Effects of Emotion on Memory Specificity in Young and Older Adults

To examine how emotional content affects the amount of visual detail remembered, we had young and older adults study neutral, negative, and positive objects. At retrieval, they distinguished same (identical) from similar (same verbal label, different visual details) and new (nonstudied) objects. A same response to a same item indicated memory for visual details (specific recognition), whereas a same or similar response to a same or similar item signified memory for the general sort of object (general recognition). Both age groups showed enhanced specific recognition for negative (not positive) objects. Young adults' general recognition advantage also was restricted to negative objects, whereas older adults showed enhanced general recognition for positive and negative objects. Negative (not positive) content enhanced the visual specificity of memory in both ages, but positive content conferred a general memory advantage only for older adults.Psycholog

How Negative Emotion Enhances the Visual Specificity of a Memory

Some studies have suggested that emotion primarily increases memory for “gist,” and does not enhance memory for detail. There are, however, some instances in which negative objects (e.g., snake, grenade) are remembered with more visual detail than neutral objects (e.g., barometer, blender). In the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we examined the encoding processes that lead a person to remember the exact visual details of negative and neutral objects, and to remember which of two decisions were made about the objects (a size decision or an animacy decision). The enhancement in memory for a negative item's visual details appeared to result from enhanced visual processing: The right fusiform gyrus, a region known to be critical for processing exemplar-specific details, showed a greater extent and magnitude of activity during the successful encoding of negative objects. Activity in the right amygdala also corresponded with memory for visual detail, although it did not relate to memory for the task performed with the item. These data provide strong evidence that engagement of some amygdalar regions can correspond with enhanced memory for certain types of details, but does not ensure successful encoding of all contextual details.Psycholog

Disowned recollections:denying true experiences undermines belief in occurrence but not judgments of remembering

Recent research findings have illustrated that false memories induced in the laboratory can be dissociated from the beliefs that the events had in fact occurred. In this study we assessed whether this dissociability is a quality peculiar to false memory, or whether it represents a general characteristic of autobiographical memory. To this end we examined whether people can be induced to stop believing in memories for true experiences. Participants observed and performed simple actions, and were later falsely informed that they had not performed some of them-that false memories for these actions had been implanted through the use of fabricated evidence. Before and after receiving this misinformation, participants rated their belief in and memory of performing those actions, other actions that they had also performed, and actions that they had not performed. Whereas the misinformation substantially undermined participants' beliefs in the specific performed actions about which they had been misinformed, it had little effect on their endorsement of remembering those actions. The misinformation thus boosted the proportion of occasions in which participants rated their memories as stronger than their beliefs, and it weakened the correlation between belief and memory ratings. Thus, this study provides the first experimental demonstration of non-believed memories of true experiences. We discuss our findings with reference to the small literature concerning the use of socially-communicated misinformation to undermine event memories, and with reference to the structure of autobiographical memory

Neural Correlates of True Memory, False Memory, and Deception

We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to determine whether neural activity can differentiate between true memory, false memory, and deception. Subjects heard a series of semantically related words and were later asked to make a recognition judgment of old words, semantically related nonstudied words (lures for false recognition), and unrelated new words. They were also asked to make a deceptive response to half of the old and unrelated new words. There were 3 main findings. First, consistent with the notion that executive function supports deception, 2 types of deception (pretending to know and pretending not to know) recruited prefrontal activity. Second, consistent with the sensory reactivation hypothesis, the difference between true recognition and false recognition was found in the left temporoparietal regions probably engaged in the encoding of auditorily presented words. Third, the left prefrontal cortex was activated during pretending to know relative to correct rejection and false recognition, whereas the right anterior hippocampus was activated during false recognition relative to correct rejection and pretending to know. These findings indicate that fMRI can detect the difference in brain activity between deception and false memory despite the fact that subjects respond with “I know” to novel events in both processes

Cultural influences on memory

Provided for non-commercial research and educational use only. Not for reproduction, distribution or commercial use. This chapter was originally published in the book Progress in Brain Research, published by Elsevier, and the attached copy is provided by Elsevier for the author’s benefi t and for the benefi t of the author’s institution, for non-commercial research and educational use including without limitation use in instruction at your institution, sending it to specifi c colleagues who know you, and providing a copy to your institution’s administrator. All other uses, reproduction and distribution, including without limitation commercial reprints, selling or licensing copies or access, or posting on open internet sites, your personal or institution’s website or repository, are prohibited. For exceptions, permission may be sought for such use through Elsevier’s permissions site at

The neural correlates of conceptual and perceptual false recognition

False recognition, broadly defined as a claim to remember something that was not encountered previously, can arise for multiple reasons. For instance, a distinction can be made between conceptual false recognition (i.e., false alarms resulting from semantic or associative similarities between studied and tested items) and perceptual false recognition (i.e., false alarms resulting from physical similarities between studied and tested items). Although false recognition has been associated with frontal cortex activity, it is unclear whether this frontal activity can be modulated by the precise relationship between studied and falsely remembered items. We used event-related fMRI to examine the neural basis of conceptual compared with perceptual false recognition. Results revealed preferential activity in multiple frontal cortex regions during conceptual false recognition, which likely reflected increased semantic processing during conceptual (but not perceptual) memory errors. These results extend recent reports that different types of false recognition can rely on dissociable neural substrates, and they indicate that the frontal activity that is often observed during false compared with true recognition can be modulated by the relationship between studied and tested items

The effects of emotional content on reality-monitoring performance in young and older adults.

Reality monitoring refers to a person’s ability to distinguish between perceived and imagined events. Prior research has demonstrated that young adults show a reality-monitoring advantage for negative arousing information as compared with neutral information. The present research examined whether this reality-monitoring benefit extends to positive information in young adults and whether older adults show a reality-monitoring advantage for emotional information of either valence. Two studies revealed no evidence for a reality-monitoring advantage for positive information; in both age groups, the reality-monitoring advantage existed only for negative information. Older adults were, however, more likely to remember that a positive item had been included on a study list than they were to remember that a nonemotional item had been studied. Young adults did not show this mnemonic enhancement for positive information. These results indicate that although older adults may show some mnemonic benefits for positive information (i.e., an enhanced ability to remember that a positive item was studied), they do not always show enhanced memory for source-specifying details of a positive item’s presentation