Об этике коммуникаций и этике ответственности

В данной статье на основе пяти принципов этики коммуникаций, выявленных американскими учеными, устанавливаются точки пересечения между основными принципами коммуникации и этикой ответственности субъекта. Осуществлен анализ понятия "этика коммуникаций" и выявлены особенности трансформации данного понятия в современных коммуникативных процессах. Подчеркивается, что ключевой фигурой в глобальности коммуникаций становится человек, создающий значения, определяющий многообразие форм знака в современном коммуникативном пространстве. Сделан вывод о том, что именно такой человек является связующим звеном между человеческими ценностями и основными принципами этики коммуникаций, что создает условия для развития ключевых положений этики ответственности

End-to-end verifiable elections in the standard model

We present the cryptographic implementation of “DEMOS”, a new e-voting system that is end-to-end verifiable in the standard model, i.e., without any additional “setup” assumption or access to a random oracle (RO). Previously known end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems required such additional assumptions (specifically, either the existence of a “randomness beacon” or were only shown secure in the RO model). In order to analyze our scheme, we also provide a modeling of end-to-end verifiability as well as privacy and receipt-freeness that encompasses previous definitions in the form of two concise attack games. Our scheme satisfies end-to-end verifiability information theoretically in the standard model and privacy/receipt-freeness under a computational assumption (subexponential Decisional Diffie Helman). In our construction, we utilize a number of techniques used for the first time in the context of e-voting schemes that include utilizing randomness from bit-fixing sources, zero-knowledge proofs with imperfect verifier randomness and complexity leveraging

Public Evidence from Secret Ballots

Elections seem simple---aren't they just counting? But they have a unique, challenging combination of security and privacy requirements. The stakes are high; the context is adversarial; the electorate needs to be convinced that the results are correct; and the secrecy of the ballot must be ensured. And they have practical constraints: time is of the essence, and voting systems need to be affordable and maintainable, and usable by voters, election officials, and pollworkers. It is thus not surprising that voting is a rich research area spanning theory, applied cryptography, practical systems analysis, usable security, and statistics. Election integrity involves two key concepts: convincing evidence that outcomes are correct and privacy, which amounts to convincing assurance that there is no evidence about how any given person voted. These are obviously in tension. We examine how current systems walk this tightrope.Comment: To appear in E-Vote-Id '1

Analysis of the IBM CCA Security API Protocols in Maude-NPA

Standards for cryptographic protocols have long been attractive candidates for formal verification. It is important that such standards be correct, and cryptographic protocols are tricky to design and subject to non-intuitive attacks even when the underlying cryptosystems are secure. Thus a number of general-purpose cryptographic protocol analysis tools have been developed and applied to protocol standards. However, there is one class of standards, security application programming interfaces (security APIs), to which few of these tools have been applied. Instead, most work has concentrated on developing special-purpose tools and algorithms for specific classes of security APIs. However, there can be much advantage gained from having general-purpose tools that could be applied to a wide class of problems, including security APIs. One particular class of APIs that has proven difficult to analyze using general-purpose tools is that involving exclusive-or. In this paper we analyze the IBM 4758 Common Cryptographic Architecture (CCA) protocol using an advanced automated protocol verification tool with full exclusive-or capabilities, the Maude-NPA tool. This is the first time that API protocols have been satisfactorily specified and analyzed in the Maude-NPA, and the first time XOR-based APIs have been specified and analyzed using a general-purpose unbounded session cryptographic protocol verification tool that provides direct support for AC theories. We describe our results and indicate what further research needs to be done to make such protocol analysis generally effective.Antonio González-Burgueño, Sonia Santiago and Santiago Escobar have been partially supported by the EU (FEDER) and the Spanish MINECO under grants TIN 2010-21062-C02-02 and TIN 2013-45732-C4-1-P, and by Generalitat Valenciana PROMETEO2011/052. José Meseguer has been partially supported by NSF Grant CNS 13-10109.González Burgueño, A.; Santiago Pinazo, S.; Escobar Román, S.; Meadows, C.; Meseguer, J. (2014). Analysis of the IBM CCA Security API Protocols in Maude-NPA. En Security Standardisation Research. Springer International Publishing. 111-130. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-14054-4_8S111130Abadi, M., Blanchet, B., Fournet, C.: Just fast keying in the pi calculus. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 10(3) (2007)Blanchet, B.: An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules. In: 14th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW 2014), Cape Breton, Nova Scotia, Canada, June 2001, pp. 82–96. IEEE Computer Society (2014)Bond, M.: Attacks on cryptoprocessor transaction sets. In: Koç, Ç.K., Naccache, D., Paar, C. (eds.) CHES 2001. LNCS, vol. 2162, pp. 220–234. Springer, Heidelberg (2001)Butler, F., Cervesato, I., Jaggard, A.D., Scedrov, A.: A formal analysis of some properties of kerberos 5 using msr. In: CSFW, pp. 175–1790. IEEE Computer Society (2002)Cachin, C., Chandran, N.: A secure cryptographic token interface. In: Proceedings of the 22nd IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium, CSF 2009, Port Jefferson, New York, USA, July 8-10, pp. 141–153 (2009)Chevalier, Y., Küsters, R., Rusinowitch, M., Turuani, M.: An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity with XOR. In: 18th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, LICS 2003 (2003)Comon-Lundh, H., Shmatikov, V.: Intruder deductions, constraint solving and insecurity decision in presence of exclusive-or. In: 18th Annual IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LICS 2003), pp. 271–280 (2003)Comon-Lundh, H., Cortier, V.: New decidability results for fragments of first-order logic and application to cryptographic protocols. In: Nieuwenhuis, R. (ed.) RTA 2003. LNCS, vol. 2706, pp. 148–164. Springer, Heidelberg (2003)Cortier, V., Keighren, G., Steel, G.: Automatic analysis of the aecurity of XOR-based key management schemes. In: Grumberg, O., Huth, M. (eds.) TACAS 2007. LNCS, vol. 4424, pp. 538–552. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)Cortier, V., Steel, G.: A generic security API for symmetric key management on cryptographic devices. In: Backes, M., Ning, P. (eds.) ESORICS 2009. LNCS, vol. 5789, pp. 605–620. Springer, Heidelberg (2009)Erbatur, S., et al.: Effective Symbolic Protocol Analysis via Equational Irreducibility Conditions. In: Foresti, S., Yung, M., Martinelli, F. (eds.) ESORICS 2012. LNCS, vol. 7459, pp. 73–90. Springer, Heidelberg (2012)Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J.: Maude-NPA: Cryptographic Protocol Analysis Modulo Equational Properties. In: Aldini, A., Barthe, G., Gorrieri, R. (eds.) FOSAD 2007/2008/2009. LNCS, vol. 5705, pp. 1–50. Springer, Heidelberg (2007)Escobar, S., Meadows, C., Meseguer, J., Santiago, S.: Sequential Protocol Composition in Maude-NPA. In: Gritzalis, D., Preneel, B., Theoharidou, M. (eds.) ESORICS 2010. LNCS, vol. 6345, pp. 303–318. Springer, Heidelberg (2010)Thayer Fabrega, F.J., Herzog, J., Guttman, J.: Strand Spaces: What Makes a Security Protocol Correct? Journal of Computer Security 7, 191–230 (1999)González-Burgueño, A.: Protocol Analysis Modulo Exclusive-Or Theories: A Case study in Maude-NPA. Master’s thesis, Universitat Politècnica de València (March 2014), https://angonbur.webs.upv.es/Previous_work/Master_Thesis.pdfIBM. Comment on Mike’s Bond paper A Chosen Key Difference Attack on Control Vectors (2001), http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~mkb23/research/CVDif-Response.pdfIBM. CCA basic services reference and guide: CCA basic services reference and guide for the IBM 4758 PCI and IBM 4764 (2001), http://www-03.ibm.com/security/cryptocards/pdfs/bs327.pdf.2008Keighren, G.: Model Checking IBM’s Common Cryptographic Architecture API. 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Brain tumour diagnostics using a DNA methylation-based classifier as a diagnostic support tool

Aims: Methylation profiling (MP) is increasingly incorporated in the diagnostic process of central nervous system (CNS) tumours at our centres in The Netherlands and Scandinavia. We aimed to identify the benefits and challenges of MP as a support tool for CNS tumour diagnostics. Methods: About 502 CNS tumour samples were analysed using (850 k) MP. Profiles were matched with the DKFZ/Heidelberg CNS Tumour Classifier. For each case, the final pathological diagnosis was compared to the diagnosis before MP. Results: In 54.4% (273/502) of all analysed cases, the suggested methylation class (calibrated score ≥0.9) corresponded with the initial pathological diagnosis. The diagnosis of 24.5% of these cases (67/273) was more refined after incorporation of the MP result. In 9.8% of cases (49/502), the MP result led to a new diagnosis, resulting in an altered WHO grade in 71.4% of these cases (35/49). In 1% of cases (5/502), the suggested class based on MP was initially disregarded/interpreted as misleading, but in retrospect, the MP result predicted the right diagnosis for three of these cases. In six cases, the suggested class was interpreted as ‘discrepant but noncontributory’. The remaining 33.7% of cases (169/502) had a calibrated score <0.9, including 7.8% (39/502) for which no class indication was given at all (calibrated score <0.3). Conclusions: MP is a powerful tool to confirm and fine-tune the pathological diagnosis of CNS tumours, and to avoid misdiagnoses. However, it is crucial to interpret the results in the context of clinical, radiological, histopathological and other molecular information

SCALA: In situ calibration for integral field spectrographs

International audienceThe scientific yield of current and future optical surveys is increasingly limited by systematic uncertainties in the flux calibration. This is the case for Type Ia supernova (SN Ia) cosmology programs, where an improved calibration directly translates into improved cosmological constraints. Current methodology rests on models of stars. Here we aim to obtain flux calibration that is traceable to state-of-the-art detector-based calibration. We present the SNIFS Calibration Apparatus (SCALA), a color (relative) flux calibration system developed for the SuperNova Integral Field Spectrograph (SNIFS), operating at the University of Hawaii 2.2 m (UH 88) telescope. By comparing the color trend of the illumination generated by SCALA during two commissioning runs, and to previous laboratory measurements, we show that we can determine the light emitted by SCALA with a long-term repeatability better than 1%. We describe the calibration procedure necessary to control for system aging. We present measurements of the SNIFS throughput as estimated by SCALA observations. The SCALA calibration unit is now fully deployed at the UH\,88 telescope, and with it color-calibration between 4000 {\AA} and 9000 {\AA} is stable at the percent level over a one-year baseline

Synchronous Constructive Cryptography

This paper proposes a simple synchronous composable security framework as an instantiation of the Constructive Cryptography framework, aiming to capture minimally, without unnecessary artefacts, exactly what is needed to state synchronous security guarantees. The objects of study are specifications (i.e., sets) of systems, and traditional security properties like consistency and validity can naturally be understood as specifications, thus unifying composable and property-based definitions. The framework\u27s simplicity is in contrast to current composable frameworks for synchronous computation which are built on top of an asynchronous framework (e.g. the UC framework), thus not only inheriting artefacts and complex features used to handle asynchronous communication, but adding additional overhead to capture synchronous communication. As a second, independent contribution we demonstrate how secure (synchronous) multi-party computation protocols can be understood as constructing a computer that allows a set of parties to perform an arbitrary, on-going computation. An interesting aspect is that the instructions of the computation need not be fixed before the protocol starts but can also be determined during an on-going computation, possibly depending on previous outputs

Insulin Glargine in the Intensive Care Unit: A Model-Based Clinical Trial Design

Online 4 Oct 2012Introduction: Current succesful AGC (Accurate Glycemic Control) protocols require extra clinical effort and are impractical in less acute wards where patients are still susceptible to stress-induced hyperglycemia. Long-acting insulin Glargine has the potential to be used in a low effort controller. However, potential variability in efficacy and length of action, prevent direct in-hospital use in an AGC framework for less acute wards. Method: Clinically validated virtual trials based on data from stable ICU patients from the SPRINT cohort who would be transferred to such an approach are used to develop a 24-hour AGC protocol robust to different Glargine potencies (1.0x, 1.5x and 2.0x regular insulin) and initial dose sizes (dose = total insulin over prior 12, 18 and 24 hours). Glycemic control in this period is provided only by varying nutritional inputs. Performance is assessed as %BG in the 4.0-8.0mmol/L band and safety by %BG<4.0mmol/L. Results: The final protocol consisted of Glargine bolus size equal to insulin over the previous 18 hours. Compared to SPRINT there was a 6.9% - 9.5% absolute decrease in mild hypoglycemia (%BG<4.0mmol/L) and up to a 6.2% increase in %BG between 4.0 and 8.0mmol/L. When the efficacy is known (1.5x assumed) there were reductions of: 27% BG measurements, 59% insulin boluses, 67% nutrition changes, and 6.3% absolute in mild hypoglycemia. Conclusion: A robust 24-48 clinical trial has been designed to safely investigate the efficacy and kinetics of Glargine as a first step towards developing a Glargine-based protocol for less acute wards. Ensuring robustness to variability in Glargine efficacy significantly affects the performance and safety that can be obtained