"Esau I Hated: Levinas on the Ethics of God's Absence

Emmanuel Levinas objects to traditional theodicy. But his objection to theodicy is so untraditional that God’s existence is incidental to it. The primary problem with theodicy, he argues, is not evidential but ethical. The primary problem with theodicy is not that its claims are false, but that its claims are offensive. In laying out Levinas's unusual view, I first sketch out the specifically ethical nature of theodicy’s offense: failing to acknowledge suffering. Next I discuss Levinas unusual account of this suffering, which theodicy fails to acknowledge. I then show how Levinas’ accusation against traditional theodicy does not hinge upon positive claims for the existence of God. I show how Levinas’ ethical objection to theodicy serves equally well as an objection to the negative existence claims of atheism. For atheism, too, has an overlooked “atheodicy” which fails to acknowledge suffering, and so may similarly offend. I then shift from the theoretical to the practical. I treat the insights gained regarding theodicy and its offenses not as ideas considered but as a strategy lived. I offer a profile of the biblical figure of Esau, whose remarkable reaction to God’s malicious absence involved no consolation, sense of grievance, or resentment of his brother Jacob, God’s beloved. I conclude that the brothers’ eventual rapprochement demonstrates a deep spiritual affinity between atheist and theist. Both live out their lives under "a gospel not to be preached". And the end of such preaching suggests a way forward in our own God-centered disputes

The Economics of Energy Efficiency in Buildings

At the 2008 summit in Hokkaido, Japan, and again this summer in L'Aquila, Italy, G-8 leaders called for a 50 percent reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 in order to avert the most serious dangers from global climate change. Improving the energy efficiency of buildings is essential: The International Energy Agency (IEA) has estimated that meeting the G-8's emission-reductions goal will require reducing annual GHG emissions from the building sector by 8.2 billion tons by 2050 below business as usual. While previous studies have shown that the cost of emissions abatement in the buildings sector is cheaper than in many other sectors, few studies have attempted to model what policies will be required to reduce building-sector emissions in line with the IEA's calculations. Trevor Houser, expanding on his earlier PIIE policy brief, uses the World Business Council for Sustainable Development's (WBCSD) model to study the economics of improving building-sector energy efficiency. Houser agrees with previous studies that the GHG abatement costs of improved building efficiency are cheaper than the abatement costs in other sectors (though more expensive than previous studies suggest), but he finds significant barriers to investments in energy efficiency. A carbon price alone--a key part of any successful climate policy--will not be enough to overcome these barriers, and complementary measures, such as improved financing approaches and enhanced standards and codes for building energy efficiency, will be needed to incentivize long-term building-sector investments and to meet the emission-reductions goals outlined by the IEA. Failure to enact such policies, and thus to take advantage of lower cost GHG abatement opportunities in the building sector, will force greater emission reductions in other sectors and will carry a much higher price tag.

A Role for the G-20 in Addressing Climate Change?

Following the chaotic Copenhagen conference of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), policymakers and pundits have discussed the G-20 as an alternative forum for advancing climate change diplomacy. This paper assesses the risks and rewards of tackling climate change in the G-20 and finds that despite its seeming attractiveness, the G-20, as structured, is not a suitable replacement for the UN-led process and has limited ability, at present, to advance climate change negotiations. There is much, however, that the G-20 can do to contribute to the goals of the climate negotiations outside of wading into the negotiations themselves. Building on its existing agenda the G-20 has the power to significantly reduce global greenhouse gas emissions, accelerate the deployment of clean energy technology, and help vulnerable countries adapt to a warmer world through the mobilization of public and private finance. Following through on the existing G-20 pledge to phase out and rationalize inefficient fossil fuel subsidies, establishing new green guidelines for multilateral development banks, coordinating green stimulus exit strategies, promoting open markets for environmental goods and services, and rebalancing global economic growth all fall well within the G-20's mandate and help meet the climate challenge.climate change, carbon, climate finance, UNFCCC, G20, green stimulus, macroeconomic imbalances, environmental goods and services, multilateral development banks, climate finance, fossil fuel subsidies

Energy Efficiency in Buildings: A Global Economic Perspective

At the 2008 summit in Hokkaido, Japan, G-8 leaders called for a 50 percent reduction in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050 in order to avert the most serious dangers from climate change. An essential component of meeting this goal will be improving the energy efficiency of buildings, which has been heralded by some studies as the most cost-effective way of reducing GHG emissions. Until now, however, few studies have attempted to assess the cost of completely overhauling the building sector in order to meet this emission-reduction goal. Using a newly developed model from the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) [pdf], Trevor Houser studies the economics of improving building-sector energy efficiency. While improving the energy efficiency of the building sector would be more expensive than some studies have suggested, Houser finds that the GHG abatement costs of improved building efficiency are cheaper than the abatement costs in other sectors. However, significant barriers to investments in energy efficiency will make it difficult to take advantage of these lower abatement costs, even if a relatively high price for carbon is established. New financing approaches, improved building standards, government investment, and enhanced awareness of the energy cost savings from increased efficiency are all needed to reduce emissions from the building sector and thus to assist in meeting the 50 percent reduction target.

Copenhagen, the Accord, and the Way Forward

Policymakers and the public had high expectations for the UN climate change summit in Copenhagen last December. Since the international community embarked on a new round of negotiations in Bali in 2007, elections in the United States, Australia, and Japan raised developed countries' climate change ambitions and a number of emerging economies--including China, India, and Brazil--announced their first ever nationwide climate change targets. Yet while political will to tackle climate change appeared to be building, international climate change negotiations were failing to deliver. The UN process launched in Bali struggled for two years to reach agreement on even the most basic issues between the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). These two trends collided in Copenhagen, when ministers and heads of state arrived to find a negotiation process in disarray and no consensus text on the table. An eleventh-hour diplomatic flurry by leaders of a diverse and representative set of countries produced a political accord addressing the core issues of the negotiations. While attracting broad support among the 192 Parties to the UNFCCC, the accord did not receive unanimous approval. Instead, the UN "took note" of the agreement. This policy brief assesses the two-week conference, evaluates the Copenhagen Accord that resulted, and discusses key issues the international community will face moving forward. Author Trevor Houser argues that despite the chaos in Copenhagen, the accord is a significant step in addressing global climate change. The chaos in Copenhagen presents the international community with a unique opportunity to go back to first principles and craft a more suitable and sustainable long-term approach to this challenge. Houser calls for combining the UN process aimed at producing a legally binding agreement with a small-group process that would start work immediately on a politically binding basis--an approach that would prevent near-term substantive action from being held hostage to disagreements over legal form while demonstrating that meaningful international cooperation is possible and thus building support for a future treaty.

From Models to Experiments

In this paper we discuss James Buchanan’s contribution in the narrow domain of understanding committee voting under majority rule. We then go on to discuss Charles Plott’s seminal experimental work on the topic that sparked a wave of public choice experimental work. However, given Plott’s claims that Buchanan influenced him significantly, it is puzzling that his work with Morris Fiorina explores a question outside of those which Buchanan and Tullock found interesting. We suggest several ways to resolve this tension. Our chapter concludes by discussing a lacuna in the experimental public choice literature in which Buchanan was particularly interested—logrolling, or vote trading

Why Trust Out-groups? The Role of Punishment Under Uncertainty

We conducted a hidden-effort trust game, in which we assigned subjects to one of two groups. The groups, which were formed through two different group formation processes, included a “social” group that required sharing and exchange among its members, and a “non-social” group that did not. Once assigned, subjects participated in the game with members from both groups, either with or without the opportunity to punish a trustee who may have defected on them. We found that for investors in the non-social group, the opportunity to punish a trustee worked to promote trust, but only when the trustee was a member of the other group. For the social group, the opportunity to punish had no effect on the investors’ trust decisions, regardless of the trustee\u27s group. We provide a theoretical framework to explain this asymmetric effect of punishment on trust. Our results suggest that groups with identities founded in sharing and exchange—a feature of globalized societies—may find it less necessary to engage in costly punishment. As a result, they may enjoy gains in economic efficiency

America’s Energy Security Options

As US gasoline prices approached $4 a gallon in spring 2011, energy security moved to the forefront of the American political debate. Politicians have been quick to offer silver bullet solutions to lower gas prices and make America more energy secure. Houser and Mohan analyze the various recent policy proposals, from expanded offshore drilling to new vehicle efficiency standards, and compare their effects on US oil imports, US oil demand, gasoline prices, and energy expenditures over the 2011–2035 period. They find that despite recent political rhetoric, when it comes to energy security there is no policy panacea. Current proposals vary widely in the time frame, magnitude, and nature of their impact. Rather than debate whether expanded domestic production, improved efficiency, or development of oil alternatives is the right course to take, the United States needs to start moving down all three roads simultaneously to significantly alter the country’s energy trajectory. An "all of the above" strategy is required, which combines increased domestic production (important in the near term) with long-term investments in energy-efficient vehicles and oil alternatives, whether electric, natural gas, or biofuels. A carbon tax, while still a long shot politically, would deliver further energy security gains and help reduce the US deficit in the process. But even if all proposals currently on the table are adopted, the US will remain dependent on the international oil market for decades to come. Therefore Washington needs a strategy for improving the stability and reliability of that market, something missing from the current policy debate.

Time preference and decision rules in a price search experiment

Structural econometric methods that assume agents have rational expectations are often criticized. Yet, little is known about the relative costs and benefits of adopting alternative empirical strategies. This paper compares three procedures for inference about a single structural parameter using data from a laboratory price search experiment. Our novel experimental design induces preferences up to the subjective rate of time preference, leaving unrestricted only this parameter and the decision rule that subjects use in solving the search task. We analyze the experimental data under the assumptions of both rational expectations and heuristic behavior, and we also draw inferences using a simple revealed preference analysis that does not require strong behavioral assumptions. We find that the revealed-preference analysis does not provide much information about the discount rate, while the two specifications with stronger behavioral assumptions provide sharper and statistically identical inferences about the population's discount rate distribution. However, substantial differences in inference appear at the individual level. We compare the individual discount-rate estimates to an external measure of forward looking behavior obtained for each subject using an instrument validated in the psychology literature. The estimates obtained under heuristic behavior are statistically significantly positively correlated with our external measure of time preference, while the estimates obtained under rational expectations and the revealed-preference estimates are not.