latin America, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico and Peru

Bolivia and the paradoxes of democratic consolidation

In Bolivia from the 1990s on, two presidents were ousted by popular protests, and protests were rampant. The protests expressed a growing discontent not only with successive administrations and their policies but with politics itself. The polity failed to built trust in democracy, ignored or repressed protests, and thus contributed to a process of democratic "deconsolidation." The main factors were corruption and the reluctance of the traditional political parties to discuss the neoliberal economic model. As a result, the current administration of Evo Morales faces two challenges: to change economic policies and to repair the support for democracy

Jet energy measurement with the ATLAS detector in proton-proton collisions at root s=7 TeV

The jet energy scale and its systematic uncertainty are determined for jets measured with the ATLAS detector at the LHC in proton-proton collision data at a centre-of-mass energy of √s = 7TeV corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 38 pb-1. Jets are reconstructed with the anti-kt algorithm with distance parameters R=0. 4 or R=0. 6. Jet energy and angle corrections are determined from Monte Carlo simulations to calibrate jets with transverse momenta pT≥20 GeV and pseudorapidities {pipe}η{pipe}<4. 5. The jet energy systematic uncertainty is estimated using the single isolated hadron response measured in situ and in test-beams, exploiting the transverse momentum balance between central and forward jets in events with dijet topologies and studying systematic variations in Monte Carlo simulations. The jet energy uncertainty is less than 2. 5 % in the central calorimeter region ({pipe}η{pipe}<0. 8) for jets with 60≤pT<800 GeV, and is maximally 14 % for pT<30 GeV in the most forward region 3. 2≤{pipe}η{pipe}<4. 5. The jet energy is validated for jet transverse momenta up to 1 TeV to the level of a few percent using several in situ techniques by comparing a well-known reference such as the recoiling photon pT, the sum of the transverse momenta of tracks associated to the jet, or a system of low-pT jets recoiling against a high-pT jet. More sophisticated jet calibration schemes are presented based on calorimeter cell energy density weighting or hadronic properties of jets, aiming for an improved jet energy resolution and a reduced flavour dependence of the jet response. The systematic uncertainty of the jet energy determined from a combination of in situ techniques is consistent with the one derived from single hadron response measurements over a wide kinematic range. The nominal corrections and uncertainties are derived for isolated jets in an inclusive sample of high-pT jets. Special cases such as event topologies with close-by jets, or selections of samples with an enhanced content of jets originating from light quarks, heavy quarks or gluons are also discussed and the corresponding uncertainties are determined. © 2013 CERN for the benefit of the ATLAS collaboration

Measurement of the inclusive and dijet cross-sections of b-jets in pp collisions at sqrt(s) = 7 TeV with the ATLAS detector

The inclusive and dijet production cross-sections have been measured for jets containing b-hadrons (b-jets) in proton-proton collisions at a centre-of-mass energy of sqrt(s) = 7 TeV, using the ATLAS detector at the LHC. The measurements use data corresponding to an integrated luminosity of 34 pb^-1. The b-jets are identified using either a lifetime-based method, where secondary decay vertices of b-hadrons in jets are reconstructed using information from the tracking detectors, or a muon-based method where the presence of a muon is used to identify semileptonic decays of b-hadrons inside jets. The inclusive b-jet cross-section is measured as a function of transverse momentum in the range 20 < pT < 400 GeV and rapidity in the range |y| < 2.1. The bbbar-dijet cross-section is measured as a function of the dijet invariant mass in the range 110 < m_jj < 760 GeV, the azimuthal angle difference between the two jets and the angular variable chi in two dijet mass regions. The results are compared with next-to-leading-order QCD predictions. Good agreement is observed between the measured cross-sections and the predictions obtained using POWHEG + Pythia. MC@NLO + Herwig shows good agreement with the measured bbbar-dijet cross-section. However, it does not reproduce the measured inclusive cross-section well, particularly for central b-jets with large transverse momenta.Comment: 10 pages plus author list (21 pages total), 8 figures, 1 table, final version published in European Physical Journal