Historical Legacy of Jesuits in China

In lieu of an abstract, below is the essay\u27s first paragraph. What is the meaning today of the missionary activities of the Society of Jesus in China? The attempt by members of the Society of Jesus to convert Chinese to Christianity from the late-16th to early-18th centuries was part of the Catholic Reformation’s missionary expansion around the world. Was the Jesuit mission also part and parcel of an expansionist Western imperialism, or did it rather reflect a humanistic universalism?2 Obviously, there are some aspects of both, but on balance, the conversion of Chinese in this era is stronger evidence of the universal appeal of the Christian message

Why factors facilitating collusion may not predict cartel occurrence — experimental evidence

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in this recordFactors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: When a factor predicts that collusion (explicit and tacit) becomes easier, firms might be less inclined to set up a cartel simply because tacit coordination already tends to go in hand with supra‐competitive profits. We illustrate this issue with laboratory data. We run n‐firm Cournot experiments with written cheap‐talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to talk. We conduct this comparison for two, four, and six firms. We find that two firms indeed find it easier to collude tacitly but that the number of firms does not significantly affect outcomes with communication. As a result, the payoff gain from communication increases with the number of firms, at a decreasing rate

Institutional Authority and Collusion

A 'collusion puzzle' exists by which, even though increasing the number of firms reduces the ability to tacitly collude, and leads to a collapse in collusion in experimental markets with three or more firms, in natural markets there are such numbers of firms colluding successfully. We present an experiment showing that, if managers are deferential towards an authority, firms can induce more collusion by delegating production decisions to middle managers and providing suitable informal nudges. This holds not only with two but also with four firms. We are also able to distinguish compliance effects from coordination effects

Explicit vs. tacit collusion: the impact of communication in oligopoly experiments

publication-status: Acceptedtypes: ArticlePre-print draft published as working paper by Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE). NOTICE: this is the author’s version of a work that was accepted for publication in European Economic Review. Changes resulting from the publishing process, such as peer review, editing, corrections, structural formatting, and other quality control mechanisms may not be reflected in this document. Changes may have been made to this work since it was submitted for publication. A definitive version was subsequently published in European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), 2012, DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.09.002We explore the difference between explicit and tacit collusion by investigating the impact communication has in experimental markets. For Bertrand oligopolies with various numbers of firms, we compare pricing behavior with and without the possibility to communicate among firms. We find strong evidence that talking helps to obtain higher pro fits for any number of firms, however, the gain from communicating is nonmonotonic in the number of firms, with medium-sized industries having the largest additional profi t from talking. We also find that industries continue to collude successfully after communication is disabled. Communication supports firms in coordinating on collusive pricing schemes, and it is also used for conflict mediation.Financial support from Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) is gratefully acknowledge

Instructions

A survey of instruction delivery and reinforcement methods in recent laboratory experiments reveals a wide and inconsistently reported variety of practices and limited research evaluating their effectiveness. Thus, we experimentally compare how methods of delivering and reinforcing experiment instructions impact subjects’ comprehension and retention of payoff-relevant information. We report a one-shot individual decision task in which non-money-maximizing behavior can be unambiguously identified and find that such behavior is prevalent in our baseline treatment which uses plain, but relatively standard experimental instructions. We find combinations of reinforcement methods that can eliminate half of non-money-maximizing behavior, and we find that we can induce a similar reduction via enhancements to the content of instructions. Residual non-money-maximizing behavior suggests that this may be an important source of noise in experimental studies